3,561 research outputs found
Nash Codes for Noisy Channels
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with
transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender
and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy
channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to
signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output
as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an
equilibrium or "Nash code" results if the sender encodes every state as
prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash
codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more
surprising observation holds for communication over a binary channel which is
used independently a number of times, a basic model of information
transmission: Under a minimal "monotonicity" requirement for breaking ties when
decoding, which holds generically, EVERY code is a Nash code.Comment: More general main Theorem 6.5 with better proof. New examples and
introductio
Nash Equilibrium and information transmission coding and decoding rules
The design of equilibrium protocols in sender-receiver games where communication is noisy occupies an important place in the Economic literature. This paper shows that the common way of constructing a noisy channel communication protocol in Information Theory does not necessarily lead to a Nash equilibrium. Given the decoding scheme, it may happen that, given some state, it is better for the sender to transmit a message that is different from that prescribed by the codebook. Similarly, when the sender uses the codebook as prescribed, the receiver may sometimes prefer to deviate from the decoding scheme when receiving a message.Noisy channel, Shannon's Theorem, sender-receiver games, Nash equilibrium
Communication Strategies for Low-Latency Trading
The possibility of latency arbitrage in financial markets has led to the
deployment of high-speed communication links between distant financial centers.
These links are noisy and so there is a need for coding. In this paper, we
develop a gametheoretic model of trading behavior where two traders compete to
capture latency arbitrage opportunities using binary signalling. Different
coding schemes are strategies that trade off between reliability and latency.
When one trader has a better channel, the second trader should not compete.
With statistically identical channels, we find there are two different regimes
of channel noise for which: there is a unique Nash equilibrium yielding ties;
and there are two Nash equilibria with different winners.Comment: Will appear in IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT), 201
Principles of Physical Layer Security in Multiuser Wireless Networks: A Survey
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the domain of physical layer
security in multiuser wireless networks. The essential premise of
physical-layer security is to enable the exchange of confidential messages over
a wireless medium in the presence of unauthorized eavesdroppers without relying
on higher-layer encryption. This can be achieved primarily in two ways: without
the need for a secret key by intelligently designing transmit coding
strategies, or by exploiting the wireless communication medium to develop
secret keys over public channels. The survey begins with an overview of the
foundations dating back to the pioneering work of Shannon and Wyner on
information-theoretic security. We then describe the evolution of secure
transmission strategies from point-to-point channels to multiple-antenna
systems, followed by generalizations to multiuser broadcast, multiple-access,
interference, and relay networks. Secret-key generation and establishment
protocols based on physical layer mechanisms are subsequently covered.
Approaches for secrecy based on channel coding design are then examined, along
with a description of inter-disciplinary approaches based on game theory and
stochastic geometry. The associated problem of physical-layer message
authentication is also introduced briefly. The survey concludes with
observations on potential research directions in this area.Comment: 23 pages, 10 figures, 303 refs. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1303.1609 by other authors. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials,
201
Pragmatic Languages with Universal Grammars
This paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there may exist noisy information transmission. The Language is pragmatic in the sense that the Receiverâ best response depends on the context, i.e, on the payoffs and on the initial probability distribution of the states of nature of the underlying game. The Language has a universal grammar because the coding rule does not depend on such specific parameters and can then be applied to any Sender-Receiver game with noisy communication.grammar, pragmatic language, prototypes, separating equilibria
Information Design for Strategic Coordination of Autonomous Devices with Non-Aligned Utilities
In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with
non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as
players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their
long-run utility functions. The topology of the point-to-point network under
investigation, suggests that the decoder implements a strategy, knowing in
advance the strategy of the encoder. We characterize the encoding and decoding
functions that form an equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The
equilibrium solution is related to an auxiliary game in which both players
choose some conditional distributions in order to maximize their expected
utilities. This problem is closely related to the literature on "Information
Design" in Game Theory. We also characterize the set of posterior distributions
that are compatible with a rate-limited channel between the encoder and the
decoder. Finally, we provide an example of non-aligned utility functions
corresponding to parallel fading multiple access channels.Comment: IEEE Proc. of the Fifty-fourth Annual Allerton Conference Allerton
House, UIUC, Illinois, USA September 27 - 30, 201
Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria
This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game
problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have
misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the
extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional
sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash
equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary
scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all
equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash
equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On
the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For
multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may
be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian
source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the
encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also
includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine
Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For
the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium
when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when
affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems
and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in
strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure
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