274 research outputs found
Shared and Searchable Encrypted Data for Untrusted Servers
Current security mechanisms pose a risk for organisations that outsource their data management to untrusted servers. Encrypting and decrypting sensitive data at the client side is the normal approach in this situation but has high communication and computation overheads if only a subset of the data is required, for example, selecting records in a database table based on a keyword search. New cryptographic schemes have been proposed that support encrypted queries over encrypted data but all depend on a single set of secret keys, which implies single user access or sharing keys among multiple users, with key revocation requiring costly data re-encryption. In this paper, we propose an encryption scheme where each authorised user in the system has his own keys to encrypt and decrypt data. The scheme supports keyword search which enables the server to return only the encrypted data that satisfies an encrypted query without decrypting it. We provide two constructions of the scheme giving formal proofs of their security. We also report on the results of a prototype implementation.
This research was supported by the UKās EPSRC research grant EP/C537181/1. The authors would like to thank the members of the Policy Research Group at Imperial College for their support
Adaptively Secure Computationally Efficient Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Searchable encryption is a technique that allows a client to store documents on a server in encrypted form. Stored documents can be retrieved selectively while revealing as little information as\ud
possible to the server. In the symmetric searchable encryption domain, the storage and the retrieval are performed by the same client. Most conventional searchable encryption schemes suffer\ud
from two disadvantages.\ud
First, searching the stored documents takes time linear in the size of the database, and/or uses heavy arithmetic operations.\ud
Secondly, the existing schemes do not consider adaptive attackers;\ud
a search-query will reveal information even about documents stored\ud
in the future. If they do consider this, it is at a significant\ud
cost to updates.\ud
In this paper we propose a novel symmetric searchable encryption\ud
scheme that offers searching at constant time in the number of\ud
unique keywords stored on the server. We present two variants of\ud
the basic scheme which differ in the efficiency of search and\ud
update. We show how each scheme could be used in a personal health\ud
record system
Distributed Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) allows a client to store encrypted data on a storage provider in such a way, that the client is able to search and retrieve the data selectively without the storage provider learning the contents of the data or the words being searched for. Practical SSE schemes usually leak (sensitive) information during or after a query (e.g., the search pattern). Secure schemes on the other hand are not practical, namely they are neither efficient in the computational search complexity, nor scalable with large data sets. To achieve efficiency and security at the same time, we introduce the concept of distributed SSE (DSSE), which uses a query proxy in addition to the storage provider.\ud
We give a construction that combines an inverted index approach (for efficiency) with scrambling functions used in private information retrieval (PIR) (for security). The proposed scheme, which is entirely based on XOR operations and pseudo-random functions, is efficient and does not leak the search pattern. For instance, a secure search in an index over one million documents and 500 keywords is executed in less than 1 second
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A New Lightweight Symmetric Searchable Encryption Scheme for String Identification
In this paper, we provide an efficient and easy-to-implement symmetric searchable encryption scheme (SSE) for string search, which takes one round of communication, O(n) times of computations over n documents. Unlike previous schemes, we use hash-chaining instead of chain of encryption operations for index generation, which makes it suitable for lightweight applications. Unlike the previous SSE schemes for string search, with our scheme, server learns nothing about the frequency and the relative positions of the words being searched except what it can learn from the history. We are the first to propose probabilistic trapdoors in SSE for string search. We provide concrete proof of non-adaptive security of our scheme against honest-but-curious server based on the definitions of [12]. We also introduce a new notion of search pattern privacy, which gives a measure of security against the leakage from trapdoor. We have shown that our scheme is secure under search pattern indistinguishability definition. We show why SSE scheme for string search cannot attain adaptive indistinguishability criteria as mentioned in [12]. We also propose modifications of our scheme so that the scheme can be used against active adversaries at the cost of more rounds of communications and memory space. We validate our scheme against two different commercial datasets (see [1],[2])
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