Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting

Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents’ electoral performance and roll-call support for their party—controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors—through a series of tests of the 1956–1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member’s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members

Bargaining in Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation

While the theoretical literature on non-cooperative legislative bargaining has grown voluminous, there is little empirical work attempting to test a key prediction in this literature: proposal power is valuable. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. Congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of the Baron and Ferejohn legislative bargaining model: members with proposal power, those sitting on the transportation authorization committee, secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power, which are more powerful than the qualitative restrictions, is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisian models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.

Multinomial Inverse Regression for Text Analysis

Text data, including speeches, stories, and other document forms, are often connected to sentiment variables that are of interest for research in marketing, economics, and elsewhere. It is also very high dimensional and difficult to incorporate into statistical analyses. This article introduces a straightforward framework of sentiment-preserving dimension reduction for text data. Multinomial inverse regression is introduced as a general tool for simplifying predictor sets that can be represented as draws from a multinomial distribution, and we show that logistic regression of phrase counts onto document annotations can be used to obtain low dimension document representations that are rich in sentiment information. To facilitate this modeling, a novel estimation technique is developed for multinomial logistic regression with very high-dimension response. In particular, independent Laplace priors with unknown variance are assigned to each regression coefficient, and we detail an efficient routine for maximization of the joint posterior over coefficients and their prior scale. This "gamma-lasso" scheme yields stable and effective estimation for general high-dimension logistic regression, and we argue that it will be superior to current methods in many settings. Guidelines for prior specification are provided, algorithm convergence is detailed, and estimator properties are outlined from the perspective of the literature on non-concave likelihood penalization. Related work on sentiment analysis from statistics, econometrics, and machine learning is surveyed and connected. Finally, the methods are applied in two detailed examples and we provide out-of-sample prediction studies to illustrate their effectiveness.Comment: Published in the Journal of the American Statistical Association 108, 2013, with discussion (rejoinder is here: http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.4200). Software is available in the textir package for

Neural Discourse Structure for Text Categorization

We show that discourse structure, as defined by Rhetorical Structure Theory and provided by an existing discourse parser, benefits text categorization. Our approach uses a recursive neural network and a newly proposed attention mechanism to compute a representation of the text that focuses on salient content, from the perspective of both RST and the task. Experiments consider variants of the approach and illustrate its strengths and weaknesses.Comment: ACL 2017 camera ready versio

The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches

In order to explain the prevalence and persistence of trade protection, a large body of work that departs from the notion of welfare maximizing governments and emphasizes instead political-economic determinants of policy has recently emerged. This survey paper summarizes and evaluates analytically the empirical component of this literature. We discuss a broad set of empirical findings which provide a convincing confirmation of the presence and significance of political economy influences. We also discuss some puzzles and controversies that have emerged in recent work.

Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across constituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.Fast Track Authority, Trade Negotiations, Strategic Delegation

Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and Congressional Term Limits

This paper demonstrates that states’ decisions on limiting congressional terms are empirically determined by measures of relative political influence in Congress. States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable that reflects variation in the stringency of term limits laws passed. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity that is introduced by some voters having access to institutions of direct democracy. At 2002 state-level values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit terms of their own congressional delegations, but are prohibited from doing so under a Supreme Court ruling. The results hold implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states.term limits; political institutions; federalism; political economy

Still the Economy, Stupid: Economic Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election

Given President Bush's popularity among relatively poor rural residents and lack thereof among wealthier urban dwellers in the 2004 presidential election, analysts have suggested that voters contradicted their economic self-interests. We investigate whether this conventional wisdom implied an absence of economic voting. Using exit poll data, we estimate whether a change in previous four-year financial status affected the propensity to vote for Bush. The main econometric concern is that underlying preferences for Bush might dictate financial status change responses. Beyond income and several other demographic variables, therefore, the regressions hold constant indicators for state and congressional district, religious affiliation, political philosophy and party, and Iraq war support. Even further controlling for approval of Bush's job performance, economic voting is statistically and quantitatively significant. Effects are asymmetric, with status worsening hurting Bush more than status improvement helped, and persist even among subgroups that provided particularly strong or weak support for Bush.