47,444 research outputs found

    Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains

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    This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

    Beliefs and Conflicts in a Real World Multiagent System

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    In a real world multiagent system, where the agents are faced with partial, incomplete and intrinsically dynamic knowledge, conflicts are inevitable. Frequently, different agents have goals or beliefs that cannot hold simultaneously. Conflict resolution methodologies have to be adopted to overcome such undesirable occurrences. In this paper we investigate the application of distributed belief revision techniques as the support for conflict resolution in the analysis of the validity of the candidate beams to be produced in the CERN particle accelerators. This CERN multiagent system contains a higher hierarchy agent, the Specialist agent, which makes use of meta-knowledge (on how the conflicting beliefs have been produced by the other agents) in order to detect which beliefs should be abandoned. Upon solving a conflict, the Specialist instructs the involved agents to revise their beliefs accordingly. Conflicts in the problem domain are mapped into conflicting beliefs of the distributed belief revision system, where they can be handled by proven formal methods. This technique builds on well established concepts and combines them in a new way to solve important problems. We find this approach generally applicable in several domains

    Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons From General Theory and Varied Contexts

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    Does the field of conflict resolution have any broadly applicable theories that work across the different domains of international and domestic conflict? Or, are contexts, participants, and resources so domain specific and variable that only thick descriptions of particular contexts will do? These are important questions which have been plaguing me in this depressing time for conflict resolution professionals, from September 11,2001 (9/11), to the war against Iraq. Have we learned anything about conflict resolution that really does improve our ability to describe, predict, and act to reduce unnecessary and harmful conflict? These are the questions I want to explore in this essay, all the while knowing that I will ask more questions than I have answers to. My hope is to spark more rigorous attention to the possibility of comparative dispute resolution study and practice, using key concepts, theories, empirical studies, practical wisdom, and experiential insights to spark and encourage more multi-level and multi-unit analysis of some of our shared propositions

    Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry

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    This paper analyses the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In his work, Harsanyi (1956) draws Nash’s solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930). Whereas Schelling (1960) proposes a multi-faceted theory of conflict that, without dismissing the assumption of rational behaviour, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi and Schelling’s contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry, as postulated by Nash (1950), are then presented. The analysis of this debate illustrates that, although in the early 1960s two different approaches to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, only Harsanyi’s insights were fully developed later. Lastly, the causes of this evolution are assessed.bargaining, game theory, symmetry

    Coordination in software agent systems

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    The OPEC Boys and the political economy of smuggling in Northern Uganda

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    Bargaining Practices: Negotiating the Kampala Compromise for the International Criminal Court

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    At the International Criminal Court\u27s (ICC) Review Conference in 2010, the ICC\u27s Assembly of States Parties (ASP) agreed upon a definition of the crime of aggression, jurisdictional conditions, and a mechanism for its entry into force (the Kampala Compromise ). These amendments give the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute political and military leaders of states for planning, preparing, initiating, or executing illegal wars, beginning as early as January 2017. This article explains the bargaining practices of the diplomats that gave rise to this historic development in international law. This article argues that the international-practices framework, as currently conceived, does not adequately capture the role sincerity played in the negotiations. Sincerity was an international practice, but not a performance. It follows that the international practices framework should be adjusted to accommodate the decisive role of sincerity, a special nonperformative international practice, in the face-to-face interactions of international politics and diplomacy. The remainder of the article lays out the international-practices framework and explains the place of performances within it. The article then introduces the concept of sincerity as a social practice. The second half of the article discusses some ways that sincerity played a role in the negotiations. The article concludes that sincerity is a special kind of international practice: It cannot be a performance, but it can be an international practice, and an effective one at that

    Decentralized multi-agent path finding for UAV traffic management

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    The development of a real-world Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) system to ensure the safe integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in low altitude airspace, has recently generated novel research challenges. A key problem is the development of Pre-Flight Conflict Detection and Resolution (CDR) methods that provide collision-free flight paths to all UAVs before their takeoff. Such problem can be represented as a Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) problem. Currently, most MAPF methods assume that the UTM system is a centralized entity in charge of CDR. However, recent discussions on UTM suggest that such centralized control might not be practical or desirable. Therefore, we explore Pre-Flight CDR methods where independent UAS Service Providers (UASSPs) with their own interests, communicate with each other to resolve conflicts among their UAV operations--without centralized UTM directives. We propose a novel MAPF model that supports the decentralized resolution of conflicts, whereby different `agents', here UASSPs, manage their UAV operations. We present two approaches: (1) a prioritization approach and (2) a simple yet practical pairwise negotiation approach where UASSPs agents determine an agreement to solve conflicts between their UAV operations. We evaluate the performance of our proposed approaches with simulation scenarios based on a consultancy study of predicted UAV traffic for delivery services in Sendai, Japan, 2030. We demonstrate that our negotiation approach improves the ``fairness'' between UASSPs, i.e. the distribution of costs between UASSPs in terms of total delays and rejected operations due to replanning is more balanced when compared to the prioritization approach
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