Risk-Aware Planning for Sensor Data Collection

With the emergence of low-cost unmanned air vehicles, civilian and military organizations are quickly identifying new applications for affordable, large-scale collectives to support and augment human efforts via sensor data collection. In order to be viable, these collectives must be resilient to the risk and uncertainty of operating in real-world environments. Previous work in multi-agent planning has avoided planning for the loss of agents in environments with risk. In contrast, this dissertation presents a problem formulation that includes the risk of losing agents, the effect of those losses on the mission being executed, and provides anticipatory planning algorithms that consider risk. We conduct a thorough analysis of the effects of risk on path-based planning, motivating new solution methods. We then use hierarchical clustering to generate risk-aware plans for a variable number of agents, outperforming traditional planning methods. Next, we provide a mechanism for distributed negotiation of stable plans, utilizing coalitional game theory to provide cost allocation methods that we prove to be fair and stable. Centralized planning with redundancy is then explored, planning for parallel task completion to mitigate risk and provide further increased expected value. Finally, we explore the role of cost uncertainty as additional source of risk, using bi-objective optimization to generate sets of alternative plans. We demonstrate the capability of our algorithms on randomly generated problem instances, showing an improvement over traditional multi-agent planning methods as high as 500% on very large problem instances

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Centralized versus market-based approaches to mobile task allocation problem: State-of-the-art

Centralized approach has been adopted for finding solutions to resource allocation problems (RAPs) in many real-life applications. On the other hand, market-based approach has been proposed as an alternative to solve the problem due to recent advancement in ICT technologies. In spite of the existence of some efforts to review the pros and cons of each approach in RAPs, the studies cannot be directly applied to specific problem domains like mobile task allocation problem which is characterised with high level of uncertainty on the availability of resources (workers). This paper aims to review existing studies on task allocation problems(TAPs) focusing on those two approaches and their comparison and identify major issues that need to be resolved for comparing the two approaches in mobile task allocation problems. Mobile Task Allocation Problem (MTAP) is defined and its problematic structures are explained in relation with task allocation to mobile workers. Solutions produced by each approach to some applications and variations of MTAP are also discussed and compared. Finally, some future research directions are identified in order to compare both approaches in function of uncertainty emerging from the mobile nature of the MTAP

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 2

In this work the self-organising potential of the CATNETS allocation mechanism is described to provide a more comprehensive view on the research done in this project. The formal description of either the centralised and decentralised approach is presented. Furthermore the agents' bidding model is described and a comprehensive overview on how the catallactic mechanism is incorporated into the middleware and simulator environments is given. --Decentralized Market Mechanisms,Centralized Market Mechanisms,Catallaxy,Market Engineering,Simulator Integration,Prototype Integration

Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 3

In this document the developments in defining the computational and theoretical framework for economical resource allocation are described. Accordingly the formal specification of the market mechanisms, bidding strategies of the involved agents and the integration of the market mechanisms into the simulator were refined. --Grid Computing

Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729