Contextual Permission: A Solution to the Free Choice Paradox

In this paper, we give a solution to the Free Choice Paradox. This is done in two stages. First, we have a close look at the logical interpretation of the natural language statements that lead to the paradox. This leads to making the important distinction of permitting an action in isolation or permitting it in combination with some or any other action, i.e. in a certain context. This distinction is made formal by the introduction of a new operator on actions, which forces them to be performed in isolation. With this distinction made clear it is possible to give a "new", stronger definition for the permission operator, which solves the Free Choice Paradox and which does not lead to any new inconsistencies or paradoxes

Free choice and contextually permitted actions

We present a solution to the paradox of free choice permission by introducing strong and weak permission in a deontic logic of action. It is shown how counterintuitive consequences of strong permission can be avoided by limiting the contexts in which an action can be performed. This is done by introducing the only operator, which allows us to say that only is performed (and nothing else), and by introducing contextual interpretation of action term

The Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions Reloaded: Formalizing Contradictory Powers in the Potential Realm

In [7] the authors of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider a Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS). We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints -coming from present technical and experimental developments in QM- that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause have raised several arguments against the PAQS [1, 2, 3]. In [11, 12] it was argued that their reasoning presupposes a metaphysical stance according to which the physical representation of reality must be exclusively considered in terms of the equation: Actuality = Reality. However, from a different metaphysical standpoint their problems disappear. It was also argued that, if we accept the idea that quantum superpositions exist in a (contradictory) potential realm, it makes perfect sense to develop QM in terms of a paraconsistent approach and claim that quantum superpositions are contradictory, contextual existents. Following these ideas, and taking as a standpoint an interpretation in terms of the physical notions of power and potentia put forward in [10, 12, 15], we present a paraconsistent formalization of quantum superpositions that attempts to capture the main features of QM.Comment: 26 pages, no figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1502.05081, arXiv:1404.5186, arXiv:1506.0737

Objectionable thick concepts in denials

So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain sense. The paper also briefly considers contextualist, presuppositional, and implicature accounts of the evaluative contents of thick concepts, but finds none clearly superior to the others