An Overview of Italian Gaming The State of the Industry

In recent years, the field of gambling in Italy has registered significant growth and Italians have demonstrated high propensity to play. The purpose of this article is to analyze the dynamics of such growth, in particular of the sectors that have developed more than others, and the effect of State policies and regulations on decisions taken by economic operators. From our research, it emerges that the gambling sector has been affected by a complex and contradictory State normative policy. Despite the fact that the Italian legal system allows only four casinos to operate, contradictory State polices throughout the years have determined a significant expansion of the offer of games but also resulted in a disparity of treatment of different sectors of the gaming industry

Normativity, Autonomy and Pluralism. Wittgenstein and the Pragmatic Turn in German Philosophy

Habermas and Apel share with the wittgensteinian linguistic turn the main issue which is at stake in the latter. That is: they rely on the linguisticalpragmatic substitution of the traditional Cartesian (and Kantian) subject of representation, thought as the nonempirical and non-objective pre-condition of the possibility of the objective world, with the function of linguistic and communicative interaction as a means of subjective and intersubjective world-disclosure (H. Sluga 1996; Wittgenstein, Tlp, § 5.54- 5.55). The issue basically concerns the way we think about language as a system and a means of representation. What is here at stake is actually the source of its normativity, and the way in which this normativity can be rationally founded

Industrial Symbiotic Networks as Coordinated Games

We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collaborative industrial practices-called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)-as MC-Net cooperative games and address the so called ISN implementation problem. This is, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to inapplicability of fair and stable benefit allocation methods even if the collaboration is a collectively desired one. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative multi-agent systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic policies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve the situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.Comment: 3 pages, Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018

Political legitimacy and European monetary union: contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of two-level games

The crisis of the euro area has severely tested the political authority of the European Union (EU). The crisis raises questions of normative legitimacy both because the EU is a normative order and because the construction of economic and monetary union (EMU) rested upon a theory that stressed the normative value of the depoliticization of money. However, this theory neglected the normative logic of the two-level game implicit in EMU. It also neglected the need for an impartial and publically acceptable constitutional order to acknowledge reasonable disagreements. By contrast, we contend that any reconstruction of the EU's economic constitution has to pay attention to reconciling a European monetary order with the legitimacy of member state governance. The EU requires a two-level contract to meet this standard. Member states must treat each other as equals and be representative of and accountable to their citizens on an equitable basis. These criteria entail that the EU's political legitimacy requires a form of demoicracy that we call ‘republican intergovernmentalism’. Only rules that could be acceptable as the product of a political constitution among the peoples of Europe can ultimately meet the required standards of political legitimacy. Such a political constitution could be brought about through empowering national parliaments in EU decision-making

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

Effects of physical efforts on injury in elite soccer

In this study, the influence of physical efforts on occurrence of match injury in a professional soccer club was investigated. Computerised motion-analysis was used to measure the physical efforts of players during 10 injury situations. Total distance and those covered at different movement intensities were measured across the 5-min period preceding injury. If the final run preceding injury involved a high-intensity action (HIA), the distance, duration and speed of the effort and the recovery time between this and the penultimate HIA were measured. To determine the influence of these physical efforts, the results were compared to a normative profile for players computed from data across 5 games for the same variables; habitual distances covered over a 5-min period and characteristics of and recovery time between HIA. Compared to the normative profile, no differences were reported in physical characteristics during the period leading up to injury or for HIA although the latter were substantially higher in intensity (duration and distance). A lower than normal recovery time between HIA prior to injury was observed (35.6±16.8 s vs. 98.8±17.5 s, p=0.003). Within the limitations of the small sample, these findings may aid in further understanding injury and physical performance in elite soccer