A parallel downloading algorithm for redundant networks

In this paper, we study the downloading mechanism of BitTorrent (or BT), a P2P based popular and convenient parallel downloading software tool, point out some of its limitations, and propose an algorithm to improve its performance. In particular, we address the limitations of BT by using neighbours in P2P networks to resolve the redundant copies problem and to optimise the downloading speed. Our preliminary experiments show that the proposed enhancement algorithm works well

Efficiency and Nash Equilibria in a Scrip System for P2P Networks

A model of providing service in a P2P network is analyzed. It is shown that by adding a scrip system, a mechanism that admits a reasonable Nash equilibrium that reduces free riding can be obtained. The effect of varying the total amount of money (scrip) in the system on efficiency (i.e., social welfare) is analyzed, and it is shown that by maintaining the appropriate ratio between the total amount of money and the number of agents, efficiency is maximized. The work has implications for many online systems, not only P2P networks but also a wide variety of online forums for which scrip systems are popular, but formal analyses have been lacking

Massive data delivery in unstructured peer-to-peer networks with network coding

With more and more multimedia applications on the Internet, such as IPTV, bandwidth becomes a vital bottleneck for the booming of large scale Internet based multimedia applications. Network coding is recently proposed to take advantage to use network bandwidth efficiently. In this paper, we focus on massive multimedia data, e.g. IPTV programs, transportation in peer-to-peer networks with network coding. By through study of networking coding, we pointed out that the prerequisites of bandwidth saving of network coding are: 1) one information source with a number of concurrent receivers, or 2) information pieces cached at intermediate nodes. We further proof that network coding can not gain bandwidth saving at immediate connections to a receiver end; As a result, we propose a novel model for IPTV data transportation in unstructured peer-to-peer networks with network coding. Our preliminary simulations show that the proposed architecture works very well.<br /

Reliable downloading algorithms for bittorrent-like systems

In this paper we study a reliable downloading algorithm for BitTorrent-like systems, and attest it in mathematics. BitTorrent-like systems have become immensely popular peer-to-peer file distribution tools in the internet in recent years. We analyze them in theory and point out some of their limitations especially in reliability, and propose an algorithm to resolve these problems by using the redundant copies in neighbors in P2P networks and can further optimize the downloading speed in some condition. Our preliminary simulations show that the proposed reliable algorithm works well; the improved BitTorrent-like systems are very stable and reliable.<br /

The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions

We show that the ways incentives can be provided during dynamic interaction depend very crucially on the manner in which players learn information. This conclusion is established in a general stationary environment with noisy public monitoring and frequent actions. The monitoring process can be represented by a sum of a multi-dimensional Brownian component and a jump process. We show that jumps can be used to provide incentives both with transfers and value burning while continuous information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers. Also, it is asymptotically optimal to use the cumulative realization of the Brownian component linearly. Additionally, we approximate the equilibrium payoff set for fixed small discount rates as the periods become short by a series of linear programming problems. These problems highlight how the two types of information can be used to provide incentives.repeated games, dynamic incentives, frequent moves

The Public Option: a Non-regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality

Network neutrality and the role of regulation on the Internet have been heavily debated in recent times. Amongst the various definitions of network neutrality, we focus on the one which prohibits paid prioritization of content and we present an analytical treatment of the topic. We develop a model of the Internet ecosystem in terms of three primary players: consumers, ISPs and content providers. Our analysis looks at this issue from the point of view of the consumer, and we describe the desired state of the system as one which maximizes consumer surplus. By analyzing different scenarios of monopoly and competition, we obtain different conclusions on the desirability of regulation. We also introduce the notion of a Public Option ISP, an ISP that carries traffic in a network neutral manner. Our major findings are (i) in a monopolistic scenario, network neutral regulations benefit consumers; however, the introduction of a Public Option ISP is even better for consumers, as it aligns the interests of the monopolistic ISP with the consumer surplus and (ii) in an oligopolistic situation, the presence of a Public Option ISP is again preferable to network neutral regulations, although the presence of competing price-discriminating ISPs provides the most desirable situation for the consumers

