1,433 research outputs found
Polynomial-Time Key Recovery Attack on the Faure-Loidreau Scheme based on Gabidulin Codes
Encryption schemes based on the rank metric lead to small public key sizes of
order of few thousands bytes which represents a very attractive feature
compared to Hamming metric-based encryption schemes where public key sizes are
of order of hundreds of thousands bytes even with additional structures like
the cyclicity. The main tool for building public key encryption schemes in rank
metric is the McEliece encryption setting used with the family of Gabidulin
codes. Since the original scheme proposed in 1991 by Gabidulin, Paramonov and
Tretjakov, many systems have been proposed based on different masking
techniques for Gabidulin codes. Nevertheless, over the years all these systems
were attacked essentially by the use of an attack proposed by Overbeck.
In 2005 Faure and Loidreau designed a rank-metric encryption scheme which was
not in the McEliece setting. The scheme is very efficient, with small public
keys of size a few kiloBytes and with security closely related to the
linearized polynomial reconstruction problem which corresponds to the decoding
problem of Gabidulin codes. The structure of the scheme differs considerably
from the classical McEliece setting and until our work, the scheme had never
been attacked. We show in this article that this scheme like other schemes
based on Gabidulin codes, is also vulnerable to a polynomial-time attack that
recovers the private key by applying Overbeck's attack on an appropriate public
code. As an example we break concrete proposed bits security parameters in
a few seconds.Comment: To appear in Designs, Codes and Cryptography Journa
New algorithms for decoding in the rank metric and an attack on the LRPC cryptosystem
We consider the decoding problem or the problem of finding low weight
codewords for rank metric codes. We show how additional information about the
codeword we want to find under the form of certain linear combinations of the
entries of the codeword leads to algorithms with a better complexity. This is
then used together with a folding technique for attacking a McEliece scheme
based on LRPC codes. It leads to a feasible attack on one of the parameters
suggested in \cite{GMRZ13}.Comment: A shortened version of this paper will be published in the
proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory 2015
(ISIT 2015
A Smart Approach for GPT Cryptosystem Based on Rank Codes
The concept of Public- key cryptosystem was innovated by McEliece's
cryptosystem. The public key cryptosystem based on rank codes was presented in
1991 by Gabidulin -Paramonov-Trejtakov(GPT). The use of rank codes in
cryptographic applications is advantageous since it is practically impossible
to utilize combinatoric decoding. This has enabled using public keys of a
smaller size. Respective structural attacks against this system were proposed
by Gibson and recently by Overbeck. Overbeck's attacks break many versions of
the GPT cryptosystem and are turned out to be either polynomial or exponential
depending on parameters of the cryptosystem. In this paper, we introduce a new
approach, called the Smart approach, which is based on a proper choice of the
distortion matrix X. The Smart approach allows for withstanding all known
attacks even if the column scrambler matrix P over the base field Fq.Comment: 5 pages. to appear in Proceedings of IEEE ISIT201
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