How could a rational analysis model explain?

Rational analysis is an influential but contested account of how probabilistic modeling can be used to construct non-mechanistic but self-standing explanatory models of the mind. In this paper, I disentangle and assess several possible explanatory contributions which could be attributed to rational analysis. Although existing models suffer from evidential problems that question their explanatory power, I argue that rational analysis modeling can complement mechanistic theorizing by providing models of environmental affordances

Anomalous monism and mental causality : on the debate of Donald Davidson’s philosophy of the mental

The English version of the first chapter of Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer: Materialismus, anomaler Monismus und mentale Kausalität. Zur gegenwärtigen Philosophie des Mentalen bei Donald Davidson und David Lewis (2001) "Anomaler Monismus und Mentale Kausalität. Ein Beitrag zur Debatte über Donald Davidsons Philosophie des Mentalen" is a contribution to the current debates on the philosophy of the mental and mental causality initiated from Donald Davidson's philosophy with his article "Mental Events" (1970). It is the intent of the English version to give a response to the controversy among American, British and Australian philosophers in the context of a global exchange of ideas on problems understanding the mental. Contents 1. Preliminary Remarks 2. The Critique of Property-Epiphenomenalism and Counterarguments (a) The Enlargement of Nomological Reasoning (b) The Counterfactual Analysis (c) Supervenient Causality 3. Are Mental Properties real or unreal (fictive)? Abstract Things and events are fundamental entities in Davidson's ontology. Less distinct is the ontological status of properties, especially of mental types. Despite of some eliminative allusions there are weighty reasons to understand Davidson's philosophy of mind as including intentional realism. With it, the question of mental causality arises. There are two striking solutions to this problem: the epiphenomenalism of mental properties and the downward causation of mental events. Davidson cannot accept either. He claims to justify the mental as supervenient causality in order to thus integrate it into physicalism (his version of monism). But his argument at best proves the explanatory, not the causal relevance of mental properties. For this and for other reasons, Davidson fails the aspired synthesis of a sufficiently strong physicalism and the autonomy of the mental; a project whose realization is anyhow hard to achieve

Explaining Black-Box Models through Counterfactuals

We present CounterfactualExplanations.jl: a package for generating Counterfactual Explanations (CE) and Algorithmic Recourse (AR) for black-box models in Julia. CE explain how inputs into a model need to change to yield specific model predictions. Explanations that involve realistic and actionable changes can be used to provide AR: a set of proposed actions for individuals to change an undesirable outcome for the better. In this article, we discuss the usefulness of CE for Explainable Artificial Intelligence and demonstrate the functionality of our package. The package is straightforward to use and designed with a focus on customization and extensibility. We envision it to one day be the go-to place for explaining arbitrary predictive models in Julia through a diverse suite of counterfactual generators.Comment: 13 pages, 9 figures, originally published in The Proceedings of the JuliaCon Conferences (JCON