Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local

We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bil\`o et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy-changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the price of anarchy.Comment: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Mathematical Foundations on Computer Scienc

On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Formation

We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all shortest path distances to the other nodes, we use the probabilistic method to provide a new, structural characterization of equilibrium graphs. We show how to use this characterization in order to prove upper bounds on the diameter of equilibrium graphs in terms of the size of the largest $k$-vicinity (defined as the the set of vertices within distance $k$ from a vertex), for any $k \geq 1$ and in terms of the number of edges, thus settling positively a conjecture of Alon et al. in the cases of graphs of large $k$-vicinity size (including graphs of large maximum degree) and of graphs which are dense enough. Next, we present a new swap-based network creation game, in which selfish costs depend on the immediate neighborhood of each node; in particular, the profit of a node is defined as the sum of the degrees of its neighbors. We prove that, in contrast to the previous model, this network creation game admits an exact potential, and also that any equilibrium graph contains an induced star. The existence of the potential function is exploited in order to show that an equilibrium can be reached in expected polynomial time even in the case where nodes can only acquire limited knowledge concerning non-neighboring nodes.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figure

The Social Climbing Game

The structure of a society depends, to some extent, on the incentives of the individuals they are composed of. We study a stylized model of this interplay, that suggests that the more individuals aim at climbing the social hierarchy, the more society's hierarchy gets strong. Such a dependence is sharp, in the sense that a persistent hierarchical order emerges abruptly when the preference for social status gets larger than a threshold. This phase transition has its origin in the fact that the presence of a well defined hierarchy allows agents to climb it, thus reinforcing it, whereas in a "disordered" society it is harder for agents to find out whom they should connect to in order to become more central. Interestingly, a social order emerges when agents strive harder to climb society and it results in a state of reduced social mobility, as a consequence of ergodicity breaking, where climbing is more difficult.Comment: 14 pages, 9 figure

Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization

Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as immunization against attack. An agent's benefit is the expected size of her connected component post-attack, and agents may also choose to immunize themselves from attack at some additional cost. Our framework is a stylized model of settings where reachability rather than centrality is the primary concern and vertices vulnerable to attacks may reduce risk via costly measures. In the reachability benefit model without attack or immunization, the set of equilibria is the empty graph and any tree. The introduction of attack and immunization changes the game dramatically; new equilibrium topologies emerge, some more sparse and some more dense than trees. We show that, under a mild assumption on the adversary, every equilibrium network with $n$ agents contains at most $2n-4$ edges for $n\geq 4$. So despite permitting topologies denser than trees, the amount of overbuilding is limited. We also show that attack and immunization don't significantly erode social welfare: every non-trivial equilibrium with respect to several adversaries has welfare at least as that of any equilibrium in the attack-free model. We complement our theory with simulations demonstrating fast convergence of a new bounded rationality dynamic which generalizes linkstable best response but is considerably more powerful in our game. The simulations further elucidate the wide variety of asymmetric equilibria and demonstrate topological consequences of the dynamics e.g. heavy-tailed degree distributions. Finally, we report on a behavioral experiment on our game with over 100 participants, where despite the complexity of the game, the resulting network was surprisingly close to equilibrium.Comment: The short version of this paper appears in the proceedings of WINE-1

Selected Topics in Network Optimization: Aligning Binary Decision Diagrams for a Facility Location Problem and a Search Method for Dynamic Shortest Path Interdiction

This work deals with three different combinatorial optimization problems: minimizing the total size of a pair of binary decision diagrams (BDDs) under a certain structural property, a variant of the facility location problem, and a dynamic version of the Shortest-Path Interdiction (DSPI) problem. However, these problems all have the following core idea in common: They all stem from representing an optimization problem as a decision diagram. We begin from cases in which such a diagram representation of reasonable size might exist, but finding a small diagram is difficult to achieve. The first problem develops a heuristic for enforcing a structural property for a collection of BDDs, which allows them to be merged into a single one efficiently. In the second problem, we consider a specific combinatorial problem that allows for a natural representation by a pair of BDDs. We use the previous result and ideas developed earlier in the literature to reformulate this problem as a linear program over a single BDD. This approach enables us to obtain sensitivity information, while often enjoying runtimes comparable to a mixed integer program solved with a commercial solver, after we pay the computational overhead of building the diagram (e.g., when re-solving the problem using different costs, but the same graph topology). In the last part, we examine DSPI, for which building the full decision diagram is generally impractical. We formalize the concept of a game tree for the DSPI and design a heuristic based on the idea of building only selected parts of this exponentially-sized decision diagram (which is not binary any more). We use a Monte Carlo Tree Search framework to establish policies that are near optimal. To mitigate the size of the game tree, we leverage previously derived bounds for the DSPI and employ an alpha–beta pruning technique for minimax optimization. We highlight the practicality of these ideas in a series of numerical experiments

On Euler Tours in Streaming Models and some Games on Graphs

In this thesis, we take a look at several graph theoretical problems. We present two streaming algorithms for finding an Euler tour in a graph, prove a tight bound on the capture time in the Bridge-Burning Cops and Robbers Game and solve an open problem for the Extreme Vertex Destruction Model. In Chapter 2, we consider the classical Euler tour problem and take a modern look at this problem in the context of the graph streaming model. Here, RAM is of size O(n polylog(n)), where n is the number of nodes, and the graph is given as a stream of its edges. With this restricted memory space, we give a one-pass algorithm for finding Euler tours in the graph streaming model. In Chapter 3, we regard a lesser-known streaming model, the so-called StrSort model, to tackle a downside of our algorithm mentioned above. The algorithm stores an Euler tour on an output tape in form of a successor function. The order of the edges is given, but the edges are not actually sorted in the order of the Euler tour. Therefore, further processing the tour with another streaming algorithm might become difficult. We give an algorithm for sorting the edges of a graph according to a found Euler tour, that has a preparation step in the graph streaming model and a processing step in the StrSort model. The so-called Bridge-Burning Cops and Robbers Game is the topic of Chapter 4. Here, every time the robber traverses an edge, this edge is deleted afterwards. We study winning strategies of a single cop and make statements on the maximum number of turns of such strategies. In Chapter 5, we study networks formed by selfish agents. When a node is ‘destroyed’, i.e. the adjacent edges are deleted, the network is damaged and some players lose the connection to each other. In the Extreme Vertex Destruction Model, we observe the impact of such a deletion on swap equilibrium graphs and make statements on the maximum amount of damage that can cause here