1,987 research outputs found

    Boltzmann meets Nash: Energy-efficient routing in optical networks under uncertainty

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    Motivated by the massive deployment of power-hungry data centers for service provisioning, we examine the problem of routing in optical networks with the aim of minimizing traffic-driven power consumption. To tackle this issue, routing must take into account energy efficiency as well as capacity considerations; moreover, in rapidly-varying network environments, this must be accomplished in a real-time, distributed manner that remains robust in the presence of random disturbances and noise. In view of this, we derive a pricing scheme whose Nash equilibria coincide with the network's socially optimum states, and we propose a distributed learning method based on the Boltzmann distribution of statistical mechanics. Using tools from stochastic calculus, we show that the resulting Boltzmann routing scheme exhibits remarkable convergence properties under uncertainty: specifically, the long-term average of the network's power consumption converges within ε\varepsilon of its minimum value in time which is at most O~(1/ε2)\tilde O(1/\varepsilon^2), irrespective of the fluctuations' magnitude; additionally, if the network admits a strict, non-mixing optimum state, the algorithm converges to it - again, no matter the noise level. Our analysis is supplemented by extensive numerical simulations which show that Boltzmann routing can lead to a significant decrease in power consumption over basic, shortest-path routing schemes in realistic network conditions.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figure

    Selfish Routing on Dynamic Flows

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    Selfish routing on dynamic flows over time is used to model scenarios that vary with time in which individual agents act in their best interest. In this paper we provide a survey of a particular dynamic model, the deterministic queuing model, and discuss how the model can be adjusted and applied to different real-life scenarios. We then examine how these adjustments affect the computability, optimality, and existence of selfish routings.Comment: Oberlin College Computer Science Honors Thesis. Supervisor: Alexa Sharp, Oberlin Colleg

    The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

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    We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.Comment: Full version of WINE 2012 paper, 24 page

    Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints

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    We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibrium. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.Comment: IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control (Accepted without changes). The first three authors contributed equall
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