Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation

This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the development and recent rediscovery of the classical theory, with possible relevant applications for model building.policy games, policy effectiveness, controllability, equilibrium existence

Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation

This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the development and recent rediscovery of the classical theory, with possible relevant applications for model building.policy games; policy effectiveness; controllability; equilibrium existence

Optimal control in ink-jet printing via instantaneous control

This paper concerns the optimal control of a free surface flow with moving contact line, inspired by an application in ink-jet printing. Surface tension, contact angle and wall friction are taken into account by means of the generalized Navier boundary condition. The time-dependent differential system is discretized by an arbitrary Lagrangian-Eulerian finite element method, and a control problem is addressed by an instantaneous control approach, based on the time discretization of the flow equations. The resulting control procedure is computationally highly efficient and its assessment by numerical tests show its effectiveness in deadening the natural oscillations that occur inside the nozzle and reducing significantly the duration of the transient preceding the attainment of the equilibrium configuration

Real and Complex Monotone Communication Games

Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of convex Nash Equilibrium Problems (NEPs), where each player aims to solve an arbitrary smooth convex optimization problem. Differently from most of current works, we do not assume any specific structure for the players' problems, and we allow the optimization variables of the players to be matrices in the complex domain. Our main contribution is the design of a novel class of distributed (asynchronous) best-response- algorithms suitable for solving the proposed NEPs, even in the presence of multiple solutions. The new methods, whose convergence analysis is based on Variational Inequality (VI) techniques, can select, among all the equilibria of a game, those that optimize a given performance criterion, at the cost of limited signaling among the players. This is a major departure from existing best-response algorithms, whose convergence conditions imply the uniqueness of the NE. Some of our results hinge on the use of VI problems directly in the complex domain; the study of these new kind of VIs also represents a noteworthy innovative contribution. We then apply the developed methods to solve some new generalizations of SISO and MIMO games in cognitive radios and femtocell systems, showing a considerable performance improvement over classical pure noncooperative schemes.Comment: to appear on IEEE Transactions in Information Theor

Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst Hope?

The political capture of copyright law by industry groups has inadvertently led to orphan works problems arising in less organized industries, such as publishing. Google Book Search (GBS) is a prime example of how private ordering can circumvent legislative inefficiencies. Digital technologies such as GBS can open up a new business model for publishers and other content industries, centered around aggregated rights holdings. However, the economic inertia that private ordering represents may pose a threat to the knowledge-oriented goals of copyright law