Non-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric information

Cataloged from PDF version of article.We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermediary that specifies how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the intermediary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would finance the fixed replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each firm’s type. We finally conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs. 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Essays on non-cooperative inventory games

Ankara : The Department of Industrial Engineering and the Institute of Engineering and Science of Bilkent University, 2012.Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Bilkent University, 2012.Includes bibliographical references leaves 165-170.In this thesis we study different non–cooperative inventory games. In particular, we focus on joint replenishment games and newsvendor duopoly under asymmetric information. Chapter 1 contains introduction and motivation behind the research. Chapter 2 is a preliminary chapter which introduce basic concepts used in the thesis such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium and mechanism design. In Chapter 3, we study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment of multiple firms that operate under an EOQ–like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We consider two variants of the participation-contribution game: in the single–stage variant, participation and contribution decisions are made simultaneously, and, in the two-stage variant, participating firms become common knowledge at the contribution stage. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria for the one-stage game and subgame-perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game. In Chapter 4, we extend the private contributions game to an asymmetric information counterpart. We assume each firm only knows the probability distribution of the other firms’ adjusted demand rates (demand rate multiplied by inventory holding cost rate). We show the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric information game and provide its characterization. Finally, we conduct some numerical study to examine the impact of information asymmetry on expected and interim values of total contributions, cycle times and total costs. quantities for all firm types except the type that has the highest possible unit cost, who orders the same quantity as he would as a monopolist newsboy. Consequently, competition leads to higher total inventory in the industry. A firm’s equilibrium order quantity increases with a stochastic increase in the total industry demand or with an increase in his initial allocation of the total industry demand. Finally, we provide full characterization of the equilibrium, corresponding payoffs and comparative statics for a parametric special case with uniform demand and linear market shares.Körpeoğlu, EvrenPh.D

A single buyer-single supplier bargaining problem with asymmetric information : theoretical approach and software implementation

This paper is focused on the coordination of order and production policy between buyers and suppliers in supply chains. When a buyer and a supplier of an item work independently, the buyer will place orders based on his economic order quantity (EOQ). However, the buyer s EOQ may not lead to an optimal policy for the supplier. It can be shown that a cooperative batching policy can reduce total cost significantly. Should the buyer have the more powerful position to enforce his EOQ on the supplier, then no incentive exists for him to deviate from his EOQ in order to choose a cooperative batching policy. To provide an incentive to order in quantities suitable to the supplier, the supplier could offer a side payment. One critical assumption made throughout in the literature dealing with incentive schemes to influence buyer s ordering policy is that the supplier has complete information regarding buyer s cost structure. However, this assumption is far from realistic. As a consequence, the buyer has no incentive to report truthfully on his cost structure. Moreover there is an incentive to overstate the total relevant cost in order to obtain as high a side payment as possible. This paper provides a bargaining model with asymmetric information about the buyer s cost structure assuming that the buyer has the bargaining power to enforce his EOQ on the supplier in case of a break-down in negotiations. An algorithm for the determination of an optimal set of contracts which are specifically designed for different cost structures of the buyer, assumed by the supplier, will be presented. This algorithm was implemented in a software application, that supports the supplier in determining the optimal set of contracts

Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996).Common property, Cooperation, Evolutionary game theory, Global interactions, Local interactions, Social norms

Integration and coordination in after-sales service logistics

Maintenance and after-sales service logistics are important disciplines that have received considerable attention both in practice and in the scientific literature. This attention is related to the often high investments and revenues associated with capital-intensive assets in technically advanced business environments. Different maintenance services such as inspections and preventive maintenance activities are executed with the goal to maximize the availability of these expensive assets. However, unavoidable failures may still happen, which means that, in addition to preventive maintenance and services, repair actions (corrective maintenance) are necessary. Spare parts, service engineers and tools are typically the main resources for executing the repair actions and their availability has a major impact on overall system downtime. In this dissertation, we analyze a multi-resource after-sales service supply chain consisting of a service provider and an emergency supplier. The service provider is contractually responsible for the timely repair of some randomly failing capital intensive assets. To execute a repair, the service provider needs both service engineers and spare parts to replace the malfunctioning parts. In case of spare parts stock out, the service provider can either wait for the regular replenishment of parts or decide to hand over the entire repair call to an emergency supplier. For the latter case, a contract between the service provider and the emergency supplier is necessary to specify the compensation. In the first part of this dissertation, we focus on the optimal integrated planning of spare parts and engineers, considering an asset availability constraint. We evaluate the system performance using Markov chain analysis and queueing models, and employ different optimization algorithms to jointly determine the optimal capacity of the resources. This integrated planning results in considerable cost savings compared to the separate planning of spare parts and engineers. In the second part, we investigate the best contract the supplier can offer to the service provider. Furthermore, we propose different coordinated contracts to achieve optimal revenues for both partners in this after-sales service supply chain, under both full and asymmetric information scenarios. Cooperative games, the dominance of one party over the other (Stackelberg game), and information sharing aspects are the tools included in the second part of this dissertation

Coordinating Supply Chains with a Credit Mechanism

This paper studies the supply chain coordination with a trade credit under symmetric and asymmetric information, where the retailer has an individual profit target from the business and the vendor is the decision-maker of the supply chain. We propose a coordination mechanism through credit contracts and show that a win-win outcome is achieved by redistributing the cost savings from coordination mechanism under certain constraints. Numerical examples are given to illustrate our results

Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach

Game Theory;econometrics

The Fishery as a Watery Commons: Lessons from the Experiences of Other Public Policy Areas for U.S. Fisheries Policy

Open access, combined with modern technologies of fishing, has created serious problems of overfishing and threatens the sustainability of many U.S. fisheries. The common pool problem -- the ocean version of "the tragedy of the commons" -- is the root cause of the overfishing. The major regulatory policies of the past few decades that have tried to address overfishing -- restrictions on fishing methods and inputs (in essence, "command and control" regulation) -- have largely been failures. Indeed, they have often perversely exacerbated fisheries' overfishing problems by encouraging "fishing derbies" or "races for the fish." Fisheries are not alone in facing a common pool problem. Other areas of the U.S. economy have confronted similar problems, and public policies have developed to deal with them. This paper discusses seven of these other areas: the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, the control of sulfur dioxide emissions by electric utilities, grazing on public lands, forest logging on public lands, oil-gas-coal extraction from public lands and offshore waters, hard rock mineral (metal) mining, and surface water usage.Important lessons can be gleaned from the policies that have been developed in these other areas, and this paper applies those lessons to the design of U.S. fisheries policy.