In Harm\u27s Way: The Continued Relevance of the U.S. Navy\u27s Forward Presence Mission in the Post-Cold War World

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States Navy has seen the fleet shrink from nearly 600 ships in 1988 to 320 ships in 1999, with a planned reduction to 305 ships by 2004. While the fleet has been reduced by nearly 50 percent over the last decade, the deployment of U.S. naval forces has continued at near-Cold War levels. The result is a mismatch between the national security requirements that naval forces are called on to support, and the forces available to meet those requirements. Some have suggested that the traditional forward presence mission of the Navy-Marine Corps team is no longer relevant in the post-Cold War environment. Others suggest that virtual presence through space surveillance and global air power can replace the physical presence of naval forces. Still others have advocated a return to an isolationist policy, forgoing military presence altogether. Although U.S. naval forces are no longer required to counter the threat of Soviet aggression, possible peer or near-peer competitors, such as Russia and China, combined with emerging regional powers, require that the United States maintain forces in areas near U.S. interests. This thesis will examine the continued importance of maintaining a strong naval presence in the three principal areas of U.S. interest--the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia--and the inability to meet U.S. national security requirements with proposed alternatives to forward presence. Also covered will be new systems and operational concepts of the Navy-Marine Corps team, and their importance to the forward presence mission

DDG 1000

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, Technology and Policy Program, 2006.Includes bibliographical references.Cost growth and inefficiencies are a serious problem in almost all major U.S. defense procurement programs, and have existed for many years despite repeated efforts to control them. These problems are particularly virulent in the design and acquisition of new naval warships. If the Navy cannot bring its costs under control, it will not be able to afford the capabilities it needs to execute the nation's national security. Several factors influence the cost growth of weapons procurement programs. Intentionally low estimates can help convince Congress to commit to programs that are actually very expensive. Bureaucratic politics can cause the Navy to spend money on superfluous features unjustified by strategic requirements. Private industry can push new, expensive technology on the Navy. Members of Congress can include pork-barrel provisions to bring more money to their constituents, often without national interest justifications. This thesis evaluates the development of the DDG 1000, the Navy's next-generation destroyer, and the dramatic change that occurred to the design of that ship during its development. Based on that analysis, it makes recommendations for the future of the DDG 1000 and for naval ship procurement more generally.(cont.) The thesis finds that though a new ship was justified in the post-Cold War world, the actual design of that ship was determined by bureaucratic politics and the ship's procurement plan was determined by pork-barrel politics, neither of which properly served the nation's strategic interests. The thesis recommends that the DDG 1000 be used solely as a technology demonstration platform, reducing procurement spending while salvaging its technological advances; that the DDG 1000 be procured from a single shipyard; that the Navy design a smaller and cheaper warship to serve the needs of the future fleet; and that the nation implement specific measures to reduce the influence of bureaucratic politics and pork barrel politics on resource allocation and procurement.by Peter Stampfl Jaglom.S.M

Developing the Technical Warrior

A selection of historical quotations on the significance and value of technical education on the warfighter, including a section on the specific value of an NPS education. Sources and dates are included for each

Acquiring the Tools of Grand Strategy: The US Navy\u27s LCS as a Case Study

Grand strategy is about how states allocate resources and employ these resources to achieve desired political conditions. In examining the match between desired ends and available ways and means, an often-overlooked subject is how the specific tools of grand strategy are forged. One of these tools is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) that started in 2000. LCS remains a controversial and often unpopular program with many stakeholders to this day. This study examines how the means of grand strategy, in this case a new ship class, are acquired. It also looks at how these means are employed (ways) to achieve the desired outcomes (ends) and the feedback loop between means, ways, and ends. The initial portion of the study examines how the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of the Navy formally acquire systems or “systems of systems.” The second portion of the study examines the design, construction, and fielding of the LCS class or the attainment of Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The final portion analyzes the design, construction, and introduction of the LCS into the fleet in terms of the three models used by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in Essence of Decision; the Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior, and Governmental Politics – Models I, II, and III respectively. The hypothesis is that individual personalities may have more influence than any of these models account for and that instances of individual impact may offer more nuanced insights into these models of state behavior. This study reveals that the process of evolutionary acquisition and spiral development caused increased risk in the time-line for achieving Final Operational Capacity (FOC) of LCS. It also provides insight into the reaction and adaption of a large organization to changes in its environment. This study does not however reveal strong evidence to support the hypothesis of individual personalities significantly influencing decision making or action taking compared to organizations in Models I-III. The details of individual participation and internal deliberations are obscured by security and proprietary rules which privileges models I and II in the analysis

Red Perimeter Defeated: U.S. Naval Supremacy, Competitive Adaptation, and the Third Battle of the Atlantic, 1946-1981

This dissertation examines the long-term military competition between the U.S. and Soviet navies during 1946-81. It investigates the dynamics of naval posture change by integrating insights from military innovation theory with in-depth process tracing, thus providing a much-improved understanding of the Cold War at sea during the most decisive phases of the 'Third Battle of the Atlantic'

Sea Mines and Countermeasures: A Bibliography

This compilation was prepared for the Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Commanding Men and Machines: Admiralship, Technology, and Ideology in the 20th Century U.S. Navy

This dissertation engages the important historical and sociological question: how do organizations develop leaders? As technological complexity increased, the military struggled to produce leaders who could understand technology and yet integrate the operations of disparate parts of large organizations. In the late 20th century, the senior leader model in the U.S. military shifted from a 'generalist' to what can be described as a 'technical specialist' model. The commanding elite that resulted have been criticized as overly technical in orientation, and the system of leader development has been subject to several reform efforts. Missing from the reform debates is an historical understanding of how and why the officer system changed. This study contributes to the history by exploring the shift in U.S. Navy leader models from 'generalist' to 'technical specialist'. It is widely believed in military circles that the shift in leadership models from 'generalist' to 'specialist' was natural, an inevitable consequence of technological change. Among scholars, the shift in the U.S. Navy from 'generalist' to 'specialist' is typically associated with aviation, circa 1935-47. This dissertation challenges these notions. The shift in leader models was not fated by technology, but was the result of highly contingent bureaucratic battles fought between general line officers (generalists) and nuclear reactor specialists for control of the development of young officers. Chance events-- in particular, the sinking of USS THRESHER-- also shaped officer policy. This study argues that for six decades--from 1899 to 1963-- navy leadership affirmed the 'generalist' as the preferred model for commander. But in the 1960s the Navy abandoned the 'generalist' model. Admiral H.G. Rickover was largely responsible for the change. In the space of a decade, Rickover restructured assignment and education processes to produce technically expert officers for his nuclear machines. Naval Academy admissions criteria and curricula were changed such that specialized technical majors replaced general degrees and universal language education. The restructured processes encouraged officers to value specialized technical expertise over general knowledge, that is, integrated operational, strategic, and cultural knowledge. Aviators and surface officers followed Rickover's cue and by the 1970s adopted more specialized models of development for their respective officers

2005 BRAC Commission

2005 BRAC COMMISSION REGIONAL HEARING THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2005 1:00 PM. LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA STATES TESTIFYING: CALIFORNIA AND GUAM