Neural Mechanisms for Information Compression by Multiple Alignment, Unification and Search

This article describes how an abstract framework for perception and cognition may be realised in terms of neural mechanisms and neural processing. This framework — called information compression by multiple alignment, unification and search (ICMAUS) — has been developed in previous research as a generalized model of any system for processing information, either natural or artificial. It has a range of applications including the analysis and production of natural language, unsupervised inductive learning, recognition of objects and patterns, probabilistic reasoning, and others. The proposals in this article may be seen as an extension and development of Hebb’s (1949) concept of a ‘cell assembly’. The article describes how the concept of ‘pattern’ in the ICMAUS framework may be mapped onto a version of the cell assembly concept and the way in which neural mechanisms may achieve the effect of ‘multiple alignment’ in the ICMAUS framework. By contrast with the Hebbian concept of a cell assembly, it is proposed here that any one neuron can belong in one assembly and only one assembly. A key feature of present proposals, which is not part of the Hebbian concept, is that any cell assembly may contain ‘references’ or ‘codes’ that serve to identify one or more other cell assemblies. This mechanism allows information to be stored in a compressed form, it provides a robust mechanism by which assemblies may be connected to form hierarchies and other kinds of structure, it means that assemblies can express abstract concepts, and it provides solutions to some of the other problems associated with cell assemblies. Drawing on insights derived from the ICMAUS framework, the article also describes how learning may be achieved with neural mechanisms. This concept of learning is significantly different from the Hebbian concept and appears to provide a better account of what we know about human learning

Quantum information in the Posner model of quantum cognition

Matthew Fisher recently postulated a mechanism by which quantum phenomena could influence cognition: Phosphorus nuclear spins may resist decoherence for long times, especially when in Posner molecules. The spins would serve as biological qubits. We imagine that Fisher postulates correctly. How adroitly could biological systems process quantum information (QI)? We establish a framework for answering. Additionally, we construct applications of biological qubits to quantum error correction, quantum communication, and quantum computation. First, we posit how the QI encoded by the spins transforms as Posner molecules form. The transformation points to a natural computational basis for qubits in Posner molecules. From the basis, we construct a quantum code that detects arbitrary single-qubit errors. Each molecule encodes one qutrit. Shifting from information storage to computation, we define the model of Posner quantum computation. To illustrate the model's quantum-communication ability, we show how it can teleport information incoherently: A state's weights are teleported. Dephasing results from the entangling operation's simulation of a coarse-grained Bell measurement. Whether Posner quantum computation is universal remains an open question. However, the model's operations can efficiently prepare a Posner state usable as a resource in universal measurement-based quantum computation. The state results from deforming the Affleck-Kennedy-Lieb-Tasaki (AKLT) state and is a projected entangled-pair state (PEPS). Finally, we show that entanglement can affect molecular-binding rates, boosting a binding probability from 33.6% to 100% in an example. This work opens the door for the QI-theoretic analysis of biological qubits and Posner molecules.Comment: Published versio

Neural Unpredictability, the Interpretation of Quantum Theory, and the Mind-Body Problem

It has been suggested, on the one hand, that quantum states are just states of knowledge; and, on the other, that quantum theory is merely a theory of correlations. These suggestions are confronted with problems about the nature of psycho-physical parallelism and about how we could define probabilities for our individual future observations given our individual present and previous observations. The complexity of the problems is underlined by arguments that unpredictability in ordinary everyday neural functioning, ultimately stemming from small-scale uncertainties in molecular motions, may overwhelm, by many orders of magnitude, many conventionally recognized sources of observed ``quantum'' uncertainty. Some possible ways of avoiding the problems are considered but found wanting. It is proposed that a complete understanding of the relationship between subjective experience and its physical correlates requires the introduction of mathematical definitions and indeed of new physical laws.Comment: 27 pages, plain TeX, v2: missing reference inserted, related papers from http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd101