229 research outputs found
Foundational Verification of Stateful P4 Packet Processing
P4 is a standardized programming language for the network data plane. But P4 is not just for routing anymore. As programmable switches support stateful objects, P4 programs move beyond just stateless forwarders into new stateful applications: network telemetry (heavy hitters, DDoS detection, performance monitoring), middleboxes (firewalls, NAT, load balancers, intrusion detection), and distributed services (in-network caching, lock management, conflict detection). The complexity of stateful programs and their richer specifications are beyond what existing P4 program verifiers can handle.
Verifiable P4 is a new interactive verification framework for P4 that (1) allows reasoning about multi-packet properties by specifying the per-packet relation between initial and final states; (2) performs modular verification, especially providing a modular description for stateful objects; (3) is foundational, i.e., with a machine-checked soundness proof with respect to a formal operational semantics of P4_{16} (the current specification of P4) in Coq. In addition, our framework includes a proved-correct reference interpreter.
We demonstrate the framework with the specification and verification of a stateful firewall that uses a sliding-window Bloom filter on a Tofino switch to block (most) unsolicited traffic
Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications
Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for
the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research
experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts
today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited
abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes,
thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led
to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at
formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism
are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of
clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN)
paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right
kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence
in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and
synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a
self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in
formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial
Formalizing, Verifying and Applying ISA Security Guarantees as Universal Contracts
Progress has recently been made on specifying instruction set architectures
(ISAs) in executable formalisms rather than through prose. However, to date,
those formal specifications are limited to the functional aspects of the ISA
and do not cover its security guarantees. We present a novel, general method
for formally specifying an ISAs security guarantees to (1) balance the needs of
ISA implementations (hardware) and clients (software), (2) can be
semi-automatically verified to hold for the ISA operational semantics,
producing a high-assurance mechanically-verifiable proof, and (3) support
informal and formal reasoning about security-critical software in the presence
of adversarial code. Our method leverages universal contracts: software
contracts that express bounds on the authority of arbitrary untrusted code.
Universal contracts can be kept agnostic of software abstractions, and strike
the right balance between requiring sufficient detail for reasoning about
software and preserving implementation freedom of ISA designers and CPU
implementers. We semi-automatically verify universal contracts against Sail
implementations of ISA semantics using our Katamaran tool; a semi-automatic
separation logic verifier for Sail which produces machine-checked proofs for
successfully verified contracts. We demonstrate the generality of our method by
applying it to two ISAs that offer very different security primitives: (1)
MinimalCaps: a custom-built capability machine ISA and (2) a (somewhat
simplified) version of RISC-V with PMP. We verify a femtokernel using the
security guarantee we have formalized for RISC-V with PMP
Arís 2.1: Adapting Arís for Object Oriented Language
In the software development area, software verification is important such that it can guarantee the software
fulfills its requirements. Despite its importance, verifying software is difficult to achieve. Additional
knowledge and effort are needed to write specification especially if the software is complex and big in
size. Nevertheless, there are some software that already have verified specifications. This project will
focus on extending Arís (Analogical Reasoning for reuse of Implementation & Specification) which has
been developed to increase verified software by reusing and transferring the specification from a similar
implementation to a target code. The extension is done to facilitate specification transferring to program
written in language other than C#, in this case Java. This extension will add functions to existing Arís
that will receive Conceptual Graphs representation of a program and write the specification to a file.
Another companion system is also built from Java to generate the Conceptual Graphs in Conceptual
Graph Interchange Format (CGIF) and transform the Spec# specification to JML. Finally, this new
system is evaluated by running some testing. From the result that we have, we can conclude that the
building of conceptual graph and the specification transformation is the most difficult part in our system
Arís 2.1: Adapting Arís for Object Oriented Language
In the software development area, software verification is important such that it can guarantee the software
fulfills its requirements. Despite its importance, verifying software is difficult to achieve. Additional
knowledge and effort are needed to write specification especially if the software is complex and big in
size. Nevertheless, there are some software that already have verified specifications. This project will
focus on extending Arís (Analogical Reasoning for reuse of Implementation & Specification) which has
been developed to increase verified software by reusing and transferring the specification from a similar
implementation to a target code. The extension is done to facilitate specification transferring to program
written in language other than C#, in this case Java. This extension will add functions to existing Arís
that will receive Conceptual Graphs representation of a program and write the specification to a file.
