36 research outputs found
Preimage Attacks on 3-Pass HAVAL and Step-Reduced MD5
This paper presents preimage attacks for the hash functions 3-pass
HAVAL and step-reduced MD5. Introduced in 1992 and 1991
respectively, these functions underwent severe collision attacks,
but no preimage attack. We describe two preimage attacks on the
compression function of 3-pass HAVAL. The attacks have a complexity
of about compression function evaluations instead of
. Furthermore, we present several preimage attacks on the
MD5 compression function that invert up to 47 (out of 64) steps
within trials instead of . Though our attacks are
not practical, they show that the security margin of 3-pass HAVAL
and step-reduced MD5 with respect to preimage attacks is not as high
as expected
Collision-resistant hash function based on composition of functions
cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that compresses an
arbitrary block of numerical data and returns a fixed-size bit string. There
exist many hash functions: MD5, HAVAL, SHA, ... It was reported that these hash
functions are not longer secure. Our work is focused in the construction of a
new hash function based on composition of functions. The construction used the
NP-completeness of Three-dimensional contingency tables and the relaxation of
the constraint that a hash function should also be a compression function.Comment: 18 pages, 1 figure. The preliminary version of this paper was
published in the Conference CARI'10, pages 141-148, Yamoussoukro, Ivory
Coast. The preliminary version was also published in the arXiv August 6, 2011
under number arXiv:1108.1478v1. This version was submittted to the journal
ARIMA (January 2011
Improved Preimage Attack on One-block MD4
We propose an improved preimage attack on one-block MD4 with the
time complexity MD4 compression function operations, as
compared to in \cite{AokiS-sac08}. We research the attack
procedure in \cite{AokiS-sac08} and formulate the complexity for
computing a preimage attack on one-block MD4. We attain the result
mainly through the following two aspects with the help of the
complexity formula. First, we continue to compute two more steps
backward to get two more chaining values for comparison during the
meet-in-the-middle attack. Second, we search two more neutral words
in one independent chunk, and then propose the multi-neutral-word
partial-fixing technique to get more message freedom and skip ten
steps for partial-fixing, as compared to previous four steps. We
also use the initial structure technique and apply the same idea to
improve the pseudo-preimage and preimage attacks on Extended MD4
with and improvement factor, as compared to
previous attacks in \cite{SasakiA-acisp09}, respectively
Preimages for Step-Reduced SHA-2
In this paper, we present a preimage attack for 42 step-reduced SHA-256 with time complexity and memory requirements of order . The same attack also applies to 42 step-reduced SHA-512 with time complexity and memory requirements of order . Our attack is meet-in-the-middle preimage attack
Enhancing the Security Level of SHA-1 by Replacing the MD Paradigm
Cryptographic hash functions are important cryptographic techniques and are used widely in many cryptographic applications and protocols. All the MD4 design based hash functions such as MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 are built on Merkle-Damgard iterative method. Recent differential and generic attacks against these popular hash functions have shown weaknesses of both specific hash functions and their underlying Merkle-Damgard construction. In this paper we propose a hash function which follows design principle of SHA-1 and is based on dither construction. Its compression function takes three inputs and generates a single output of 160-bit length. An extra input to a compression function is generated through a fast pseudo-random function. Dither construction shows strong resistance against major generic and other cryptanalytic attacks. The security of proposed hash function against generic attacks, differential attack, birthday attack and statistical attack was analyzed in detail. It is exhaustedly compared with SHA-1 because hash functions from SHA-2 and SHA-3 are of higher bit length and known to be more secure than SHA-1. It is shown that the proposed hash function has high sensitivity to an input message and is secure against different cryptanalytic attacks
Automatic Search of Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks on AES-like Hashing
The Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) preimage attack is highly effective in breaking the preimage resistance of many hash functions, including but not limited to the full MD5, HAVAL, and Tiger, and reduced SHA-0/1/2. It was also shown to be a threat to hash functions built on block ciphers like AES by Sasaki in 2011. Recently, such attacks on AES hashing modes evolved from merely using the freedom of choosing the internal state to also exploiting the freedom of choosing the message state. However, detecting such attacks especially those evolved variants is difficult. In previous works, the search space of the configurations of such attacks is limited, such that manual analysis is practical, which results in sub-optimal solutions. In this paper, we remove artificial limitations in previous works, formulate the essential ideas of the construction of the attack in well-defined ways, and translate the problem of searching for the best attacks into optimization problems under constraints in Mixed-Integer-Linear-Programming (MILP) models. The MILP models capture a large solution space of valid attacks; and the objectives of the MILP models are attack configurations with the minimized computational complexity. With such MILP models and using the off-the-shelf solver, it is efficient to search for the best attacks exhaustively. As a result, we obtain the first attacks against the full (5-round) and an extended (5.5-round) version of Haraka-512 v2, and 8-round AES-128 hashing modes, as well as improved attacks covering more rounds of Haraka-256 v2 and other members of AES and Rijndael hashing modes
Comprehensive Preimage Security Evaluations on Rijndael-based Hashing
The Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack is one of the most powerful cryptanalysis techniques, as seen by its use in preimage attacks on MD4, MD5, Tiger, HAVAL, and Haraka-512 v2 hash functions and key recovery for full-round KTANTAN. An efficient approach to constructing MITM attacks is automation, which refers to modeling MITM characteristics and objectives into constraints and using optimizers to search for the best attack configuration. This work focuses on the simplification and renovation of the most advanced superposition framework based on Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) proposed at CRYPTO 2022. With the refined automation model, this work provides the first comprehensive analysis of the preimage security of hash functions based on all versions of the Rijndael block cipher, the origin of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and improves the best-known results. Specifically, this work has extended the attack rounds of Rijndael 256-192 and 256-256, reduced the attack complexity of Rijndael 256-128 and 128-192 (AES192), and filled the gap of preimage security evaluation on Rijndael versions with a block size of 192 bits
Cryptanalysis of 4-Pass HAVAL
HAVAL is a cryptographic hash function proposed by Zheng et al. Rompay et al and Wang et al found collisions of full 3-Pass HAVAL. In this paper, we study the security of 4-Pass HAVAL. We find collisions of full versions of 4-Pass HAVAL. The attack is similar to the two-block attack of MD5 proposed by Wang et al. The computational complexity of the attack is about 2^30-2^32 for the first block and 2^27-2^29 for the second block. We use this attack to find 256bit collisions of 4-Pass HAVAL in 3-4 hour on a common PC
(Pseudo) Preimage Attack on Round-Reduced Grøstl Hash Function and Others (Extended Version)
The Grøstl hash function is one of the 5 final round candidates of the SHA-3 competition hosted by NIST. In this paper, we study the preimage resistance of the Grøstl hash function. We propose pseudo preimage attacks on Grøstl hash function for both 256-bit and 512-bit versions, i.e. we need to choose the initial value in order to invert the hash function. Pseudo preimage attack on 5(out of 10)-round Grøstl-256 has a complexity of (in time and memory) and pseudo preimage attack on 8(out of 14)-round Grøstl-512 has a complexity of . To the best of our knowledge, our attacks are the first (pseudo) preimage attacks on round-reduced Grøstl hash function, including its compression function and output transformation. These results are obtained by a variant of meet-in-the-middle preimage attack framework by Aoki and Sasaki. We also improve the time complexities of the preimage attacks against 5-round Whirlpool and 7-round AES hashes by Sasaki in FSE~2011
D.STVL.9 - Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography
This report gives a brief summary of some of the research trends in symmetric cryptography at the time of writing (2008). The following aspects of symmetric cryptography are investigated in this report: • the status of work with regards to different types of symmetric algorithms, including block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and MAC algorithms (Section 1); • the algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives (Section 2); • the design criteria for symmetric ciphers (Section 3); • the provable properties of symmetric primitives (Section 4); • the major industrial needs in the area of symmetric cryptography (Section 5)