1,249 research outputs found
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with
respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an
election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the
outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that
performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting is
a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple
variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter.
We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control
resistances among natural voting systems
Complexity of Manipulation, Bribery, and Campaign Management in Bucklin and Fallback Voting
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to
which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to
influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic
voting), control, and bribery. Bucklin and fallback voting are among the voting
systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks.
However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and
bribery attacks. We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of
Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation and bribery
scenarios; we also complement our discussion by considering several campaign
management problems for Bucklin and fallback.Comment: 28 page
More Natural Models of Electoral Control by Partition
"Control" studies attempts to set the outcome of elections through the
addition, deletion, or partition of voters or candidates. The set of benchmark
control types was largely set in the seminal 1992 paper by Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick that introduced control, and there now is a large literature studying
how many of the benchmark types various election systems are vulnerable to,
i.e., have polynomial-time attack algorithms for.
However, although the longstanding benchmark models of addition and deletion
model relatively well the real-world settings that inspire them, the
longstanding benchmark models of partition model settings that are arguably
quite distant from those they seek to capture.
In this paper, we introduce--and for some important cases analyze the
complexity of--new partition models that seek to better capture many real-world
partition settings. In particular, in many partition settings one wants the two
parts of the partition to be of (almost) equal size, or is partitioning into
more than two parts, or has groups of actors who must be placed in the same
part of the partition. Our hope is that having these new partition types will
allow studies of control attacks to include such models that more realistically
capture many settings
Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting candidates or voters
We investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copelandα, maximin, k-veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting
Search versus Search for Collapsing Electoral Control Types
Electoral control types are ways of trying to change the outcome of elections
by altering aspects of their composition and structure [BTT92]. We say two
compatible (i.e., having the same input types) control types that are about the
same election system E form a collapsing pair if for every possible input
(which typically consists of a candidate set, a vote set, a focus candidate,
and sometimes other parameters related to the nature of the attempted
alteration), either both or neither of the attempted attacks can be
successfully carried out [HHM20]. For each of the seven general (i.e., holding
for all election systems) electoral control type collapsing pairs found by
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton [HHM20] and for each of the additional
electoral control type collapsing pairs of Carleton et al. [CCH+ 22] for veto
and approval (and many other election systems in light of that paper's Theorems
3.6 and 3.9), both members of the collapsing pair have the same complexity
since as sets they are the same set. However, having the same complexity (as
sets) is not enough to guarantee that as search problems they have the same
complexity. In this paper, we explore the relationships between the search
versions of collapsing pairs. For each of the collapsing pairs of Hemaspaandra,
Hemaspaandra, and Menton [HHM20] and Carleton et al. [CCH+ 22], we prove that
the pair's members' search-version complexities are polynomially related (given
access, for cases when the winner problem itself is not in polynomial time, to
an oracle for the winner problem). Beyond that, we give efficient reductions
that from a solution to one compute a solution to the other. For the concrete
systems plurality, veto, and approval, we completely determine which of their
(due to our results) polynomially-related collapsing search-problem pairs are
polynomial-time computable and which are NP-hard.Comment: The metadata's abstract is abridged due to arXiv.org's
abstract-length limit. The paper itself has the unabridged (i.e., full)
abstrac
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