Modelling Combinatorial Auctions in Linear Logic

We show that linear logic can serve as an expressive framework in which to model a rich variety of combinatorial auction mechanisms. Due to its resource-sensitive nature, linear logic can easily represent bids in combinatorial auctions in which goods may be sold in multiple units, and we show how it naturally generalises several bidding languages familiar from the literature. Moreover, the winner determination problem, i.e., the problem of computing an allocation of goods to bidders producing a certain amount of revenue for the auctioneer, can be modelled as the problem of finding a proof for a particular linear logic sequent

Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results

We model Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's multiwinner voting systems as a certain resource allocation problem. We show that for many restricted variants of this problem, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, there are no constant-factor approximation algorithms. Yet, we also show cases where good approximation algorithms exist (briefly put, these variants correspond to optimizing total voter satisfaction under Borda scores, within Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's voting systems).Comment: 26 pages, 1 figur

Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually

A Market-Based Model for Resource Allocation in Agent Systems

In traditional computational systems, resource owners have no incentive to subject themselves to additional risk and congestion associated with providing service to arbitrary agents, but there are applications that benefit from open environments. We argue for the use of markets to regulate agent systems. With market mechanisms, agents have the abilities to assess the cost of their actions, behave responsibly, and coordinate their resource usage both temporally and spatially. \par We discuss our market structure and mechanisms we have developed to foster secure exchange between agents and hosts. Additionally, we believe that certain agent applications encourage repeated interactions that benefit both agents and hosts, giving further reason for hosts to fairly accommodate agents. We apply our ideas to create a resource-allocation policy for mobile-agent systems, from which we derive an algorithm for a mobile agent to plan its expenditure and travel. With perfect information, the algorithm guarantees the agent\u27s optimal completion time. \par We relax the assumptions underlying our algorithm design and simulate our planning algorithm and allocation policy to show that the policy prioritizes agents by endowment, handles bursty workloads, adapts to situations where network resources are overextended, and that delaying agents\u27 actions does not catastrophically affect agents\u27 performance

Allocating educational resources through happiness maximization and traditional CSP approach

This is an electronic version of the paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Software and Data Technologies, held in Sofia on 2009An instance of an Educational Resources Allocation (ERA) problem is the distribution of a set of students in different laboratories. This can be a complex and dynamic problem if non-quantitative considerations (i.e. how close the final allocation is to the student preferences or desires) are involved in the decision process. Traditionally, different approaches based on Constraint-Satisfaction techniques and Multi-agent negotiation have been applied to the general problem of Resource Allocation. This paper shows how a Multi-agent approach can be used to model and simulate the assignment of sets of students to several predefined laboratories, by using their preferences to guide the allocation process. This approach aims at finding new solutions that try to satisfy individual student needs with no knowledge about the general allocation problem. The paper shows some experimental results and a comparison, between a CSP-based solution modeled in CHOCO, a CSP Java-based library, and a Multi-agent model implemented using MASON, a multi-agent simulation platform.This work has been supported by research projects TIN2007-65989 and TIN2007-64718. We also thank IBM for its support to the Linux Reference Cente

TOKEN-BASED APPROACH FOR SCALABLE TEAMCOORDINATION

To form a cooperative multiagent team, autonomous agents are required to harmonize activities and make the best use of exclusive resources to achieve their common goal. In addition, to handle uncertainty and quickly respond to external environmental events, they should share knowledge and sensor in formation. Unlike small team coordination, agents in scalable team must limit the amount of their communications while maximizing team performance. Communication decisions are critical to scalable-team coordination because agents should target their communications, but these decisions cannot be supported by a precise model or by complete team knowledge.The hypothesis of my thesis is: local routing of tokens encapsulating discrete elements of control, based only on decentralized local probability decision models, will lead to efficient scalable coordination with several hundreds of agents. In my research, coordination controls including all domain knowledge, tasks and exclusive resources are encapsulated into tokens. By passing tokens around, agents transfer team controls encapsulated in the tokens. The team benefits when a token is passed to an agent who can make use of it, but communications incur costs. Hence, no single agent has sole responsible over any shared decision. The key problem lies in how agents make the correct decisions to target communications and pass tokens so that they will potentially benefit the team most when considering communication costs.My research on token-based coordination algorithm starts from the investigation of random walk of token movement. I found a little increase of the probabilities that agents make the right decision to pass a token, the overall efficiency of the token movement could be greatly enhanced. Moreover, if token movements are modeled as a Markov chain, I found that the efficiency of passing tokens could be significantly varied based on different network topologies.My token-based algorithm starts at the investigation of each single decision theoretic agents. Although under the uncertainties that exist in large multiagent teams, agents cannot act optimal, it is still feasible to build a probability model for each agents to rationally pass tokens. Specifically, this decision only allow agent to pass tokens over an associate network where only a few of team members are considered as token receiver.My proposed algorithm will build each agent's individual decision model based on all of its previously received tokens. This model will not require the complete knowledge of the team. The key idea is that I will make use of the domain relationships between pairs of coordination controls. Previously received tokens will help the receiver to infer whether the sender could benefit the team if a related token is received. Therefore, each token is used to improve the routing of other tokens, leading to a dramatic performance improvement when more tokens are added. By exploring the relationships between different types of coordination controls, an integrated coordination algorithm will be built, and an improvement of one aspect of coordination will enhance the performance of the others

Distributed Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods

International audienceDistributed mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods are mechanisms lacking central control, in which agents can locally agree on deals to exchange some of the goods in their possession. We study convergence properties for such distributed mechanisms when used as fair division procedures. Specifically, we identify sets of assumptions under which any sequence of deals meeting certain conditions will converge to a proportionally fair allocation and to an envy-free allocation, respectively. We also introduce an extension of the basic framework where agents are vertices of a graph representing a social network that constrains which agents can interact with which other agents, and we prove a similar convergence result for envy-freeness in this context. Finally, when not all assumptions guaranteeing envy-freeness are satisfied, we may want to minimise the degree of envy exhibited by an outcome. To this end, we introduce a generic framework for measuring the degree of envy in a society and establish the computational complexity of checking whether a given scenario allows for a deal that is beneficial to every agent involved and that will reduce overall envy