The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions.

The launch of the CLSTM system on 9 September 2002 marked the completion of an ambitious project undertaken by the banking sector following the G10 central banks’ recommendations on reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions. The CLS system is owned by 66 of the largest foreign exchange-dealing banks, including 4 French banks. In the first phase, 7 currencies (euro, US dollar, sterling, yen, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar and Australian dollar) will be eligible for CLS. The system is bound to establish itself as the standard “market infrastructure” for settling foreign exchange transactions. The first section of this article looks at the CLS system in light of the central banks’ joint efforts with the banking industry to reduce settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions. The second section describes the CLS operating principles and its contribution to controlling settlement risk. The third section discusses the central banks’ role in the oversight of the CLS project. The final section looks at the impact that the implementation of the system may have on payment activities.

Exploring agent-based methods for the analysis of payment systems: a crisis model for StarLogo TNG

agent-based modeling, payment systems, RTGS, liquidity, crisis simulation Abstract: This paper presents an exploratory agent-based model of a real time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system. Banks are represented as agents who exchange payment requests, which are settled according to a set of simple rules. The model features the main elements of a real-life system, including a central bank acting as liquidity provider, and a simplified money market. A simulation exercise using synthetic data of BI-REL (the Italian RTGS) predicts the macroscopic impact of a disruptive event on the flow of interbank payments. The main advantage of agent - based modeling is that we can dynamically see what happens to the major variables involved. In our reduced-scale system, three hypothetical distinct phases emerge after the disruptive event: 1) a liquidity sink effect is generated and the participants’ liquidity expectations turn out to be excessive; 2) an illusory thickening of the money market follows, along with increased payment delays; and, finally 3) defaulted obligations dramatically rise. The banks cannot staunch the losses accruing on defaults, even after they become fully aware of the critical event, and a scenario emerges in which it might be necessary for the central bank to step in as liquidity provider. The methodology presented differs from traditional payment systems simulations featuring deterministic streams of payments dealt with in a centralized manner with static behavior on the part of banks. The paper is within a recent stream of empirical research that attempts to model RTGS with agent – based techniques.

Payment and Settlement Systems in Finland 1995

This paper is an overview of domestic payment and settlement systems in Finland. It contains an up-to-date description of institutional aspects of payment systems, payment media used by non-banks, interbank exchange and settlement circuits and securities settlement systems. At the end of the paper, annual statistics are presented on payment and settlement systems and on payment media for the years 1989–1994.clearing; settlement; payment media; Finland

Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk in Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks

Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks� assets has led to the idea of �too interconnected to fail� resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel II credit risk transfer and synthetic securitization framework, there is little evidence that the CDS market predicated on a system of offsets to minimize final settlement can provide the credit risk mitigation sought by banks for reference assets in the case of a significant credit event. The large negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS financial network from the demise of a big CDS seller undermines the justification in Basel II that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontinued.

CLS Bank: Managing Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk

In the foreign exchange market, where average daily turnover is in trillions of dollars and trades span time zones, legal systems, and domestic payments systems, participants take on various risks. The most serious risk is credit risk - the risk that one party will fail to pay. Central banks, private sector financial institutions, and domestic payments systems operators laboured for more than a decade to develop a multi-currency settlement system to deal with these risks. The result, the CLS Bank, began operations in September 2002. It virtually eliminates the credit risk inherent in foreign exchange transactions by providing a payment-versus-payment arrangement for settlement. The CLS Bank is regulated by the Federal Reserve Board in consultation with the central banks that have currencies settling through its system. At present there are seven currencies, including the Canadian dollar. The Bank of Canada acts as banker for the CLS Bank, providing it with a settlement account and making and receiving payments on its behalf through the Large Value Transfer System. With the participation and support of the world's largest foreign-exchange-dealing institutions, and growing membership, the CLS Bank has the potential to become the dominant global mechanism for settling foreign exchange transactions.

