Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial -- i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial -- i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.Allocation mechanisms, Public goods, Strategy-proofness, Dictatorship, Efficiency

On the Private Provision of Public Goods: A Diagrammatic Exposition

This paper surveys a selection of the literature on the private provision of public goods using the Kolm triangle. (The Kolm triangle is the analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good.) We provide simple geometrical proofs of various established results using this graphical device. Our reference framework is the model of private contributions to public goods developed by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). With the Kolm triangle, we can easily study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, the effects of redistribution of the initial wealth, the level of provision in Stackelberg equilibria, the effects of subsidizing private contributions, and the implementation of Lindahl equilibria.Public Goods, Nash Equilibrium, Stackelberg Equilibrium, Lindahl Equilibrium, Kolm triangle, Redistribution, Subsidies, Regressive Redistribution of Income

When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency

Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact of such inefficient household decisions on market performance is investigated. At one extreme, market efficiency can occur even when household decisions are inefficient, namely when household inefficiencies are merely due to inefficient net trades with the market. At the other extreme, market efficiency is bound to fail, if household inefficiencies are solely caused by an inefficient distribution of a household's aggregate consumption to its individual members. This leads us to consider competitive forces as a disciplinary device for households. When households compete for both resources and members then household stability requires efficient or not too inefficient internal distribution.Allocative efficiency, General equilibrium, Household behavior

When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency.

Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact of such inefficient household decisions on market performance is investigated. At one extreme, market efficiency can occur even when household decisions are inefficient, namely when household inefficiencies are merely due to inefficient net trades with the market. At the other extreme, market efficiency is bound to fail, if household inefficiencies are solely caused by an inefficient distribution of a household's aggregate consumption to its individual members. This leads us to consider competitive forces as a disciplinary device for households. When households compete for both resources and members then household stability requires efficient or not too inefficient internal distribution.

Club Theory and Household Formation

The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi- member households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists of the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among house- holds where no group of consumers can benefit from forming a new household and valuation equilibria prove equivalent in the absence of consumption externalities, but not in their presence.Household Behavior, Household Formation, General Equilibrium, Clubs

Trading Volumes in Dynamically Efficient Markets

The classic Lucas asset pricing model with complete markets stresses aggregate risk and, hence, fails to investigate the impact of agents heterogeneity on the dynamics of the equilibrium quantities and measures of trading volume. In this paper, we investigate under what conditions non-informational heterogeneity, i.e. differences in preferences and endowments, leads to non trivial trading volume in equilibrium. Our main result comes in form of a non-informational no trade theorem which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for zero trading volume in a dynamically efficient, continuous time Lucas market model with multiple goods and securities.General Equilibrium, Trading Volume; heterogenous agents; multiple goods; incomplete markets; no-trade theorem.

The Economics of Regional Poverty-Environment Programs: An Application for Lao People's Democratic Republic

Program administrators are often faced with the difficult problem of allocating scarce resources among regions in a country when interventions are aimed at addressing multiple objectives. One main concern is the tradeoff between poverty reduction and improvement of environmental quality. To provide a framework for analysis, the authors develop a model of optimal budget allocation that allows for variations in three factors: administrators'valuation of objectives; their willingness to accept tradeoffs among objectives and regional allotments; and regional administrative costs. The results from an application of this model using information for Lao People's Democratic Republic show that simple poverty indicators alone do not provide consistent guidelines for policy. However, when different poverty indicators are embedded in an optimizing model that incorporates preferences and costs, the resulting provincial allocations are very similar. This suggests that adoption of a formal analytical approach to resource allocation can help promote the harmonization of regional policy guidelines.Poverty Reduction Strategies,Public Health Promotion,Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Environmental Economics&Policies,Poverty Assessment,Poverty Reduction Strategies,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Health Economics&Finance

Optimal Financial Markets Liberalization

This paper examines the optimal financial markets liberalization policy for a large country in a two-country general equilibrium production economy. In our model, household's portfolio choice is modeled separately from firm's investment decision and financial markets play an important role in the allocation of capital between production technologies. We find that the type of production technology, specifically whether it exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital, is an important factor in evaluating the welfare gains from financial markets liberalization, and hence the optimal financial structure for a country. As financial markets become liberalized, there is gain from efficient capital allocation as a result of improved sharing risk sharing. On the other hand, a less wealthy country will not be able to gain by borrowing at a lower risk-free rate and reinvesting in a more productive risky technology when financial markets are completely liberalized. When production technologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale, the gain from efficient capital allocation as a result of financial markets liberalization dominates the opportunity cost of higher borrowing rate for the less wealthy country. Consequently, complete financial markets liberalization is more likely to be optimal when production technologies exhibit decreasing returns to capital.