78 research outputs found
Complexity of and Algorithms for Borda Manipulation
We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute
how to manipulate the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open
problems in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules.
Because of this NP-hardness, we treat computing a manipulation as an
approximation problem where we try to minimize the number of manipulators.
Based on ideas from bin packing and multiprocessor scheduling, we propose two
new approximation methods to compute manipulations of the Borda rule.
Experiments show that these methods significantly outperform the previous best
known %existing approximation method. We are able to find optimal manipulations
in almost all the randomly generated elections tested. Our results suggest
that, whilst computing a manipulation of the Borda rule by a coalition is
NP-hard, computational complexity may provide only a weak barrier against
manipulation in practice
Swap Bribery
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an
external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in
order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery
where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is
asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter's
preference list by paying for a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates.
Each swap may have a different price; the price of a bribery is the sum of the
prices of all swaps that it involves. We prove complexity results for this
model, which we call swap bribery, for a broad class of election systems,
including variants of approval and k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and maximin.Comment: 17 page
Resolving the Complexity of Some Fundamental Problems in Computational Social Choice
This thesis is in the area called computational social choice which is an
intersection area of algorithms and social choice theory.Comment: Ph.D. Thesi
The Complexity of Manipulating -Approval Elections
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity
of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and
bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often
tempting at the individual level but disastrous for the agents as a whole.
Creating election systems where the determination of such strategies is
difficult is thus an important goal.
An interesting set of elections is that of scoring protocols. Previous work
in this area has demonstrated the complexity of misuse in cases involving a
fixed number of candidates, and of specific election systems on unbounded
number of candidates such as Borda. In contrast, we take the first step in
generalizing the results of computational complexity of election misuse to
cases of infinitely many scoring protocols on an unbounded number of
candidates. Interesting families of systems include -approval and -veto
elections, in which voters distinguish candidates from the candidate set.
Our main result is to partition the problems of these families based on their
complexity. We do so by showing they are polynomial-time computable, NP-hard,
or polynomial-time equivalent to another problem of interest. We also
demonstrate a surprising connection between manipulation in election systems
and some graph theory problems
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