Schopenhauer's World. The System of The World as Will and Presentation I

in recent years, the research on Schopenhauer has shown a change in the interpretation of his main work, «The World as Will and Presentation», from (1) a normative and linear instruction which guides the reader from idealism to mysticism, pessimism and nothingness to (2) value-free and independent descriptions of the world with all phenomena (like idealism, mysticism, nothingness etc.) in it. thus Schopenhauer’s main work has become an empirical or baconian approach—something like a «philosophical cosmography»—. this fundamental change of interpretation radically puts into question what Schopenhauer means by characterizing his main work as an «organic system». the present paper attempts to give an answer to this question, reviewing the self-reflexive, methodological and metaphilosophical hints which Schopenhauer gives in the first volume of his «World» («as Will and presentation»)

Ernst Troeltsch and Mysticism

Although the ‘mystical’ character of Ernst Troeltsch’s theological programme is controversial, the fact that ‘mysticism’ played an eminent role in his analysis of modern Christianity can hardly be denied. This article first spells out the different aspects of Troeltsch’s concept of mysticism (Mystik) against the background of contemporary theological and religious developments. On the one hand, the highly critical discourse on mysticism of the dominant Ritschl School is highlighted and on the other hand, the proliferation of all sorts of ‘mystical’ religiosity in Germany around 1900 is discussed. Secondly, it is shown that Troeltsch distanced himself to a large extent from the critics of mysticism. In fact, he takes the concept of mysticism to denote a typical, modern, individualistic form of piety and theology. Thirdly, attention is given to the fact that Troeltsch adopts the mystical terminology to describe his own position and uses it to develop his ecclesiology. Fourthly, Troeltsch’s view of the relationship between (individualist) mysticism and ethics is discussed. In his view, mysticism does not imply quietism, but an active engagement in church and worldly matters. All in all, this contribution underscores the importance of Christian mysticism for Troeltsch’s personal belief and piety as well as for his ‘mystical’ conceptualization of religion

Jean-Paul Sartre: Mystical Atheist or Mystical Antipathist?

Jean-Paul Sartre is rarely discussed in the philosophy of religion. In 2009, however, Jerome Gellman broke the silence, publishing an article in which he argued that the source of Sartre’s atheism was neither philosophical nor existential, but mystical. Drawing from several of Sartre’s works – including Being and Nothingness, Words, and a 1943 review entitled ‘A New Mystic’ – I argue that there are strong biographical and philosophical reasons to disagree with Gellman’s conclusion that Sartre was a ‘mystical atheist’. Moreover, I question the likelihood of drawing any definitive conclusions regarding the sources of Sartre’s ambiguous atheism

What Has History to Do with Philosophy? Insights from the Medieval Contemplative Tradition

This paper highlights the corrective and complementary role that historically informed philosophy can play in contemporary discussions. What it takes for an experience to count as genuinely mystical has been the source of significant controversy; most current philosophical definitions of ‘mystical experience’ exclude embodied, non-unitive states -- but, in so doing, they exclude the majority of reported mystical experiences. I use a re- examination of the full range of reported medieval mystical experiences (both in the apophatic tradition, which excludes or denigrates embodied states, and in the affective tradition, which treats such states as fully mystical) to demonstrate how a better understanding of the historical medieval mystic tradition can serve as a valuable complement to ongoing philosophical discussions of religious and mystical experience

Schweitzer and a mystical ecology in Paul

Issue topic: Festschrift in honour of Erwin Buck

Behind the Veil: Mysticism and the Reply to Hiddenness in the Work of Travis Dumsday

Ever since J. L. Schellenberg formulated his infamous atheistic argument from hiddenness in his 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, the problem of divine hiddenness--the question of why a good God would hide Himself, even from those actively seeking Him--has troubled theists. Schellenberg\u27s argument from hiddenness has proven notoriously difficult for theists to answer, and perhaps this is why it is now second only to the problem of evil in popularity with atheists. While many theists have tried to find an adequate answer to the problem of hiddenness, and many have made good attempts, no response has been quite complete. Many such replies have been made by Dr. Travis Dumsday of the Concordia University of Edmonton. Dumsday has written prolifically on the subject of divine hiddenness, but in this paper I will look at only three of his replies to Schellenberg\u27s argument from hiddenness. These three responses, while each insufficient on their own, become a far more formidable reply to the problem of hiddenness when combined and synthesized around a more mystic conception of God imported from the Christian mystic tradition. Drawing upon the mysticism of Saint Francis of Assisi and the rigorous philosophy of Dumsday, I argue that the great mystery that we call God remains hidden in order to preserve the well-being of nonbelievers, and that He does indeed reveal Himself, but only to those who cultivate the requisite level of moral virtue and seek Him diligently