120 research outputs found
Secure multi-party protocols under a modern lens
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Mathematics, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-272).A secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol for computing a function f allows a group of parties to jointly evaluate f over their private inputs, such that a computationally bounded adversary who corrupts a subset of the parties can not learn anything beyond the inputs of the corrupted parties and the output of the function f. General MPC completeness theorems in the 1980s showed that every efficiently computable function can be evaluated securely in this fashion [Yao86, GMW87, CCD87, BGW88] using the existence of cryptography. In the following decades, progress has been made toward making MPC protocols efficient enough to be deployed in real-world applications. However, recent technological developments have brought with them a slew of new challenges, from new security threats to a question of whether protocols can scale up with the demand of distributed computations on massive data. Before one can make effective use of MPC, these challenges must be addressed. In this thesis, we focus on two lines of research toward this goal: " Protocols resilient to side-channel attacks. We consider a strengthened adversarial model where, in addition to corrupting a subset of parties, the adversary may leak partial information on the secret states of honest parties during the protocol. In presence of such adversary, we first focus on preserving the correctness guarantees of MPC computations. We then proceed to address security guarantees, using cryptography. We provide two results: an MPC protocol whose security provably "degrades gracefully" with the amount of leakage information obtained by the adversary, and a second protocol which provides complete security assuming a (necessary) one-time preprocessing phase during which leakage cannot occur. * Protocols with scalable communication requirements. We devise MPC protocols with communication locality: namely, each party only needs to communicate with a small (polylog) number of dynamically chosen parties. Our techniques use digital signatures and extend particularly well to the case when the function f is a sublinear algorithm whose execution depends on o(n) of the n parties' inputs.by Elette Chantae Boyle.Ph.D
Fully leakage-resilient signatures revisited: Graceful degradation, noisy leakage, and construction in the bounded-retrieval model
We construct new leakage-resilient signature schemes. Our schemes remain unforgeable against an adversary leaking arbitrary (yet bounded) information on the entire state of the signer (sometimes known as fully leakage resilience), including the random coin tosses of the signing algorithm. The main feature of our constructions is that they offer a graceful degradation of security in situations where standard existential unforgeability is impossible
Leakage-resilient coin tossing
Proceedings 25th International Symposium, DISC 2011, Rome, Italy, September 20-22, 2011.The ability to collectively toss a common coin among n parties
in the presence of faults is an important primitive in the arsenal of
randomized distributed protocols. In the case of dishonest majority, it
was shown to be impossible to achieve less than 1
r bias in O(r) rounds
(Cleve STOC ’86). In the case of honest majority, in contrast, unconditionally
secure O(1)-round protocols for generating common unbiased
coins follow from general completeness theorems on multi-party secure
protocols in the secure channels model (e.g., BGW, CCD STOC ’88).
However, in the O(1)-round protocols with honest majority, parties
generate and hold secret values which are assumed to be perfectly hidden
from malicious parties: an assumption which is crucial to proving the
resulting common coin is unbiased. This assumption unfortunately does
not seem to hold in practice, as attackers can launch side-channel attacks
on the local state of honest parties and leak information on their secrets.
In this work, we present an O(1)-round protocol for collectively generating
an unbiased common coin, in the presence of leakage on the local
state of the honest parties. We tolerate t ≤ ( 1
3
− )n computationallyunbounded
Byzantine faults and in addition a Ω(1)-fraction leakage on
each (honest) party’s secret state. Our results hold in the memory leakage
model (of Akavia, Goldwasser, Vaikuntanathan ’08) adapted to the
distributed setting.
Additional contributions of our work are the tools we introduce to
achieve the collective coin toss: a procedure for disjoint committee election,
and leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing.National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate FellowshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCF-1018064
Efficient secure comparison in the dishonest majority model
Secure comparison (SC) is an essential primitive in Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) and a fundamental building block in Privacy-Preserving Data Analytics (PPDA). Although secure comparison has been studied since the introduction of SMC in the early 80s and many protocols have been proposed, there is still room for improvement, especially providing security against malicious adversaries who form the majority among the participating parties. It is not hard to develop an SC protocol secure against malicious majority based on the current state-of-the-art SPDZ framework. SPDZ is designed to work for arbitrary polynomially-bounded functionalities; it may not provide the most efficient SMC implementation for a specific task, such as SC. In this thesis, we propose a novel and efficient compiler specifically designed to convert most existing SC protocols with semi-honest security into the ones secure against the dishonest majority (malicious majority). We analyze the security of the proposed solutions using the real-ideal paradigm. Moreover, we provide computation and communication complexity analysis. Comparing to the current state-of-the-art SC protocols Rabbit and edaBits, our design offers significant performance gain. The empirical results show that the proposed solution is at least 5 and 10 times more efficient than Rabbit in run-time and communication cost respectively.Includes bibliographical references
How to Construct a Leakage-Resilient (Stateless) Trusted Party
Trusted parties and devices are commonly used in the real world to securely perform computations on secret inputs. However, their security can often be compromised by side-channel attacks in which the adversary obtains partial leakage on intermediate computation values. This gives rise to the following natural question: To what extent can one protect the trusted party against leakage?