Another companion system is also built from Java to generate the Conceptual Graphs in Conceptual
Graph Interchange Format (CGIF) and transform the Spec# specification to JML. Finally, this new
system is evaluated by running some testing. From the result that we have, we can conclude that the
building of conceptual graph and the specification transformation is the most difficult part in our system
Zero Knowledge for Everything and Everyone: Fast ZK Processor with Cached RAM for ANSI C Programs
We build a complete and efficient ZK toolchain that handles proof statements encoded as arbitrary ANSI C programs.
Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs are foundational in cryptography. Recent ZK research has focused intensely on non-interactive proofs of small statements, useful in blockchain scenarios. We instead target large statements that are useful, e.g., in proving properties of programs.
Recent work (Heath and Kolesnikov, CCS 2020 [HK20a]) designed a proof-of-concept ZK machine (ZKM). Their machine executes arbitrary programs over a minimal instruction set, authenticating in ZK the program execution. In this work, we significantly extend this research thrust, both in terms of efficiency and generality. Our contributions include:
• A rich and performance-oriented architecture for representing arbitrary ZK proofs as programs.
• A complete compiler toolchain providing full support for ANSI C95 programs. We ran off-the-shelf buggy versions of sed and gzip, proving in ZK that each program has a bug. To our knowledge, this is the first ZK system capable of executing standard Linux programs.
• Improved ZK RAM. [HK20a] introduced an efficient ZK-specific RAM BubbleRAM that consumes communication per access. We extend BubbleRAM with multi-level caching, decreasing communication to per access. This introduces the possibility of a cache miss, which we handle cheaply. Our experiments show that cache misses are rare; in isolation, i.e., ignoring other processor costs, BubbleCache improves communication over BubbleRAM by more than . Using BubbleCache improves our processor’s total communication (including costs of cache misses) by %.
• Numerous low-level optimizations, resulting in a CPU that is both more expressive and faster than [HK20a]’s.
• Attention to user experience. Our engineer-facing ZK instrumentation and extensions are minimal and easy to use.
Put together, our system is efficient and general, and can run many standard Linux programs. The resultant machine runs at up to 11KHz on a 1Gbps LAN and supports MBs of RAM
On a New, Efficient Framework for Falsifiable Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments
Et kunnskapsløst bevis er en protokoll mellom en bevisfører og en attestant. Bevisføreren har som mål å overbevise attestanten om at visse utsagn er korrekte, som besittelse av kortnummeret til et gyldig kredittkort, uten å avsløre noen private opplysninger, som for eksempel kortnummeret selv. I mange anvendelser er det ønskelig å bruke IIK-bevis (Ikke-interaktive kunnskapsløse bevis), der bevisføreren produserer kun en enkelt melding som kan bekreftes av mange attestanter.
En ulempe er at sikre IIK-bevis for ikke-trivielle språk kun kan eksistere ved tilstedeværelsen av en pålitelig tredjepart som beregner en felles referansestreng som blir gjort tilgjengelig for både bevisføreren og attestanten. Når ingen slik part eksisterer liter man av og til på ikke-interaktiv vitne-uskillbarhet, en svakere form for personvern. Studiet av effektive og sikre IIK-bevis er en kritisk del av kryptografi som har blomstret opp i det siste grunnet anvendelser i blokkjeder.
