Multi-item Auctions for Automatic Negotiation

Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as a market in which there are vendor agents and buyer agents trading on items representing the resources. These agents use multi-item auctions which are viewed here as a process of automatic negotiation, and implemented as a network of intelligent software agents. In this negotiation, agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities which let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. For example, the "richer" an agent is, the more items it can buy, i.e. the more resources it can acquire. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, then we discuss experimental evidence of such a model. Dans un environnement multiagent, les ressources peuvent toujours s'avérer insuffisantes relativement à un nombre élevé de demandes. Dans ce cahier, nous proposons une approche mixant les enchères et les agents logiciels en vue de contribuer à résoudre ce problème. Cette approche consiste en fait à utiliser le mécanisme d'enchères multi-articles en vue d'allouer les ressources à un ensemble d'agents. À cet effet, nous considérons le problème de ressources comme un marché dans lequel évoluent des agents acheteurs et des agents vendeurs négociant des articles représentant des ressources. Ces agents utilisent des enchères multi-articles et par conséquent ils constituent un processus de négociation automatisé et programmé comme un réseau d'agents logiciels. Dans ce type de négociation, chaque agent exhibe différentes capacités d'acquisition lui permettant ainsi d'agir différemment selon le contexte ou la situation de marché. Par exemple, plus on est riche, plus on peut acheter d'articles. Nous présentons pour ce modèle une enchère anglaise et nous discuterons ses résultats expérimentaux.Multi-agent systems, Negotiations, Multi-item auctions, Systèmes multiagents, négociations, enchères multi items

Multi-item Auctions for Automatic Negotiation

Dans un environnement multiagent, les ressources peuvent toujours s'avérer insuffisantes relativement à un nombre élevé de demandes. Dans ce cahier, nous proposons une approche mixant les enchères et les agents logiciels en vue de contribuer à résoudre ce problème. Cette approche consiste en fait à utiliser le mécanisme d'enchères multi-articles en vue d'allouer les ressources à un ensemble d'agents. À cet effet, nous considérons le problème de ressources comme un marché dans lequel évoluent des agents acheteurs et des agents vendeurs négociant des articles représentant des ressources. Ces agents utilisent des enchères multi-articles et par conséquent ils constituent un processus de négociation automatisé et programmé comme un réseau d'agents logiciels. Dans ce type de négociation, chaque agent exhibe différentes capacités d'acquisition lui permettant ainsi d'agir différemment selon le contexte ou la situation de marché. Par exemple, plus on est riche, plus on peut acheter d'articles. Nous présentons pour ce modèle une enchère anglaise et nous discuterons ses résultats expérimentaux.Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as a market in which there are vendor agents and buyer agents trading on items representing the resources. These agents use multi-item auctions which are viewed here as a process of automatic negotiation, and implemented as a network of intelligent software agents. In this negotiation, agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities which let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. For example, the "richer" an agent is, the more items it can buy, i.e. the more resources it can acquire. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, then we discuss experimental evidence of such a model

The Semantic Grid: A future e-Science infrastructure

e-Science offers a promising vision of how computer and communication technology can support and enhance the scientific process. It does this by enabling scientists to generate, analyse, share and discuss their insights, experiments and results in an effective manner. The underlying computer infrastructure that provides these facilities is commonly referred to as the Grid. At this time, there are a number of grid applications being developed and there is a whole raft of computer technologies that provide fragments of the necessary functionality. However there is currently a major gap between these endeavours and the vision of e-Science in which there is a high degree of easy-to-use and seamless automation and in which there are flexible collaborations and computations on a global scale. To bridge this practice–aspiration divide, this paper presents a research agenda whose aim is to move from the current state of the art in e-Science infrastructure, to the future infrastructure that is needed to support the full richness of the e-Science vision. Here the future e-Science research infrastructure is termed the Semantic Grid (Semantic Grid to Grid is meant to connote a similar relationship to the one that exists between the Semantic Web and the Web). In particular, we present a conceptual architecture for the Semantic Grid. This architecture adopts a service-oriented perspective in which distinct stakeholders in the scientific process, represented as software agents, provide services to one another, under various service level agreements, in various forms of marketplace. We then focus predominantly on the issues concerned with the way that knowledge is acquired and used in such environments since we believe this is the key differentiator between current grid endeavours and those envisioned for the Semantic Grid

User evaluation of a market-based recommender system

Recommender systems have been developed for a wide variety of applications (ranging from books, to holidays, to web pages). These systems have used a number of different approaches, since no one technique is best for all users in all situations. Given this, we believe that to be effective, systems should incorporate a wide variety of such techniques and then some form of overarching framework should be put in place to coordinate them so that only the best recommendations (from whatever source) are presented to the user. To this end, in our previous work, we detailed a market-based approach in which various recommender agents competed with one another to present their recommendations to the user. We showed through theoretical analysis and empirical evaluation with simulated users that an appropriately designed marketplace should be able to provide effective coordination. Building on this, we now report on the development of this multi-agent system and its evaluation with real users. Specifically, we show that our system is capable of consistently giving high quality recommendations, that the best recommendations that could be put forward are actually put forward, and that the combination of recommenders performs better than any constituent recommende

The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources

This paper provides an economic framework within which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets. The paper looks at the use of auctions as a policy instrument and the effects of auction design on consumer interests, the efficient allocation of resources, and industry competitiveness.Australia; Research; Ascending-bid auction; Auctions; Bidders; Conservation funds; Descending-bid auction; Dutch auction; English auction; Environmental Management; First-price sealed-bid auction; Infrastructure; Markets; Oral auction; Outcry auction; Pollutant emission permits; Power supply contracts; Public resources; Radio- spectrum; Second-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum licences; Vickrey auction; Water rights;

Spectrum Auctions

Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.Auctions, Spectrum Auctions, Multiple Item Auctions

A Multi-Agent based Configuration Process for Mass Customization

Large product variety in mass customization involves a high internal complexity level inside a companyís operations, as well as a high external complexity level from a customerís perspective. In order to reach a competitive advantage through mass customization, it is necessary to cope with both problems. This is done within the scope of variety formation and variety steering tasks: Variety formation supports customers during the configuration task according to their preferences and knowledge, variety steering tasks internally deal with finding the customizerís optimal offer. Driven by this economic background, we present a comprehensive multi-agent based design for a configuration process in this paper. It is identified as a suitable solution approach integrating both perspectives. The mass customized products are assumed to be based on a modular architecture and each module variant is associated with an autonomous rational agent. Agents must compete with each other in order to join product variants which suit real customersí requirements. The negotiation process is based on a market mechanism supported by the target costing concept and a Dutch auction.Multi-agent systems; Configuration process; Market mechanism; Mass Customization