Human Nature in the Adaptation of Trust

This chapter pleads for more inspiration from human nature, in agent-based modeling.As an illustration of an effort in that direction, it summarizes and discusses an agentbased model of the build-up and adaptation of trust between multiple producers and suppliers.The central question is whether, and under what conditions, trust and loyalty are viable in markets.While the model incorporates some well known behavioural phenomena from the trust literature, more extended modeling of human nature is called for.The chapter explores a line of further research on the basis of notions of mental framing and frame switching on the basis of relational signaling, derived from social psychology.trust;transaction costs;buyer-supplier relationships;social psychology

A Spatially Extended Model for Residential Segregation

In this paper we analyze urban spatial segregation phenomenon in terms of the income distribution over a population, and inflationary parameter weighting the evolution of housing prices. For this, we develop a discrete, spatially extended model based in a multi--agent approach. In our model, the mobility of socioeconomic agents is driven only by the housing prices. Agents exchange location in order to fit their status to the cost of their housing. On the other hand, the price of a particular house changes depends on the status of its tenant, and on the neighborhood mean lodging cost, weighted by a control parameter. The agent's dynamics converges to a spatially organized configuration, whose regularity we measured by using an entropy--like indicator. With this simple model we found a nontrivial dependence of segregation on both, the initial inequality of the socioeconomic agents and the inflationary parameter. In this way we supply an explanatory model for the segregation--inequality thesis putted forward by Douglas Massey.Comment: 17 pages, 11 figures. email: [email protected], [email protected]

A Rule-driven Approach for Defining the Behavior of Negotiating Software Agents

One problem with existing agent-mediated negotiation systems is that they rely on ad hoc, static, non-adaptive, and hardcoded schemes to represent the behaviour of agents. This limitation is probably due to the complexity of the negotiation task itself. Indeed, while negotiating, software (human) agents face tough decisions. These decisions are based not only on the information made available by the negotiation server, but on the behaviour of the other participants in the negotiation process as well. The information and the behaviour in question are constantly changing and highly uncertain. In the first part of the paper, we propose a rule-driven approach to represent, manage and explore negotiation strategies and coordination information. For that, we divide the behaviour of negotiating agents into protocols, strategies and coordination. Among the many advantages of the proposed solution, we can cite the high level of abstraction, the closeness to human understanding, the versatility, and the possibility to modify the agents' behaviour during the negotiation process. To validate our solution, we ran many agent tournaments, and used the rule-driven approach to implement bidding strategies that are common in the English and Dutch auctions. We also implemented simple coordination schemes across several auctions. The ongoing validation work is detailed and discussed in the second part of the paper. Un des inconvénients qu'on retrouve fréquemment dans les systèmes de négociation par agents est qu'ils reposent sur des schémas ad-hoc, non adaptatifs et figés dans le code pour représenter le comportement des agents. Cette limitation est probablement due à la complexité de l'activité de négociation elle-même. En effet, au cours de la négociation, les agents logiciels (humains) ont des décisions difficiles à prendre. Ces décisions ne sont pas seulement basées sur l'information disponible sur le serveur de négociation, mais aussi sur le comportement des autres participants durant le processus de négociation. L'information et le comportement en question changent constamment et sont très incertains. Dans la première partie de l'article, nous proposons une approche à base de règles pour représenter, gérer et explorer les stratégies de négociation ainsi que l'information de coordination. Parmi les nombreux avantages de la solution proposée, on peut citer le haut niveau d'abstraction, la proximité avec la compréhension humaine, la souplesse d'utilisation et la possibilité de modifier le comportement des agents durant le processus de négociation. Pour valider notre solution, nous avons effectué plusieurs tournois entre agents et utilisé l'approche à base de règles pour implémenter des stratégies simples applicables à l'enchère anglaise et à l'enchère hollandaise. Nous avons aussi implémenté des schémas simples de coordination impliquant plusieurs enchères. Le travail de validation, en cours, est détaillé et discuté dans la seconde partie de l'article.e-negotiation, online auction, software agent, negotiation strategy, coordination, rule-based system, rule engine, Négociation électronique, enchères en ligne, agents logiciels, stratégie de négociation, coordination, système à base de règles, moteur de règles

From modularity to emergence: a primer on the design and science of complex systems

Electrical networks, flocking birds, transportation hubs, weather patterns, commercial organisations, swarming robots... Increasingly, many of the systems that we want to engineer or understand are said to be ‘complex’. These systems are often considered to be intractable because of their unpredictability, non-linearity, interconnectivity, heterarchy and ‘emergence’. Such attributes are often framed as a problem, but can also be exploited to encourage systems to efficiently exhibit intelligent, robust, self-organising behaviours. But what does it mean to describe systems as complex? How do these complex systems differ from the more easily understood ‘modular’ systems that we are familiar with? What are the underlying similarities between different systems, whether modular or complex? Answering these questions is a first step in approaching the design and science of complexity. However, to do so, it is necessary to look beyond the specifics of any particular system or field of study. We need to consider the fundamental nature of systems, looking for a common way to view ostensibly different phenomena. This primer introduces a domain-neutral framework and diagrammatic scheme for characterising the ways in which systems are modular or complex. Rather than seeing modularity and complexity as inherent attributes of systems, we instead see them as ways in which those systems are characterised by those who are interested in them. The framework is not tied to any established mode of representation (e.g. networks, equations, formal modelling languages) nor to any domain-specific terminology (e.g. ‘vertex’, ‘eigenvector’, ‘entropy’). Instead, it consists of basic system constructs and three fundamental attributes of modular system architecture, namely structural encapsulation, function-structure mapping and interfacing. These constructs and attributes encourage more precise descriptions of different aspects of complexity (e.g. emergence, self-organisation, heterarchy). This allows researchers and practitioners from different disciplines to share methods, theories and findings related to the design and study of different systems, even when those systems appear superficially dissimilar

Adaptive build-up and breakdown of trust: An agent based computational approach

This article employs Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate whether, and under what conditions, trust is viable in markets. The emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents develop trust in a partner as a function of observed loyalty. They select partners on the basis of their trust in the partner and potential profit, with adaptive weights. On the basis of realized profits, they adapt the weight they attach to trust relative to profitability, and their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of defection. Trust and loyalty turn out to be viable under fairly general conditions.Agent-based computational economics;Inter-firm relations;Transaction costs;Governance;Trust;Complex adaptive systems

A Free Exchange e-Marketplace for Digital Services

The digital era is witnessing a remarkable evolution of digital services. While the prospects are countless, the e-marketplaces of digital services are encountering inherent game-theoretic and computational challenges that restrict the rational choices of bidders. Our work examines the limited bidding scope and the inefficiencies of present exchange e-marketplaces. To meet challenges, a free exchange e-marketplace is proposed that follows the free market economy. The free exchange model includes a new bidding language and a double auction mechanism. The rule-based bidding language enables the flexible expression of preferences and strategic conduct. The bidding message holds the attribute-valuations and bidding rules of the selected services. The free exchange deliberates on attributes and logical bidding rules for automatic deduction and formation of elicited services and bids that result in a more rapid self-managed multiple exchange trades. The double auction uses forward and reverse generalized second price auctions for the symmetric matching of multiple digital services of identical attributes and different quality levels. The proposed double auction uses tractable heuristics that secure exchange profitability, improve truthful bidding and deliver stable social efficiency. While the strongest properties of symmetric exchanges are unfeasible game-theoretically, the free exchange converges rapidly to the social efficiency, Nash truthful stability, and weak budget balance by multiple quality-levels cross-matching, constant learning and informs at repetitive thick trades. The empirical findings validate the soundness and viability of the free exchange