Mechanisms for Outsourcing Computation via a Decentralized Market

As the number of personal computing and IoT devices grows rapidly, so does the amount of computational power that is available at the edge. Since many of these devices are often idle, there is a vast amount of computational power that is currently untapped, and which could be used for outsourcing computation. Existing solutions for harnessing this power, such as volunteer computing (e.g., BOINC), are centralized platforms in which a single organization or company can control participation and pricing. By contrast, an open market of computational resources, where resource owners and resource users trade directly with each other, could lead to greater participation and more competitive pricing. To provide an open market, we introduce MODiCuM, a decentralized system for outsourcing computation. MODiCuM deters participants from misbehaving-which is a key problem in decentralized systems-by resolving disputes via dedicated mediators and by imposing enforceable fines. However, unlike other decentralized outsourcing solutions, MODiCuM minimizes computational overhead since it does not require global trust in mediation results. We provide analytical results proving that MODiCuM can deter misbehavior, and we evaluate the overhead of MODiCuM using experimental results based on an implementation of our platform

Robust peer-to-peer systems

textPeer-to-peer (p2p) approaches are an increasingly effective way to deploy services. Popular examples include BitTorrent, Skype, and KaZaA. These approaches are attractive because they can be highly fault-tolerant, scalable, adaptive, and less expensive than a more centralized solution. Cooperation lies at the heart of these strengths. Yet, in settings where working together is crucial, a natural question is: "What if users stop cooperating?" After all, cooperative services are typically deployed over multiple administrative domains, and thus vulnerable to Byzantine failures and users who may act selfishly. This dissertation explores how to construct p2p systems to tolerate Byzantine participants while also incentivizing selfish participants to contribute resources. We describe how to balance obedience against choice in building a robust p2p live streaming system. Imposing obedience is desirable as it leaves little room for peers to attack or cheat the system. However, providing choice is also attractive as it allows us to engineer flexible and efficient solutions. We first focus on obedience by using Nash equilibria to drive the design of BAR Gossip, the first gossip protocol that is resilient to Byzantine and selfish nodes. BAR Gossip relies on verifiable pseudo-random partner selection to eliminate non-determinism, which can be used to game the system, while maintaining the robustness and rapid convergence of traditional gossip. A novel fair enough exchange primitive entices cooperation among selfish peers on short timescales, thereby avoiding the need for distributed reputation schemes. We next focus on tempering obedience with choice by using approximate equilibria to guide the construction of a novel p2p live streaming system. These equilibria allow us to design incentives to limit selfish behavior rigorously, yet provide sufficient flexibility to build practical systems. We show the advantages of using an [element of]-Nash equilibrium, instead of an exact Nash, to design and implement FlightPath, our live streaming system that uses bandwidth efficiently, absorbs flash crowds, adapts to sudden peer departures, handles churn, and tolerates malicious activity.Computer Science

Non-cooperative scheduling considered harmful in collaborative volunteer computing environments

Abstract-Advances in inter-networking technology and computing components have enabled Volunteer Computing (VC) systems that allows volunteers to donate their computers&apos; idle CPU cycles to a given project. BOINC is the most popular VC infrastructure today with over 580,000 hosts that deliver over 2,300 TeraFLOP per day. BOINC projects usually have hundreds of thousands of independent tasks and are interested in overall throughput. Each project has its own server which is responsible for distributing work units to clients, recovering results and validating them. The BOINC scheduling algorithms are complex and have been used for many years now. Their efficiency and fairness have been assessed in the context of throughput oriented projects. Yet, recently, burst projects, with fewer tasks and interested in response time, have emerged. Many works have proposed new scheduling algorithms to optimize individual response time but their use may be problematic in presence of other projects. In this article we show that the commonly used BOINC scheduling algorithms are unable to enforce fairness and project isolation. Burst projects may dramatically impact the performance of all other projects (burst or non-burst). To study such interactions, we perform a detailed, multi-player and multi-objective game theoretic study. Our analysis and experiments provide a good understanding on the impact of the different scheduling parameters and show that the non-cooperative optimization may result in inefficient and unfair share of the resources