Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties

The conventional wisdom among international law scholars is that, once a rule of customary international law (CIL) becomes established, nations never have the unilateral right to withdraw from it. In a recent article published in the Yale Law Journal, Withdrawing from International Custom, we termed this conventional wisdom the Mandatory View of CIL and distinguished it from a possible regime in which nations could opt out of at least some CIL rules through advance notice, something we termed a Default View of CIL. After considering the intellectual origins and functional desirability of the Mandatory View, as well as the extent to which withdrawal rights are available under treaties, we concluded that it was difficult to justify a complete ban on withdrawal from all rules of CIL. That article is the subject of a forthcoming symposium edition of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, in which a variety of scholars raise important questions about our analysis and its implications. In this essay, we seek to advance the analysis set forth in Withdrawing by addressing four topics implicated by the symposium responses: the current state of CIL; the proper way to conceive of CIL and its relationship to treaties; how a shift away from the Mandatory View might occur in practice; and whether a shift to a Default View would make a meaningful difference in state practice. We also identify some issues that could benefit from additional research

Societal constitutionalism : alternatives to state-centred constitutional theory

Englische Fassung: Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional theory? ("Storrs Lectures 2003/04" Yale Law School) In: Christian Joerges, Inge-Johanne Sand und Gunther Teubner (Hg.) Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance. Hart, Oxford 2004, 3-28. Und in: Ius et Lex 2004, S.31-50. Französische Fassung: Constitutionalisme sociétal et globalisation: Alternatives à la théorie constitutionelle centrée sur l'État. Themis 2005 (im Erscheinen) Italienische Fassung: Costituzionalismo societario: alternative alla teoria costituzionale stato-centrica. In: Gunther Teubner, Costituzionalismo societario. Armando, Roma 2005 (im Erscheinen). Spanische Fassung: Globalización y constitucionalismo social: alternativas a la teoría constitucionalista centrada en el Estado". In: Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez (Hg.), Teoría de sistemas y Derecho penal: Fundamentos y posibilidades de aplicación. Granada: Comares, 2005 (im Erscheinen) und in: Cancio Meliá und Bacigalupo Saggese (Hg.) Derecho penal y política transnacional. Barcelona: Atelier, 2005 (in Erscheinen)und in: Gunther Teubner, El Derecho como sistema autopoiético de la sociedad global, herausgegeben von Carlos Gómez-Jara Diez. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2005 (im Erscheinen) und Lima: ARA Editores, 2005 (im Erscheinen) Polnische Fassung: Konstytucjonalizm spoleczny: Alternatywy dla teorii konstitucyjnej nakierowanej na panstwo. Ius et Lex 3, 2004, S.5-27

Regulated MAS: Social Perspective

This chapter addresses the problem of building normative multi-agent systems in terms of regulatory mechanisms. It describes a static conceptual model through which one can specify normative multi-agent systems along with a dynamic model to capture their operation and evolution. The chapter proposes a typology of applications and presents some open problems. In the last section, the authors express their individual views on these mattersMunindar Singh’s effort was partially supported by the U.S. Army Research Office under grant W911NF-08-1-0105. The content of this paper does not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U.S. Government; no official endorsement should be inferred or implied. Nicoletta Fornara’s effort is supported by the Hasler Foundation project nr. 11115-KG and by the SER project nr. C08.0114 within the COST Action IC0801 Agreement Technologies. Henrique Lopes Cardoso’s effort is supported by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), under project PTDC/EIA-EIA/104420/2008. Pablo Noriega’s effort has been partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through the Agreement Technologies CONSOLIDER project under contract CSD2007-0022, and the Generalitat of Catalunya grant 2009-SGR-1434.Peer Reviewe

Sobre las reglas de predicador e indexicalidad

We argue that no attempt of reducing meaning to a systematic set of rules, according to which the role of linguistic expressions is to be normatively defined, can be abstracted from an irreducibly decisional compound. By comparing Lorenzen’s project of building an Ortho-languageand Brandom’s inferentialist take on meaning, we distinguish two ways of acknowledging this fact, while claiming that Lorenzen’s take is more genuinely constructive, insofar as choices be thought of as genuine features of constructions. It brings into a new perspective the relation between dialogical constructivism and Brouwer’s intuitionism. Finally we bring up a philosophical argument for the claim that interaction rules should be indexed on players and on their choices, when providing deontic bases to semantics.Argumentamos que ningún intento de reducir el significado a un conjunto sistemático de reglas, según el cual el papel de las expresiones lingüísticas debe definirse normativamente, puede abstraerse de un compuesto irreductiblemente decisional. Comparando el proyecto de Lorenzen de construir un lenguaje ortodoxo (Orthosprache) con el enfoque inferencialista de Brandom sobre el significado, distinguimos aquí dos formas de reconocer este hecho. Afirmaremos entonces que el enfoque de Lorenzen es más genuinamente constructivo, en la medida en que las elecciones se consideran características genuinas de las construcciones. Esto nos llevará a una nueva perspectiva de la relación entre el constructivismo dialógico y el intuicionismo de Brouwer. De esta manera, presentamos un argumento filosófico para la afirmación de que las reglas de interacción deben indexarse en relación a los jugadores y sus elecciones, al proporcionar bases deónticas a la semántica