6,958 research outputs found
ZETA - Zero-Trust Authentication: Relying on Innate Human Ability, not Technology
Reliable authentication requires the devices and
channels involved in the process to be trustworthy; otherwise
authentication secrets can easily be compromised. Given the
unceasing efforts of attackers worldwide such trustworthiness
is increasingly not a given. A variety of technical solutions,
such as utilising multiple devices/channels and verification
protocols, has the potential to mitigate the threat of untrusted
communications to a certain extent. Yet such technical solutions
make two assumptions: (1) users have access to multiple
devices and (2) attackers will not resort to hacking the human,
using social engineering techniques. In this paper, we propose
and explore the potential of using human-based computation
instead of solely technical solutions to mitigate the threat of
untrusted devices and channels. ZeTA (Zero Trust Authentication
on untrusted channels) has the potential to allow people to
authenticate despite compromised channels or communications
and easily observed usage. Our contributions are threefold:
(1) We propose the ZeTA protocol with a formal definition
and security analysis that utilises semantics and human-based
computation to ameliorate the problem of untrusted devices
and channels. (2) We outline a security analysis to assess
the envisaged performance of the proposed authentication
protocol. (3) We report on a usability study that explores the
viability of relying on human computation in this context
Towards Enhanced Usability of IT Security Mechanisms - How to Design Usable IT Security Mechanisms Using the Example of Email Encryption
Nowadays, advanced security mechanisms exist to protect data, systems, and
networks. Most of these mechanisms are effective, and security experts can
handle them to achieve a sufficient level of security for any given system.
However, most of these systems have not been designed with focus on good
usability for the average end user. Today, the average end user often struggles
with understanding and using security mecha-nisms. Other security mechanisms
are simply annoying for end users. As the overall security of any system is
only as strong as the weakest link in this system, bad usability of IT security
mechanisms may result in operating errors, resulting in inse-cure systems.
Buying decisions of end users may be affected by the usability of security
mechanisms. Hence, software provid-ers may decide to better have no security
mechanism then one with a bad usability. Usability of IT security mechanisms is
one of the most underestimated properties of applications and sys-tems. Even IT
security itself is often only an afterthought. Hence, usability of security
mechanisms is often the after-thought of an afterthought. This paper presents
some guide-lines that should help software developers to improve end user
usability of security-related mechanisms, and analyzes com-mon applications
based on these guidelines. Based on these guidelines, the usability of email
encryption is analyzed and an email encryption solution with increased
usability is presented. The approach is based on an automated key and trust
man-agement. The compliance of the proposed email encryption solution with the
presented guidelines for usable security mechanisms is evaluated
On the Privacy Practices of Just Plain Sites
In addition to visiting high profile sites such as Facebook and Google, web
users often visit more modest sites, such as those operated by bloggers, or by
local organizations such as schools. Such sites, which we call "Just Plain
Sites" (JPSs) are likely to inadvertently represent greater privacy risks than
high profile sites by virtue of being unable to afford privacy expertise. To
assess the prevalence of the privacy risks to which JPSs may inadvertently be
exposing their visitors, we analyzed a number of easily observed privacy
practices of such sites. We found that many JPSs collect a great deal of
information from their visitors, share a great deal of information about their
visitors with third parties, permit a great deal of tracking of their visitors,
and use deprecated or unsafe security practices. Our goal in this work is not
to scold JPS operators, but to raise awareness of these facts among both JPS
operators and visitors, possibly encouraging the operators of such sites to
take greater care in their implementations, and visitors to take greater care
in how, when, and what they share.Comment: 10 pages, 7 figures, 6 tables, 5 authors, and a partridge in a pear
tre
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences
In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks,
highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are
performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control
(C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by
attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked
parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side
of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection
and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted
security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in
current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages.
Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor
BitWhisper: Covert Signaling Channel between Air-Gapped Computers using Thermal Manipulations
It has been assumed that the physical separation (air-gap) of computers
provides a reliable level of security, such that should two adjacent computers
become compromised, the covert exchange of data between them would be
impossible. In this paper, we demonstrate BitWhisper, a method of bridging the
air-gap between adjacent compromised computers by using their heat emissions
and built-in thermal sensors to create a covert communication channel. Our
method is unique in two respects: it supports bidirectional communication, and
it requires no additional dedicated peripheral hardware. We provide
experimental results based on implementation of BitWhisper prototype, and
examine the channel properties and limitations. Our experiments included
different layouts, with computers positioned at varying distances from one
another, and several sensor types and CPU configurations (e.g., Virtual
Machines). We also discuss signal modulation and communication protocols,
showing how BitWhisper can be used for the exchange of data between two
computers in a close proximity (at distance of 0-40cm) at an effective rate of
1-8 bits per hour, a rate which makes it possible to infiltrate brief commands
and exfiltrate small amount of data (e.g., passwords) over the covert channel
- …