Bayesian Inference of Social Norms as Shared Constraints on Behavior

People act upon their desires, but often, also act in adherence to implicit social norms. How do people infer these unstated social norms from others' behavior, especially in novel social contexts? We propose that laypeople have intuitive theories of social norms as behavioral constraints shared across different agents in the same social context. We formalize inference of norms using a Bayesian Theory of Mind approach, and show that this computational approach provides excellent predictions of how people infer norms in two scenarios. Our results suggest that people separate the influence of norms and individual desires on others' actions, and have implications for modelling generalizations of hidden causes of behavior.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures, to appear in CogSci 2019, code available at https://github.com/ztangent/norms-cogsci1

A survey on the nature, reasons for compliance and emergence of social norms

The aim of the paper is to offer a critical review of some of the most important contributions on the subject of social norms. The analysis will hinge upon a fundamental distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons to action, which are supposed to represent two basic types of motivations making up the individual system of rational deliberation. Such a dichotomy will make it possible to divide the account of rules of behaviour in three categories, depending on the weight accorded to one rather than the other reason to action. The narrower concept is given by what will be called strictly-conceived convention, which coincides with Lewis's classical account of a convention. In this case, it is the self-regarding motive that actually provides an underpinning of such a regularity of behaviour, making it possible to build a system of convergent mutual expectations. The next category, that of broadly-conceived conventions are based on Sugden's earliest works on the subject; in this case, the self-regarding motive is still the crucial one, but conventions are not necessarily mutually beneficial, thus coming down to a standard Nash equilibrium, or evolutionary stable strategy, notion. Finally, with the final category of norms a decisive shift out of the self-interested justification is accomplished. In fact, these regularities are grounded on some forms of other-regarding behaviour, as Sudgen's model of normative expectations sets out clearly. The cognitive structure needed in order to generate such type of expectations leading to norms is then critically examined, reaching the conclusion that the account of norms provided in the received theory does not prove thoroughly satisfactory. Particularly, the notion of "empirical" expectation, as opposed to that of "causal" expectation, is deemed as the relevant one in order to build a system of mutual expectation in the case of norms; however, this concept does not help to explain how a norm comes out as an equilibrium of the social interaction, thus making the whole explanation arguably circular. We finally argue for the importance to ground the concept of norm on the dynamic evolution of expectations.

Free riding and norms of control: self determination and imposition. An experimental comparison.

This is an experiment on the effect of norm application in a public good game. We want to investigate whether a control norm affects the contribution level differently, only in relation to the way in which the norm is applied in the game. We compare the amount of public good provided in two different groups. In the first group (constituent group), experimental subjects create a control norm, and then they self-apply it in a basic public good game. In the second group (control group), the norm created by the constituent group is exogenously imposed. Experimental results show a significant difference between the two public good levels considered. Self determination implies a higher level of efficiency, as compared to the exogenous one.public good games, free riding, norm of control, voluntary contribution

Risky Business

This article is part of an exchange including Anthony Alfieri and William Simon in the Georgetown Law Journal on the implications of law firms\u27 increasing reliance on the concept of risk management as the focus of efforts to ensure ethical conduct by lawyers. A risk management program involves the adoption of various policies and procedures designed to minimize conduct that may lead to individual and firm liability. Conflicts checking procedures, standard terms in engagement letters, and the requirement of a second signature by a disinterested partner on legal opinions are but a few of such measures. On one hand, the risk management paradigm reflects appreciation of the importance of situational incentives and pressures in shaping behavior in organizational settings. This is an advance over conceptions of legal ethics that assume that behavior is principally a function of individual character. Law firms are now major business enterprises, and their systems of rewards and sanctions, as well as their cultures, necessarily influence the conduct of those who work in them. Attending to the ways in which these influences can reinforce or discourage certain types of behavior can help firms establish and maintain environments that enhance the likelihood that lawyers will act ethically. On the other hand, a risk management approach risks inculcating an instrumental view of legal and ethical provisions. To the extent that it conceptualizes ethics as a matter of avoiding liability, risk management may foster the attitude of Holmes\u27s bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which . . . knowledge [of the law] enables him to predict. The bad man wants to avoid punishment, but has no commitment to legal compliance as a good in itself. This can lead to an impoverished view of law and ethics, in which the choice of behavior is contingent on the costs and benefits of a given course of action. This tension in the risk management model has been examined in the context of corporate legal compliance programs, and law firms may draw useful lessons from that research. Social psychologists and management theorists have identified complex connections among program characteristics, group dynamics, individual perceptions and motives, and employee behavior in the business setting. In particular, they have suggested that instrumental and values-based programs proceed on different premises and contribute to compliance in different ways. Instrumental programs can be effective by affecting employee cost-benefit calculations, while values-based programs can foster appropriate behavior because the employee identifies with the values that this behavior expresses. Scholars suggest that compliance programs with both dimensions generally are necessary, but integrating them into a single program requires careful consideration of how they may interact. The article closes by suggesting that this research on corporate programs may offer useful insights for law firms. It cautions, however, that applying this research will need to take account of the ways in which law firms both resemble and are different from typical business corporations