Developing financial markets

Central banks have an interest in well-functioning money markets, foreign exchange markets, and secondary markets for government securities. Efficient financial markets support both the monetary stability and financial stability goals of the central bank; and more broadly should benefit economic development. Well-functioning money markets support the transmission of an interest-rate based monetary policy and can provide information to the central bank. Liquid foreign exchange markets can help to stabilise the exchange rate and reduce transaction costs in cross-border trade and transfers. The development of these markets will support the later introduction of related financial markets such as repo and derivatives, which should in turn lead to improved risk management and financial stability, thereby enhancing economic welfare. Liquidity and price stability in short-term interest rate markets can support market-making, and thus liquidity in the securities markets. This in turn should reduce the cost of issuance for the government and other fixed-interest issuers. Indeed the secondary market for government securities may act as a catalyst for wider fixed income securities markets development: its yield curve is the benchmark for the pricing of the private sector credit. The advancement of these markets should be accompanied by the development of the appropriate market infrastructure such as robust payment and settlement systems and supportive legal framework. Many developing economies are characterised by illiquidity in these core markets, and in most cases a surplus of central bank money, in the form of excess commercial bank balances with the central bank. This handbook will look at what the central bank, and the Ministry of Finance as issuer of government securities, could do (and in some cases should not do) in support of the development of these markets.Developing financial markets

Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk In Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks

Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks’ assets has led to the idea of “too interconnected to fail” resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel II credit risk transfer and synthetic securitization framework, there is little evidence that the CDS market predicated on a system of offsets to minimize final settlement can provide the credit risk mitigation sought by banks for reference assets in the case of a significant credit event. The large negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS financial network from the demise of a big CDS seller undermines the justification in Basel II that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontinued.Credit Default Swaps; Financial Networks; Systemic Risk; Agent BasedCredit Default Swaps, Financial Networks, Systemic Risk, Agent Based Models, Complex Systems, Stress Testing

The multi-layer network nature of systemic risk and its implications for the costs of financial crises

The inability to see and quantify systemic financial risk comes at an immense social cost. Systemic risk in the financial system arises to a large extent as a consequence of the interconnectedness of its institutions, which are linked through networks of different types of financial contracts, such as credit, derivatives, foreign exchange and securities. The interplay of the various exposure networks can be represented as layers in a financial multi-layer network. In this work we quantify the daily contributions to systemic risk from four layers of the Mexican banking system from 2007-2013. We show that focusing on a single layer underestimates the total systemic risk by up to 90%. By assigning systemic risk levels to individual banks we study the systemic risk profile of the Mexican banking system on all market layers. This profile can be used to quantify systemic risk on a national level in terms of nation-wide expected systemic losses. We show that market-based systemic risk indicators systematically underestimate expected systemic losses. We find that expected systemic losses are up to a factor four higher now than before the financial crisis of 2007-2008. We find that systemic risk contributions of individual transactions can be up to a factor of thousand higher than the corresponding credit risk, which creates huge risks for the public. We find an intriguing non-linear effect whereby the sum of systemic risk of all layers underestimates the total risk. The method presented here is the first objective data driven quantification of systemic risk on national scales that reveal its true levels.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figure

Modernizing payment systems in emerging economies

The authors address the following questions in this overview of payment systems: What is a payment system? How can efficient systems contribute to the development of modern, market-based financial institutions and markets? What elements are necessary for payment systems to operate efficiently? What are the operational characteristics of a modern payment system? What is the World Bank approach to selected payment system initiatives, design, and development? Effective, efficient payment systems, they conclude, are vital for the economic development of emerging economies. Efficient payment systems help promote the development of commerce, enhance economic policy oversight, control the risk inherent in moving large values, and reduce the financial, capital and human resources devoted to the transfer of payments. Many emerging economies lack the financial and technical resources to develop such systems. Many turn technical resources to develop such systems. Many turn to the World Bank and other international agencies for assistance. Unfortunately, some believe that the entire solution for an effective payment system rests in obtaining modern computer hardware and believe the World Bank's sole contribution is to finance hardware costs. Hardware procurement alone will not solve problems of payment systems. These countries need organizational plans and structure for national payment systems before they spend money on computer equipment. They often lack the expertise to design and operate modern payment systems, so they may need technical assistance from financial experts before they invest in systems development. The design of a new payment system should be kept simple. Many emerging economies lack the infrastructure and banking sophistication to leapfrog from basic to state-of-the-art payment systems. The first task is to fix the most serious problems. The second is to upgrade the current systems incrementally, to meet basic standards of timeliness, security, and reliability. As these improvements are made, the countries can turn their attention to long-term, advanced solutions. Each country's payments system is unique. To simply import another country's system without adjusting for the target country's geography, infrastructure, banking and legal structures, culture, and needs could lead to suboptimal solutions. Development of the system should follow a disciplined plan for defining the needs of users and for organizing the project team and project goals.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation,Information Technology