Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions

Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness

Some Reflections about Wittgenstein´s Bezugssystem

Only a few months before his death, Wittgenstein invited us to imagine "that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid�; nevertheless he warned "this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid� (OC 96). Those hardened propositions provide a certainty which is "like a mighty force whose point of application does not move, and so no work is accomplished by it� (Z 402). There are many things that seem to be fixed, things which are removed from the traffic: they are "so to speak shunted onto an unused siding� (OC 210). Those things just give "our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form� (OC 211). Maybe they were once disputed; but perhaps, for unthinkable ages, they have belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts

Comprehension, Demonstration, and Accuracy in Aristotle

according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge of all scientific propositions were..

Physical Logic

In R.D. Sorkin's framework for logic in physics a clear separation is made between the collection of unasserted propositions about the physical world and the affirmation or denial of these propositions by the physical world. The unasserted propositions form a Boolean algebra because they correspond to subsets of an underlying set of spacetime histories. Physical rules of inference, apply not to the propositions in themselves but to the affirmation and denial of these propositions by the actual world. This physical logic may or may not respect the propositions' underlying Boolean structure. We prove that this logic is Boolean if and only if the following three axioms hold: (i) The world is affirmed, (ii) Modus Ponens and (iii) If a proposition is denied then its negation, or complement, is affirmed. When a physical system is governed by a dynamical law in the form of a quantum measure with the rule that events of zero measure are denied, the axioms (i) - (iii) prove to be too rigid and need to be modified. One promising scheme for quantum mechanics as quantum measure theory corresponds to replacing axiom (iii) with axiom (iv) Nature is as fine grained as the dynamics allows.Comment: 14 pages, v2 published version with a change in the title and other minor change

The Scope of the Truthmakers Requirement

Truths require truthmakers, many think. In this paper I will discuss the scope of this requirement. Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that, necessarily, all truths require truthmakers. I shall argue against this claim. I shall argue against it on the basis of its implications. I shall first consider its implications when applied to synthetic, contingent propositions. If the truthmaker requirement applies to these propositions, so I shall argue, it is not possible for there to be nothing, and it is not possible for any (possibly) accompanied entity to exist on its own. I shall then consider its implications when applied to modal propositions, specifically those concerning possible existence. I shall argue that if the truthmaker requirement applies to such propositions, then there can be no relation which is equivalent to metaphysical explanation, which – I shall suggest – amounts to a denial of the existence of grounding

Comment on ``Consistent Sets Yield Contrary Inferences in Quantum Theory''

In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.Comment: 2pages, uses REVTEX 3.

Leibniz and the Problem of Temporary Truths

Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, true propositions that have not always been or will not always be true. In contrast with contemporary philosophers, though, Leibniz conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on his view, the truth of a predicative sentence consists in the analytic containment of the concept expressed by the predicate in the concept expressed by the subject. Given that analytic relations among concepts are eternal and unchanging, the problem arises of explaining how Leibniz reconciled one commitment with the other: how can truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? This paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and inconsistent at another. It is argued that, given a proper understanding of what it is for a concept to be consistent, this idea is not as problematic as it may seem at first, and is in fact implied by Leibniz’s general views about propositions, in conjunction with the thesis that some propositions are only temporarily true

A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation

In the emerging literature on judgment (as opposed to preference) aggregation, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. When a group forms collective beliefs, it may assign experts with special knowledge on certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions; and, when a group forms collective goals or desires, it may assign individuals specially affected by certain propositions similar rights on those propositions. We identify a problem similar to, but more general than, Sen's `liberal paradox': Under plausible conditions, the assignment of such rights to two or more individuals (or subgroups) is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby propositions accepted by all individuals must be collectively accepted. So a group respecting expert or liberal rights on certain propositions must sometimes overrule its unanimous judgments on others. The inconsistency does not arise if either different individuals' rights are `disconnected' or individuals are `agnostic/tolerant' or `deferring/empathetic' towards other individuals' rights. Our findings have implications for the design of mechanisms by which groups (societies, committees, expert panels, organizations) can reach decisions on systems of interconnected propositions.liberal paradox, liberal right, expert right, subgroup rights, unanimity principle, judgment aggregation, empathy, deferral, tolerance, agnosticism