Multi-objective model-free control based on population dynamics and cooperative games

This work solves a model-free resource allocation problem with two objectives. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines a centralized cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system, and a decentralized non-cooperative game approach using the Nash equilibrium to achieve the control objective by means of both partial and local information. Furthermore, invariant set and stability analysis are discussed for the noncooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach relies on a novel and alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the chosen characteristic function. This alternative computational way is proposed in order to mitigate the commonly high computational burden issue, which is associated to the combinatorial explosion associated to the cooperative game approach.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Non-centralized Control for Flow-based Distribution Networks: A Game-theoretical Insight

This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized noncooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems.Generalitat de Catalunya FI 2014Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2016-76493-C3-3-RMinisterio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2008-05818Proyecto europeo FP7-ICT DYMASO

A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks

Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201

Cooperative Control and Potential Games

We present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the game-theoretic concepts of potential and weakly acyclic games, and demonstrate how several cooperative control problems, such as consensus and dynamic sensor coverage, can be formulated in these settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game-theoretic concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms to accommodate restricted action sets caused by the limitations of agent capabilities and group based decision making. Furthermore, we also introduce a new class of games called sometimes weakly acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an equilibrium

Deep Reinforcement Learning for Swarm Systems

Recently, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods have been applied successfully to multi-agent scenarios. Typically, these methods rely on a concatenation of agent states to represent the information content required for decentralized decision making. However, concatenation scales poorly to swarm systems with a large number of homogeneous agents as it does not exploit the fundamental properties inherent to these systems: (i) the agents in the swarm are interchangeable and (ii) the exact number of agents in the swarm is irrelevant. Therefore, we propose a new state representation for deep multi-agent RL based on mean embeddings of distributions. We treat the agents as samples of a distribution and use the empirical mean embedding as input for a decentralized policy. We define different feature spaces of the mean embedding using histograms, radial basis functions and a neural network learned end-to-end. We evaluate the representation on two well known problems from the swarm literature (rendezvous and pursuit evasion), in a globally and locally observable setup. For the local setup we furthermore introduce simple communication protocols. Of all approaches, the mean embedding representation using neural network features enables the richest information exchange between neighboring agents facilitating the development of more complex collective strategies.Comment: 31 pages, 12 figures, version 3 (published in JMLR Volume 20