Active inference, evidence accumulation, and the urn task

Deciding how much evidence to accumulate before making a decision is a problem we and other animals often face, but one that is not completely understood. This issue is particularly important because a tendency to sample less information (often known as reflection impulsivity) is a feature in several psychopathologies, such as psychosis. A formal understanding of information sampling may therefore clarify the computational anatomy of psychopathology. In this theoretical letter, we consider evidence accumulation in terms of active (Bayesian) inference using a generic model of Markov decision processes. Here, agents are equipped with beliefs about their own behavior--in this case, that they will make informed decisions. Normative decision making is then modeled using variational Bayes to minimize surprise about choice outcomes. Under this scheme, different facets of belief updating map naturally onto the functional anatomy of the brain (at least at a heuristic level). Of particular interest is the key role played by the expected precision of beliefs about control, which we have previously suggested may be encoded by dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain. We show that manipulating expected precision strongly affects how much information an agent characteristically samples, and thus provides a possible link between impulsivity and dopaminergic dysfunction. Our study therefore represents a step toward understanding evidence accumulation in terms of neurobiologically plausible Bayesian inference and may cast light on why this process is disordered in psychopathology

Optimal inference with suboptimal models:Addiction and active Bayesian inference

When casting behaviour as active (Bayesian) inference, optimal inference is defined with respect to an agent's beliefs - based on its generative model of the world. This contrasts with normative accounts of choice behaviour, in which optimal actions are considered in relation to the true structure of the environment - as opposed to the agent's beliefs about worldly states (or the task). This distinction shifts an understanding of suboptimal or pathological behaviour away from aberrant inference as such, to understanding the prior beliefs of a subject that cause them to behave less 'optimally' than our prior beliefs suggest they should behave. Put simply, suboptimal or pathological behaviour does not speak against understanding behaviour in terms of (Bayes optimal) inference, but rather calls for a more refined understanding of the subject's generative model upon which their (optimal) Bayesian inference is based. Here, we discuss this fundamental distinction and its implications for understanding optimality, bounded rationality and pathological (choice) behaviour. We illustrate our argument using addictive choice behaviour in a recently described 'limited offer' task. Our simulations of pathological choices and addictive behaviour also generate some clear hypotheses, which we hope to pursue in ongoing empirical work

Active Sensing as Bayes-Optimal Sequential Decision Making

Sensory inference under conditions of uncertainty is a major problem in both machine learning and computational neuroscience. An important but poorly understood aspect of sensory processing is the role of active sensing. Here, we present a Bayes-optimal inference and control framework for active sensing, C-DAC (Context-Dependent Active Controller). Unlike previously proposed algorithms that optimize abstract statistical objectives such as information maximization (Infomax) [Butko & Movellan, 2010] or one-step look-ahead accuracy [Najemnik & Geisler, 2005], our active sensing model directly minimizes a combination of behavioral costs, such as temporal delay, response error, and effort. We simulate these algorithms on a simple visual search task to illustrate scenarios in which context-sensitivity is particularly beneficial and optimization with respect to generic statistical objectives particularly inadequate. Motivated by the geometric properties of the C-DAC policy, we present both parametric and non-parametric approximations, which retain context-sensitivity while significantly reducing computational complexity. These approximations enable us to investigate the more complex problem involving peripheral vision, and we notice that the difference between C-DAC and statistical policies becomes even more evident in this scenario.Comment: Scheduled to appear in UAI 201