Online Multidimensional Packing Problems in the Random-Order Model

We study online multidimensional variants of the generalized assignment problem which are used to model prominent real-world applications, such as the assignment of virtual machines with multiple resource requirements to physical infrastructure in cloud computing. These problems can be seen as an extension of the well known secretary problem and thus the standard online worst-case model cannot provide any performance guarantee. The prevailing model in this case is the random-order model, which provides a useful realistic and robust alternative. Using this model, we study the d-dimensional generalized assignment problem, where we introduce a novel technique that achieves an O(d)-competitive algorithms and prove a matching lower bound of Omega(d). Furthermore, our algorithm improves upon the best-known competitive-ratio for the online (one-dimensional) generalized assignment problem and the online knapsack problem

Vector Bin Packing with Multiple-Choice

We consider a variant of bin packing called multiple-choice vector bin packing. In this problem we are given a set of items, where each item can be selected in one of several $D$-dimensional incarnations. We are also given $T$ bin types, each with its own cost and $D$-dimensional size. Our goal is to pack the items in a set of bins of minimum overall cost. The problem is motivated by scheduling in networks with guaranteed quality of service (QoS), but due to its general formulation it has many other applications as well. We present an approximation algorithm that is guaranteed to produce a solution whose cost is about $\ln D$ times the optimum. For the running time to be polynomial we require $D=O(1)$ and $T=O(\log n)$. This extends previous results for vector bin packing, in which each item has a single incarnation and there is only one bin type. To obtain our result we also present a PTAS for the multiple-choice version of multidimensional knapsack, where we are given only one bin and the goal is to pack a maximum weight set of (incarnations of) items in that bin

Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players

We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by the mechanism. We formulate a notion of incentive compatibility (IC) that we call {\em support-based IC} that is substantially more robust than Bayesian IC, and develop black-box reductions from support-based-IC mechanism design to algorithm design. For single-dimensional settings, this black-box reduction applies even when we only have an LP-relative {\em approximation algorithm} for the algorithmic problem. Thus, we obtain near-optimal mechanisms for various covering settings including single-dimensional covering problems, multi-item procurement auctions, and multidimensional facility location.Comment: Major changes compared to the previous version. Please consult this versio

The Galois Complexity of Graph Drawing: Why Numerical Solutions are Ubiquitous for Force-Directed, Spectral, and Circle Packing Drawings

Many well-known graph drawing techniques, including force directed drawings, spectral graph layouts, multidimensional scaling, and circle packings, have algebraic formulations. However, practical methods for producing such drawings ubiquitously use iterative numerical approximations rather than constructing and then solving algebraic expressions representing their exact solutions. To explain this phenomenon, we use Galois theory to show that many variants of these problems have solutions that cannot be expressed by nested radicals or nested roots of low-degree polynomials. Hence, such solutions cannot be computed exactly even in extended computational models that include such operations.Comment: Graph Drawing 201