Multi-issue negotiation with deadlines.

This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which all the issues are bundled and discussed together, the simultaneous procedure in which the issues are discussed simultaneously but independently of each other, and the sequential procedure in which the issues are discussed one after another. Since each of them yields a different outcome, a key problem is to decide which one to use in which circumstances. Specifically, we consider this question for a model in which the agents have time constraints (in the form of both deadlines and discount factors) and information uncertainty (in that the agents do not know the opponent's utility function). For this model, we consider issues that are both independent and those that are interdependent and determine equilibria for each case for each procedure. In doing so, we show that the package deal is in fact the optimal procedure for each party. We then go on to show that, although the package deal may be computationally more complex than the other two procedures, it generates Pareto optimal outcomes (unlike the other two), it has similar earliest and latest possible times of agreement to the simultaneous procedure (which is better than the sequential procedure), and that it (like the other two procedures) generates a unique outcome only under certain conditions (which we define)

On efficient procedures for multi-issue negotiation

This paper studies bilateral, multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents with deadlines. There are a number of procedures for negotiating the issues and each of these gives a different outcome. Thus, a key problem is to decide which one to use. Given this, we study the three main alternatives: the package deal, the simultaneous procedure, and the sequential procedure. First, we determine equilibria for the case where each agent is uncertain about its opponent’s deadline. We then compare the outcomes for these procedures and determine the one that is optimal (in this case, the package deal is optimal for each party). We then compare the procedures in terms of their time complexity, the uniqueness and Pareto optimality of their solutions, and their time of agreement

Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons From General Theory and Varied Contexts

Does the field of conflict resolution have any broadly applicable theories that work across the different domains of international and domestic conflict? Or, are contexts, participants, and resources so domain specific and variable that only thick descriptions of particular contexts will do? These are important questions which have been plaguing me in this depressing time for conflict resolution professionals, from September 11,2001 (9/11), to the war against Iraq. Have we learned anything about conflict resolution that really does improve our ability to describe, predict, and act to reduce unnecessary and harmful conflict? These are the questions I want to explore in this essay, all the while knowing that I will ask more questions than I have answers to. My hope is to spark more rigorous attention to the possibility of comparative dispute resolution study and practice, using key concepts, theories, empirical studies, practical wisdom, and experiential insights to spark and encourage more multi-level and multi-unit analysis of some of our shared propositions

An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications

A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents

Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behaviour uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality in common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer

Internationalizing education: evaluating the growth of intercultural communication and competency in students through an international negotiation project using an online law office

Graduates will need to be able to recognize and appreciate culture in a way that minimizes conflict, promote understanding and to establish a relationship of trust and confidence. The need for competency in intercultural communication and an awareness of ethical challenges sets out a challenge for academics. This study examines the types of learning and characteristics developed by students when working on a ten‐week international negotiation project. It questions whether the study was an effective learning tool to raise consciousness of cultural diversity and effectively address the ‘stumbling blocks’ identified in intercultural communication. Using the findings from this, the study will consider the factors academics should consider when designing high quality, equitable and global study programmes in order for students to develop cross‐cultural capacities and aptitudes in order to be able to perform, professionally and socially, in a multicultural environment

Interpreting Cancun: Experience and Lessons for Bangladesh

The paper is based on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun, Mexico. It aims to reveal the importance of putting the process, outcome and future implications of the Cancun Ministerial under critical and careful scrutiny to draw the necessary insights and lessons related to major issues debated and discussed. The study critically shows how the state of play in the WTO is going to evolve in the post-Cancun era, and how Bangladesh should do her homework in this context.WTO-General Council, Cancun, Bangladesh

A multi-agent platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics

This paper describes an agent-based platform for the allocation of loads in distributed transportation logistics, developed as a collaboration between CWI, Dutch National Center for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam and Vos Logistics Organizing, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. The platform follows a real business scenario proposed by Vos, and it involves a set of agents bidding for transportation loads to be distributed from a central depot in the Netherlands to different locations across Germany. The platform supports both human agents (i.e. transportation planners), who can bid through specialized planning and bidding interfaces, as well as automated, software agents. We exemplify how the proposed platform can be used to test both the bidding behaviour of human logistics planners, as well as the performance of automated auction bidding strategies, developed for such settings. The paper first introduces the business problem setting and then describes the architecture and main characteristics of our auction platform. We conclude with a preliminary discussion of our experience from a human bidding experiment, involving Vos planners competing for orders both against each other and against some (simple) automated strategies

The Doha Round after Hong Kong

Trade ministers from member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) convened in Hong Kong in December 2005 to jump-start the flagging Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The ministerial accomplished more in spirit than in substance and placed more emphasis on negotiating process than on policy reform. The industrial countries offered up kernels of subsidy reform and development assistance, but all the big-ticket items were studiously deferred to future meetings. Progress on nonagricultural market access and services was microscopic. Without substantive offers in these areas, the United States and European Union will not be able to augment their offers on farm reforms. Developing countries are skeptical that the European Union will up the ante in agriculture even if they offer concrete reforms on goods and services trade. In any event, most developing countries are reluctant to lower their own market access barriers. So neither side moves. Trade ministers do not have the political authority to break this "Alphonse and Gaston" routine and approve reforms in sensitive areas that are needed to produce a comprehensive package of accords acceptable to all WTO members. To succeed, the Doha Round needs a political jolt. A trade summit involving heads of state of countries whose policy reforms are crucial to the success of the WTO talks must be convened to break the impasse.