8,774 research outputs found

    You Do Not Need More Data: Improving End-To-End Speech Recognition by Text-To-Speech Data Augmentation

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    Data augmentation is one of the most effective ways to make end-to-end automatic speech recognition (ASR) perform close to the conventional hybrid approach, especially when dealing with low-resource tasks. Using recent advances in speech synthesis (text-to-speech, or TTS), we build our TTS system on an ASR training database and then extend the data with synthesized speech to train a recognition model. We argue that, when the training data amount is relatively low, this approach can allow an end-to-end model to reach hybrid systems' quality. For an artificial low-to-medium-resource setup, we compare the proposed augmentation with the semi-supervised learning technique. We also investigate the influence of vocoder usage on final ASR performance by comparing Griffin-Lim algorithm with our modified LPCNet. When applied with an external language model, our approach outperforms a semi-supervised setup for LibriSpeech test-clean and only 33% worse than a comparable supervised setup. Our system establishes a competitive result for end-to-end ASR trained on LibriSpeech train-clean-100 set with WER 4.3% for test-clean and 13.5% for test-other

    Synesthesia: Detecting Screen Content via Remote Acoustic Side Channels

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    We show that subtle acoustic noises emanating from within computer screens can be used to detect the content displayed on the screens. This sound can be picked up by ordinary microphones built into webcams or screens, and is inadvertently transmitted to other parties, e.g., during a videoconference call or archived recordings. It can also be recorded by a smartphone or "smart speaker" placed on a desk next to the screen, or from as far as 10 meters away using a parabolic microphone. Empirically demonstrating various attack scenarios, we show how this channel can be used for real-time detection of on-screen text, or users' input into on-screen virtual keyboards. We also demonstrate how an attacker can analyze the audio received during video call (e.g., on Google Hangout) to infer whether the other side is browsing the web in lieu of watching the video call, and which web site is displayed on their screen
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