Physiological Gaussian Process Priors for the Hemodynamics in fMRI Analysis

Background: Inference from fMRI data faces the challenge that the hemodynamic system that relates neural activity to the observed BOLD fMRI signal is unknown. New Method: We propose a new Bayesian model for task fMRI data with the following features: (i) joint estimation of brain activity and the underlying hemodynamics, (ii) the hemodynamics is modeled nonparametrically with a Gaussian process (GP) prior guided by physiological information and (iii) the predicted BOLD is not necessarily generated by a linear time-invariant (LTI) system. We place a GP prior directly on the predicted BOLD response, rather than on the hemodynamic response function as in previous literature. This allows us to incorporate physiological information via the GP prior mean in a flexible way, and simultaneously gives us the nonparametric flexibility of the GP. Results: Results on simulated data show that the proposed model is able to discriminate between active and non-active voxels also when the GP prior deviates from the true hemodynamics. Our model finds time varying dynamics when applied to real fMRI data. Comparison with Existing Method(s): The proposed model is better at detecting activity in simulated data than standard models, without inflating the false positive rate. When applied to real fMRI data, our GP model in several cases finds brain activity where previously proposed LTI models does not. Conclusions: We have proposed a new non-linear model for the hemodynamics in task fMRI, that is able to detect active voxels, and gives the opportunity to ask new kinds of questions related to hemodynamics.Comment: 18 pages, 14 figure

Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation

We have previously tried to explain perceptual inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pursues Helmholtz’s agenda to understand the brain in terms of energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as the minimization of a free-energy bound on the likelihood of sensory inputs, given an internal model of how they were caused. In this article, we consider what would happen if the data themselves were sampled to minimize this bound. It transpires that the ensuing active sampling or inference is mandated by ergodic arguments based on the very existence of adaptive agents. Furthermore, it accounts for many aspects of motor behavior; from retinal stabilization to goal-seeking. In particular, it suggests that motor control can be understood as fulfilling prior expectations about proprioceptive sensations. This formulation can explain why adaptive behavior emerges in biological agents and suggests a simple alternative to optimal control theory. We illustrate these points using simulations of oculomotor control and then apply to same principles to cued and goal-directed movements. In short, the free-energy formulation may provide an alternative perspective on the motor control that places it in an intimate relationship with perception

Probabilistic Models of Motor Production

N. Bernstein defined the ability of the central neural system (CNS) to control many degrees of freedom of a physical body with all its redundancy and flexibility as the main problem in motor control. He pointed at that man-made mechanisms usually have one, sometimes two degrees of freedom (DOF); when the number of DOF increases further, it becomes prohibitively hard to control them. The brain, however, seems to perform such control effortlessly. He suggested the way the brain might deal with it: when a motor skill is being acquired, the brain artificially limits the degrees of freedoms, leaving only one or two. As the skill level increases, the brain gradually "frees" the previously fixed DOF, applying control when needed and in directions which have to be corrected, eventually arriving to the control scheme where all the DOF are "free". This approach of reducing the dimensionality of motor control remains relevant even today. One the possibles solutions of the Bernstetin's problem is the hypothesis of motor primitives (MPs) - small building blocks that constitute complex movements and facilitite motor learnirng and task completion. Just like in the visual system, having a homogenious hierarchical architecture built of similar computational elements may be beneficial. Studying such a complicated object as brain, it is important to define at which level of details one works and which questions one aims to answer. David Marr suggested three levels of analysis: 1. computational, analysing which problem the system solves; 2. algorithmic, questioning which representation the system uses and which computations it performs; 3. implementational, finding how such computations are performed by neurons in the brain. In this thesis we stay at the first two levels, seeking for the basic representation of motor output. In this work we present a new model of motor primitives that comprises multiple interacting latent dynamical systems, and give it a full Bayesian treatment. Modelling within the Bayesian framework, in my opinion, must become the new standard in hypothesis testing in neuroscience. Only the Bayesian framework gives us guarantees when dealing with the inevitable plethora of hidden variables and uncertainty. The special type of coupling of dynamical systems we proposed, based on the Product of Experts, has many natural interpretations in the Bayesian framework. If the dynamical systems run in parallel, it yields Bayesian cue integration. If they are organized hierarchically due to serial coupling, we get hierarchical priors over the dynamics. If one of the dynamical systems represents sensory state, we arrive to the sensory-motor primitives. The compact representation that follows from the variational treatment allows learning of a motor primitives library. Learned separately, combined motion can be represented as a matrix of coupling values. We performed a set of experiments to compare different models of motor primitives. In a series of 2-alternative forced choice (2AFC) experiments participants were discriminating natural and synthesised movements, thus running a graphics Turing test. When available, Bayesian model score predicted the naturalness of the perceived movements. For simple movements, like walking, Bayesian model comparison and psychophysics tests indicate that one dynamical system is sufficient to describe the data. For more complex movements, like walking and waving, motion can be better represented as a set of coupled dynamical systems. We also experimentally confirmed that Bayesian treatment of model learning on motion data is superior to the simple point estimate of latent parameters. Experiments with non-periodic movements show that they do not benefit from more complex latent dynamics, despite having high kinematic complexity. By having a fully Bayesian models, we could quantitatively disentangle the influence of motion dynamics and pose on the perception of naturalness. We confirmed that rich and correct dynamics is more important than the kinematic representation. There are numerous further directions of research. In the models we devised, for multiple parts, even though the latent dynamics was factorized on a set of interacting systems, the kinematic parts were completely independent. Thus, interaction between the kinematic parts could be mediated only by the latent dynamics interactions. A more flexible model would allow a dense interaction on the kinematic level too. Another important problem relates to the representation of time in Markov chains. Discrete time Markov chains form an approximation to continuous dynamics. As time step is assumed to be fixed, we face with the problem of time step selection. Time is also not a explicit parameter in Markov chains. This also prohibits explicit optimization of time as parameter and reasoning (inference) about it. For example, in optimal control boundary conditions are usually set at exact time points, which is not an ecological scenario, where time is usually a parameter of optimization. Making time an explicit parameter in dynamics may alleviate this

