27,163 research outputs found
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE QUALITY OF SERVICE IN INTERCONNECTION
This paper analyses the structure of the Internet marketplace and the business relationships of key players involved in network services provision. A brief overview of existing pricing policies and research work in this area is presented and some new issues are introduced. We believe that the role of information asymmetry is critical when considering agreements for Internet access and interconnection. In negotiation and contract preparation, information asymmetry gives rise to adverse selection. The current structure of connectivity agreements does not address information asymmetries thus allowing the possibility of opportunistic behaviour in the form of moral hazard. Inasmuch as interconnection agreements involve sharing and/or exchanging network resources, either party will tend to exploit the agreement to its own advantage (i.e. conserving its own resources) and, possibly, to the detriment of the other (i.e. overutilising the other’s resources). The discussion focuses on interconnection agreements between Internet Service Providers, namely peering and transit. The paper concludes with an outline of an incentive compatible mechanism that can sustain quality of service requirements in interconnection agreements.interconnection information asymmetry
Notes on Cloud computing principles
This letter provides a review of fundamental distributed systems and economic
Cloud computing principles. These principles are frequently deployed in their
respective fields, but their inter-dependencies are often neglected. Given that
Cloud Computing first and foremost is a new business model, a new model to sell
computational resources, the understanding of these concepts is facilitated by
treating them in unison. Here, we review some of the most important concepts
and how they relate to each other
Breaking the Economic Barrier of Caching in Cellular Networks: Incentives and Contracts
In this paper, a novel approach for providing incentives for caching in small
cell networks (SCNs) is proposed based on the economics framework of contract
theory. In this model, a mobile network operator (MNO) designs contracts that
will be offered to a number of content providers (CPs) to motivate them to
cache their content at the MNO's small base stations (SBSs). A practical model
in which information about the traffic generated by the CPs' users is not known
to the MNO is considered. Under such asymmetric information, the incentive
contract between the MNO and each CP is properly designed so as to determine
the amount of allocated storage to the CP and the charged price by the MNO. The
contracts are derived by the MNO in a way to maximize the global benefit of the
CPs and prevent them from using their private information to manipulate the
outcome of the caching process. For this interdependent contract model, the
closed-form expressions of the price and the allocated storage space to each CP
are derived. This proposed mechanism is shown to satisfy the sufficient and
necessary conditions for the feasibility of a contract. Moreover, it is shown
that the proposed pricing model is budget balanced, enabling the MNO to cover
all the caching expenses via the prices charged to the CPs. Simulation results
show that none of the CPs will have an incentive to choose a contract designed
for CPs with different traffic loads.Comment: Accepted for publication at Globecom 201
Using Tuangou to reduce IP transit costs
A majority of ISPs (Internet Service Providers) support connectivity to the entire Internet by transiting their traffic via other providers. Although the transit prices per Mbps decline steadily, the overall transit costs of these ISPs remain high or even increase, due to the traffic growth. The discontent of the ISPs with the high transit costs has yielded notable innovations such as peering, content distribution networks, multicast, and peer-to-peer localization. While the above solutions tackle the problem by reducing the transit traffic, this paper explores a novel approach that reduces the transit costs without altering the traffic. In the proposed CIPT (Cooperative IP Transit), multiple ISPs cooperate to jointly purchase IP (Internet Protocol) transit in bulk. The aggregate transit costs decrease due to the economies-of-scale effect of typical subadditive pricing as well as burstable billing: not all ISPs transit their peak traffic during the same period. To distribute the aggregate savings among the CIPT partners, we propose Shapley-value sharing of the CIPT transit costs. Using public data about IP traffic of 264 ISPs and transit prices, we quantitatively evaluate CIPT and show that significant savings can be achieved, both in relative and absolute terms. We also discuss the organizational embodiment, relationship with transit providers, traffic confidentiality, and other aspects of CIPT
On the Economics of Cloud Markets
Cloud computing is a paradigm that has the potential to transform and
revolutionalize the next generation IT industry by making software available to
end-users as a service. A cloud, also commonly known as a cloud network,
typically comprises of hardware (network of servers) and a collection of
softwares that is made available to end-users in a pay-as-you-go manner.
Multiple public cloud providers (ex., Amazon) co-existing in a cloud computing
market provide similar services (software as a service) to its clients, both in
terms of the nature of an application, as well as in quality of service (QoS)
provision. The decision of whether a cloud hosts (or finds it profitable to
host) a service in the long-term would depend jointly on the price it sets, the
QoS guarantees it provides to its customers, and the satisfaction of the
advertised guarantees. In this paper, we devise and analyze three
inter-organizational economic models relevant to cloud networks. We formulate
our problems as non co-operative price and QoS games between multiple cloud
providers existing in a cloud market. We prove that a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (NE) exists in two of the three models. Our analysis paves the path
for each cloud provider to 1) know what prices and QoS level to set for
end-users of a given service type, such that the provider could exist in the
cloud market, and 2) practically and dynamically provision appropriate capacity
for satisfying advertised QoS guarantees.Comment: 7 pages, 2 figure
International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate
The “taxation of the digital economy” is currently at the top of the global international tax policymaking agenda. A core claim some European governments are advancing is that user data or user participation in the digital economy justifies a gross tax on digital receipts, new profit attribution criteria, or a special formulary apportionment factor in a future formulary regime targeted specifically at the “digital economy.” Just a couple years ago the OECD undertook an evaluation of whether the digital economy can (or should) be “ring-fenced” as part of the BEPS project, and concluded that it neither can be nor should be.
Importantly, concluding that there should be no special rules for the digital economy does not resolve the broader question of whether the international tax system requires reform. The practical reality appears to be that all the largest economies have come to agree either that a) there is something wrong with the taxation of the “digital economy,” or b) there is something more fundamentally wrong with the structure of the current international tax system given globalization and technological trends.
This paper is intended as a limited exploration of the second (or third, or fourth) best. It analyzes three policy options that have been discussed in general terms in the current global debate. First, I consider whether “user participation” justifies changing profit allocation results in the digital economy alone. I conclude that applying the user participation concept in a manner that is limited to the digital economy is intellectually indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist ring-fencing. Moreover, at the technical level user participation faces all the same challenges as more comprehensive and principled proposals for reallocating excess returns among jurisdictions. Second, I consider one such comprehensive international tax reform idea, loosely referred to by the moniker “marketing intangibles.” This idea represents a compromise between the present transfer pricing system and sales or destination-based reforms to the transfer pricing regime. I conclude that splitting taxing rights over “excess” returns between the present transfer pricing system and a destination-based approach is complex, creates new sources of potential conflict, and requires relatively extensive tax harmonization. This conclusion applies equally to user participation and marketing intangibles. If such a mechanism were nevertheless pursued, I suggest that a formulary system for splitting the excess return is the most manageable approach. Third, I consider “minimum effective taxation” ideas. I conclude that, as compared to the other two policy options discussed herein, minimum effective taxation provides a preferable path for multilateral cooperation
- …