Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Exchange of Services in Networks: Competition, Cooperation, and Fairness

Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental questions regarding their properties and efficiency remain unanswered. We consider such a service exchange model and analyze the users' interactions under three different approaches. First, we study a centrally designed service allocation policy that yields the fair total service each user should receive based on the service it others to the others. Accordingly, we consider a competitive market where each user determines selfishly its allocation policy so as to maximize the service it receives in return, and a coalitional game model where users are allowed to coordinate their policies. We prove that there is a unique equilibrium exchange allocation for both game theoretic formulations, which also coincides with the central fair service allocation. Furthermore, we characterize its properties in terms of the coalitions that emerge and the equilibrium allocations, and analyze its dependency on the underlying network graph. That servicing policy is the natural reference point to the various mechanisms that are currently proposed to incentivize user participation and improve the efficiency of such networked service (or, resource) exchange markets.Comment: to appear in ACM Sigmetrics 201

Analyzing Peer Selection Policies for BitTorrent Multimedia On-Demand Streaming Systems in Internet

The adaptation of the BitTorrent protocol to multimedia on-demand streaming systems essentially lies on the modification of its two core algorithms, namely the piece and the peer selection policies, respectively. Much more attention has though been given to the piece selection policy. Within this context, this article proposes three novel peer selection policies for the design of BitTorrent-like protocols targeted at that type of systems: Select Balanced Neighbour Policy (SBNP), Select Regular Neighbour Policy (SRNP), and Select Optimistic Neighbour Policy (SONP). These proposals are validated through a competitive analysis based on simulations which encompass a variety of multimedia scenarios, defined in function of important characterization parameters such as content type, content size, and client interactivity profile. Service time, number of clients served and efficiency retrieving coefficient are the performance metrics assessed in the analysis. The final results mainly show that the novel proposals constitute scalable solutions that may be considered for real project designs. Lastly, future work is included in the conclusion of this paper.Comment: 19 PAGE

Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of internet traffic quality regulation

In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traffic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on minimum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insensitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities.

Critical market shares for investors and access seekers and competitive models in fibre networks

In this paper we consider and evaluate NGA architectures which meet the foreseeable future bandwidth demand and allow for highest bandwidth and quality for end-users and which no longer rely on copper cable elements. These are FTTH architectures only. From all available FTTH architectures we concentrate on the two most relevant architectures in Europe, Ethernet Point-to-Point and GPON. We assume the incumbent to be the investor in the NGA network infrastructure. If the NGA architecture is based on a Point-to-Point fibre plant we have modelled the competitors as using unbundled fibre loops as the wholesale access service. If the architecture is based on a Point-to-Multipoint fibre plant, we consider an active wholesale access (bitstream access) at the MPoP or at the core network node locations. Our basic modelling relies upon an engineering bottom-up cost modelling approach. We model the total cost of the services considered under efficient conditions, taking into account the cost of all network elements needed to produce these services in the specific architecture deployed. This approach is coherent with a Long Run Incremental Cost approach as applied in regulatory economics. Our modelling approach generates a broad set of results including the relative performance of the various network architectures, investment requirements and the degree of profitable coverage. In this paper, however, we focus on the results on the potential for competition and potential market structures in an NGA environment. --NGA architecture,cost modelling,FTTH,coverage,access models,unbundling

Using Tuangou to reduce IP transit costs

A majority of ISPs (Internet Service Providers) support connectivity to the entire Internet by transiting their traffic via other providers. Although the transit prices per Mbps decline steadily, the overall transit costs of these ISPs remain high or even increase, due to the traffic growth. The discontent of the ISPs with the high transit costs has yielded notable innovations such as peering, content distribution networks, multicast, and peer-to-peer localization. While the above solutions tackle the problem by reducing the transit traffic, this paper explores a novel approach that reduces the transit costs without altering the traffic. In the proposed CIPT (Cooperative IP Transit), multiple ISPs cooperate to jointly purchase IP (Internet Protocol) transit in bulk. The aggregate transit costs decrease due to the economies-of-scale effect of typical subadditive pricing as well as burstable billing: not all ISPs transit their peak traffic during the same period. To distribute the aggregate savings among the CIPT partners, we propose Shapley-value sharing of the CIPT transit costs. Using public data about IP traffic of 264 ISPs and transit prices, we quantitatively evaluate CIPT and show that significant savings can be achieved, both in relative and absolute terms. We also discuss the organizational embodiment, relationship with transit providers, traffic confidentiality, and other aspects of CIPT

Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of Internet traffic quality regulation

In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traf-fic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on mini-mum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insen-sitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities. --