566 research outputs found
Merits of Leśniewski type nominalism
For the sake of explaining the merits of a Leśniewski type nominalism, it should be made clear what is meant by „nominalism” and what the characteristics of this special type of nominalism are. To the first question we can find quite a lot of mutually inconsistent answers. Therefore I will just explain the distinction between two different nominalistic traditions which I hold to be fundamental. I think we should not just focus on the question which so-called abstract entities are rejected but as well look for basic entities nominalists rely on
Modal Structuralism and Theism
Drawing an analogy between modal structuralism about mathematics
and theism, I oer a structuralist account that implicitly denes theism in
terms of three basic relations: logical and metaphysical priority, and epis-
temic superiority. On this view, statements like `God is omniscient' have
a hypothetical and a categorical component. The hypothetical component
provides a translation pattern according to which statements in theistic
language are converted into statements of second-order modal logic. The
categorical component asserts the logical possibility of the theism struc-
ture on the basis of uncontroversial facts about the physical world. This
structuralist reading of theism preserves objective truth-values for theistic
statements while remaining neutral on the question of ontology. Thus, it
oers a way of understanding theism to which a naturalist cannot object,
and it accommodates the fact that religious belief, for many theists, is an
essentially relational matter
An Intrinsic Theory of Quantum Mechanics: Progress in Field's Nominalistic Program, Part I
In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. This account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why the quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom.
Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science Without Numbers (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first step towards a genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics. I will also compare the present account to Mark Balaguer’s (1996) nominalization of quantum mechanics and discuss how it might bear on the debate about “wave function realism.” In closing, I will suggest some possible ways to extend this account to accommodate spinorial degrees of freedom and a variable number of particles (e.g. for particle creation and annihilation).
Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call a “periodic difference structure” and prove a representation theorem as well as a uniqueness theorem. These formal results could prove fruitful for further investigation into the metaphysics of phase and theoretical structure
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