Neuronal bases of structural coherence in contemporary dance observation

The neuronal processes underlying dance observation have been the focus of an increasing number of brain imaging studies over the past decade. However, the existing literature mainly dealt with effects of motor and visual expertise, whereas the neural and cognitive mechanisms that underlie the interpretation of dance choreographies remained unexplored. Hence, much attention has been given to the Action Observation Network (AON) whereas the role of other potentially relevant neuro-cognitive mechanisms such as mentalizing (theory of mind) or language (narrative comprehension) in dance understanding is yet to be elucidated. We report the results of an fMRI study where the structural coherence of short contemporary dance choreographies was manipulated parametrically using the same taped movement material. Our participants were all trained dancers. The whole-brain analysis argues that the interpretation of structurally coherent dance phrases involves a subpart (Superior Parietal) of the AON as well as mentalizing regions in the dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex. An ROI analysis based on a similar study using linguistic materials (Pallier et al. 2011) suggests that structural processing in language and dance might share certain neural mechanisms

Separate areas for mirror responses and agency within the parietal operculum

There is common neural activity in parietal and premotor cortex when executing and observing goal-directed movements: the “mirror” response. In addition, active and passive limb movements cause overlapping activity in premotor and somatosensory cortex. This association of motor and sensory activity cannot ascribe agency, the ability to discriminate between self- and non-self-generated events. This requires that some signals accompanying self-initiated limb movement dissociate from those evoked by observing the action of another or by movement imposed on oneself by external force. We demonstrated associated activity within the medial parietal operculum in response to feedforward visual or somatosensory information accompanying observed and imposed finger movements. In contrast, the response to motor and somatosensory information during self-initiated finger and observed movements resulted in activity localized to the lateral parietal operculum. This ascribes separate functions to medial and lateral second-order somatosensory cortex, anatomically dissociating the agent and the mirror response, demonstrating how executed and observed events are distinguished despite common activity in widespread sensorimotor cortices

A Neural Model of Visually Guided Steering, Obstacle Avoidance, and Route Selection

A neural model is developed to explain how humans can approach a goal object on foot while steering around obstacles to avoid collisions in a cluttered environment. The model uses optic flow from a 3D virtual reality environment to determine the position of objects based on motion discontinuities, and computes heading direction, or the direction of self-motion, from global optic flow. The cortical representation of heading interacts with the representations of a goal and obstacles such that the goal acts as an attractor of heading, while obstacles act as repellers. In addition the model maintains fixation on the goal object by generating smooth pursuit eye movements. Eye rotations can distort the optic flow field, complicating heading perception, and the model uses extraretinal signals to correct for this distortion and accurately represent heading. The model explains how motion processing mechanisms in cortical areas MT, MST, and posterior parietal cortex can be used to guide steering. The model quantitatively simulates human psychophysical data about visually-guided steering, obstacle avoidance, and route selection.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F4960-01-1-0397); National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NMA201-01-1-2016); National Science Foundation (SBE-0354378); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624