Intellectual risk management in projects of transportation of large vehicles by the game theory

Показано, що транспортування великогабаритних вантажів є проектом, в якому команда останнього постійно стикається із інтелектуальними ризиками протидії оточуючого середовища у вигляді субпідрядників (шляховиків, електриків, автоінспекції, тощо) виконанню окремих етапів проекту. Управління цими ризиками містить різні форми співпраці із субпідрядниками, – від об’єднання (SCRUM-технології) до конкурентної гри із "супротивником". Запропоновано адаптивну комплексну структуру технології проектної діяльності з перевезення великогабаритного багажу, яка передбачає на початку кожного етапу виявлення форми співпраці із субпідрядником та гнучку технологію роботи із ним.It has been shown that the transport of large-sized cargoes is a project in which the latter team constantly faces the intellectual risks of counteracting the environment in the form of subcontractors (roadmakers, electricians, road inspectors, etc.) for the implementation of individual stages of the project. Managing these risks involves various forms of cooperation with subcontractors, from the merger (SCRUM-technology) to the game with the "opponent". The adaptive complex structure of the project activity on transportation of large-sized luggage is offered, which provides at the beginning of each stage the identification of the form of cooperation with the subcontractor and the flexible technology of work with it. The aim of the work is to reduce the time and cost of implementing large baggage transportation projects by managing the intellectual risks of counteraction from subcontractors of the project through the development and implementation of an adaptive integrated structure of the project activity technology, which foresees, at the beginning of each phase of the project, the identification of the form of cooperation with the next subcontractors and the flexible working technology with them. To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set and solved: analyzed problems of transportation of large-sized cargoes and revealed design features of such activity; Estimated intellectual risks of counteraction to project activity from "subcontractors" of the project; proposed adaptive complex structure of technology project activity, which combines SCRUM technology and game; the industrial tests of the results of the research with a positive technical and economic effect have been carried out. The results of the work were used in the system of support for the adoption of design decisions in the context of intellectual risks "SOLINTR". The system "SOLINTR" was involved in the PEO "ECHO" when planning and equipping the project of transportation of large-sized cargo at a distance of 235 km with a positive technical and economic effect

Spartan Daily, December 10, 1941

Volume 30, Issue 52https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/3372/thumbnail.jp

Suffolk Journal, Vol. 43, No. 20, 3/07/1988

https://dc.suffolk.edu/journal/2152/thumbnail.jp

The use of Game Theory to solve conflicts in the project management and construction industry

A typical construction project involves a wide range of disparate professionals, in many cases geographically distributed, working together for a relatively short period of time on the design and construction of a facility. Since organizations are becoming flatter, culturally rich, geographically diverse and intensely competitive, the possibilities for conflict in such environments are greater. Negotiation is an important aspect of a project and plays an important role in resolving claims, preventing disputes, and keeping a harmonious relationship between project participants. Part of any project manager’s role as a leader is to recognize conflict, understand the sources of conflict and manage it, and to do this a project manager must be able to understand the basics of negotiation theory and have sufficient competencies to lead in such situations. To address the complex technical and human issues in negotiation, different negotiation theories and models are available which mainly include game theory, economic theory, and behavior theory. Since Game Theory provides, by its very nature, the appropriate tools for the analysis and eventual solution of conflicts of any kind, this paper uses a model based on Game Theory in order to identify the activities that are responsible for the delays in a project and divide the costs among them

On the Shapley value of liability games

In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such liability problems. We establish three main monotonicity properties of the Shapley value. First, creditors can only benefit from the increase in their claims or of the asset value. Second, the firm can only benefit from the increase of a claim but can end up with more or with less if the asset value increases, depending on the configuration of small and large liabilities. Third, creditors with larger claims benefit more from the increase of the asset value. Even though liability games are constant-sum games and we show that the Shapley value can be calculated directly from a liability problem, we prove that calculating the Shapley payoff to the firm is NP-hard

The BG News January 20, 1984

The BGSU campus student newspaper January 20, 1984. Volume 66 - Issue 61https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/bg-news/5207/thumbnail.jp

The College News, 1919-03-19, Vol. 05, No. 21

Bryn Mawr College student newspaper. Merged with The Haverford News in 1968 to form the Bi-college News (with various titles from 1968 on). Published weekly (except holidays) during the academic year

The College News, 1919-03-19, Vol. 05, No. 21

Bryn Mawr College student newspaper. Merged with The Haverford News in 1968 to form the Bi-college News (with various titles from 1968 on). Published weekly (except holidays) during the academic year