Our goal is to design a hardware device that allows parties to securely evaluate a function of their inputs by feeding with encoded inputs that are obtained using local secret randomness. Security should hold even in the presence of an active adversary that can corrupt a subset of parties and obtain restricted leakage on the internal computations in .
We design hardware devices in this setting both for zero-knowledge proofs and for general multi-party computations. Our constructions can unconditionally resist either leakage or a strong form of ``only computation leaks\u27\u27 (OCL) leakage that captures realistic side-channel attacks, providing different tradeoffs between efficiency and security
McFIL: Model Counting Functionality-Inherent Leakage
Protecting the confidentiality of private data and using it for useful
collaboration have long been at odds. Modern cryptography is bridging this gap
through rapid growth in secure protocols such as multi-party computation,
fully-homomorphic encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs. However, even with
provable indistinguishability or zero-knowledgeness, confidentiality loss from
leakage inherent to the functionality may partially or even completely
compromise secret values without ever falsifying proofs of security. In this
work, we describe McFIL, an algorithmic approach and accompanying software
implementation which automatically quantifies intrinsic leakage for a given
functionality. Extending and generalizing the Chosen-Ciphertext attack
framework of Beck et al. with a practical heuristic, our approach not only
quantifies but maximizes functionality-inherent leakage using Maximum Model
Counting within a SAT solver. As a result, McFIL automatically derives
approximately-optimal adversary inputs that, when used in secure protocols,
maximize information leakage of private values.Comment: To appear in USENIX Security 202
A Survey of Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
In the past 15 years, cryptography has made considerable progress in expanding the adversarial attack model to cover side-channel attacks, and has built schemes to provably defend against some of them. This survey covers the main models and results in this so-called leakage-resilient cryptography
Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage
We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against AC0 leakage and similar low-complexity classes.
In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against AC0 leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against AC0 leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012)
Leakage Resilient Secret Sharing and Applications
A secret sharing scheme allows a dealer to share a secret among a set of parties such that any authorized subset of the parties can recover the secret, while any unauthorized subset of the parties learns no information about the secret. A local leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme (introduced in independent works by (Goyal and Kumar, STOC 18) and (Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai and Rabin, Crypto 18)) additionally requires the secrecy to hold against every unauthorized set of parties even if they obtain some bounded local leakage from every other share. The leakage is said to be local if it is computed independently for each share. So far, the only known constructions of local leakage resilient secret sharing schemes are for threshold access structures for very low () or very high () thresholds.
In this work, we give a compiler that takes a secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure and produces a local leakage resilient secret sharing scheme for the same access structure, with only a constant-factor blow-up in the sizes of the shares. Furthermore, the resultant secret sharing scheme has optimal leakage-resilience rate i.e., the ratio between the leakage tolerated and the size of each share can be made arbitrarily close to . Using this secret sharing scheme as the main building block, we obtain the following results:
1. Rate Preserving Non-Malleable Secret Sharing: We give a compiler that takes any secret sharing scheme for a 4-monotone access structure with rate and converts it into a non-malleable secret sharing scheme for the same access structure with rate . The prior such non-zero rate construction (Badrinarayanan and Srinivasan, 18) only achieves a rate of , where is the maximum size of any minimal set in the access structure. As a special case, for any threshold and an arbitrary , we get the first constant rate construction of -out-of- non-malleable secret sharing.
2. Leakage-Tolerant Multiparty Computation for General Interaction Pattern: For any function, we give a reduction from constructing leakage-tolerant secure multi-party computation protocols obeying any interaction pattern to constructing a secure (and not necessarily leakage-tolerant) protocol for a related function obeying the star interaction pattern. This improves upon the result of (Halevi et al., ITCS 2016), who constructed a protocol that is secure in a leak-free environment
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