1,224 research outputs found

    A Nested Family of kk-total Effective Rewards for Positional Games

    Get PDF
    We consider Gillette's two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each k \in \ZZ_+ we introduce an effective reward function, called kk-total. For k=0k = 0 and 11 this function is known as {\it mean payoff} and {\it total reward}, respectively. We restrict our attention to the deterministic case. For all kk, we prove the existence of a saddle point which can be realized by uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies. We also demonstrate that kk-total reward games can be embedded into (k+1)(k+1)-total reward games

    On Nash-Solvability of Finite Two-Person Tight Vector Game Forms

    Full text link
    We consider finite two-person normal form games. The following four properties of their game forms are equivalent: (i) Nash-solvability, (ii) zero-sum-solvability, (iii) win-lose-solvability, and (iv) tightness. For (ii, iii, iv) this was shown by Edmonds and Fulkerson in 1970. Then, in 1975, (i) was added to this list and it was also shown that these results cannot be generalized for nn-person case with n>2n > 2. In 1990, tightness was extended to vector game forms (vv-forms) and it was shown that such vv-tightness and zero-sum-solvability are still equivalent, yet, do not imply Nash-solvability. These results are applicable to several classes of stochastic games with perfect information. Here we suggest one more extension of tightness introducing v+v^+-tight vector game forms (v+v^+-forms). We show that such v+v^+-tightness and Nash-solvability are equivalent in case of weakly rectangular game forms and positive cost functions. This result allows us to reduce the so-called bi-shortest path conjecture to v+v^+-tightness of v+v^+-forms. However, both (equivalent) statements remain open

    Average-energy games

    Get PDF
    Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the objective is to optimize the long-run average gain per action, and energy games, where the system has to avoid running out of energy. We study average-energy games, where the goal is to optimize the long-run average of the accumulated energy. We show that this objective arises naturally in several applications, and that it yields interesting connections with previous concepts in the literature. We prove that deciding the winner in such games is in NP inter coNP and at least as hard as solving mean-payoff games, and we establish that memoryless strategies suffice to win. We also consider the case where the system has to minimize the average-energy while maintaining the accumulated energy within predefined bounds at all times: this corresponds to operating with a finite-capacity storage for energy. We give results for one-player and two-player games, and establish complexity bounds and memory requirements.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.0685

    Modeling Mutual Influence in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

    Get PDF
    In multi-agent systems (MAS), agents rarely act in isolation but tend to achieve their goals through interactions with other agents. To be able to achieve their ultimate goals, individual agents should actively evaluate the impacts on themselves of other agents' behaviors before they decide which actions to take. The impacts are reciprocal, and it is of great interest to model the mutual influence of agent's impacts with one another when they are observing the environment or taking actions in the environment. In this thesis, assuming that the agents are aware of each other's existence and their potential impact on themselves, I develop novel multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods that can measure the mutual influence between agents to shape learning. The first part of this thesis outlines the framework of recursive reasoning in deep multi-agent reinforcement learning. I hypothesize that it is beneficial for each agent to consider how other agents react to their behavior. I start from Probabilistic Recursive Reasoning (PR2) using level-1 reasoning and adopt variational Bayes methods to approximate the opponents' conditional policies. Each agent shapes the individual Q-value by marginalizing the conditional policies in the joint Q-value and finding the best response to improving their policies. I further extend PR2 to Generalized Recursive Reasoning (GR2) with different hierarchical levels of rationality. GR2 enables agents to possess various levels of thinking ability, thereby allowing higher-level agents to best respond to less sophisticated learners. The first part of the thesis shows that eliminating the joint Q-value to an individual Q-value via explicitly recursive reasoning would benefit the learning. In the second part of the thesis, in reverse, I measure the mutual influence by approximating the joint Q-value based on the individual Q-values. I establish Q-DPP, an extension of the Determinantal Point Process (DPP) with partition constraints, and apply it to multi-agent learning as a function approximator for the centralized value function. An attractive property of using Q-DPP is that when it reaches the optimum value, it can offer a natural factorization of the centralized value function, representing both quality (maximizing reward) and diversity (different behaviors). In the third part of the thesis, I depart from the action-level mutual influence and build a policy-space meta-game to analyze agents' relationship between adaptive policies. I present a Multi-Agent Trust Region Learning (MATRL) algorithm that augments single-agent trust region policy optimization with a weak stable fixed point approximated by the policy-space meta-game. The algorithm aims to find a game-theoretic mechanism to adjust the policy optimization steps that force the learning of all agents toward the stable point

    Evolutionary games on graphs

    Full text link
    Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure

    Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems

    Get PDF
    This open access two-volume set constitutes the proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, TACAS 2021, which was held during March 27 – April 1, 2021, as part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2021. The conference was planned to take place in Luxembourg and changed to an online format due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The total of 41 full papers presented in the proceedings was carefully reviewed and selected from 141 submissions. The volume also contains 7 tool papers; 6 Tool Demo papers, 9 SV-Comp Competition Papers. The papers are organized in topical sections as follows: Part I: Game Theory; SMT Verification; Probabilities; Timed Systems; Neural Networks; Analysis of Network Communication. Part II: Verification Techniques (not SMT); Case Studies; Proof Generation/Validation; Tool Papers; Tool Demo Papers; SV-Comp Tool Competition Papers
    • …
    corecore