I den første artikkelen konstruerer vi et nytt IIK-bevis for språkene som består av alle felles nullpunkter for en endelig mengde polynomer over en endelig kropp. Vi demonstrerer nytteverdien av beviset ved flerfoldige eksempler på anvendelser. Særlig verdt å merke seg er at det er mulig å gå nesten automatisk fra en beskrivelse av et språk på et høyt nivå til definisjonen av IIK-beviset, som minsker behovet for dedikert kryptografisk ekspertise. I den andre artikkelen konstruerer vi et IIV-bevis ved å bruke en ny kompilator. Vi utforsker begrepet Kunnskapslydighet (et sterkere sikkerhetsbegrep enn lydighet) for noen konstruksjoner av IIK-bevis. I den tredje artikkelen utvider vi arbeidet fra den første artikkelen ved å konstruere et nytt IIK-bevis for mengde-medlemskap som lar oss bevise at et element ligger, eller ikke ligger, i den gitte mengden.
Flere nye konstruksjoner har bedre effektivitet sammenlignet med allerede kjente konstruksjoner.A zero-knowledge proof is a protocol between a prover, and a verifier. The prover aims to convince the verifier of the truth of some statement, such as possessing credentials for a valid credit card, without revealing any private information, such as the credentials themselves. In many applications, it is desirable to use NIZKs (Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge) proofs, where the prover sends outputs only a single message that can be verified by many verifiers.
As a drawback, secure NIZKs for non-trivial languages can only exist in the presence of a trusted third party that computes a common reference string and makes it available to both the prover and verifier. When no such party exists, one sometimes relies on non interactive witness indistinguishability (NIWI), a weaker notion of privacy. The study of efficient and secure NIZKs is a crucial part of cryptography that has been thriving recently due to blockchain applications.
In the first paper, we construct a new NIZK for the language of common zeros of a finite set of polynomials over a finite field. We demonstrate its usefulness by giving a large number of example applications. Notably, it is possible to go from a high-level language description to the definition of the NIZK almost automatically, lessening the need for dedicated cryptographic expertise. In the second paper, we construct a NIWI using a new compiler. We explore the notion of Knowledge Soundness (a security notion stronger than soundness) of some NIZK constructions. In the third paper, we extended the first paper’s work by constructing a new set (non-)membership NIZK that allows us to prove that an element belongs or does not belong to the given set.
Many new constructions have better efficiency compared to already-known constructions.Doktorgradsavhandlin
Lattice Problems Beyond Polynomial Time
We study the complexity of lattice problems in a world where algorithms,
reductions, and protocols can run in superpolynomial time, revisiting four
foundational results: two worst-case to average-case reductions and two
protocols. We also show a novel protocol.
1. We prove that secret-key cryptography exists if
-approximate SVP is hard for -time
algorithms. I.e., we extend to our setting (Micciancio and Regev's improved
version of) Ajtai's celebrated polynomial-time worst-case to average-case
reduction from -approximate SVP to SIS.
2. We prove that public-key cryptography exists if
-approximate SVP is hard for -time
algorithms. This extends to our setting Regev's celebrated polynomial-time
worst-case to average-case reduction from -approximate
SVP to LWE. In fact, Regev's reduction is quantum, but ours is classical,
generalizing Peikert's polynomial-time classical reduction from
-approximate SVP.
3. We show a -time coAM protocol for -approximate
CVP, generalizing the celebrated polynomial-time protocol for -CVP due to Goldreich and Goldwasser. These results show
complexity-theoretic barriers to extending the recent line of fine-grained
hardness results for CVP and SVP to larger approximation factors. (This result
also extends to arbitrary norms.)
4. We show a -time co-non-deterministic protocol for
-approximate SVP, generalizing the (also celebrated!)
polynomial-time protocol for -CVP due to Aharonov and Regev.
5. We give a novel coMA protocol for -approximate CVP with a
-time verifier.
All of the results described above are special cases of more general theorems
that achieve time-approximation factor tradeoffs
Principles of Security and Trust
This open access book constitutes the proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2019, which took place in Prague, Czech Republic, in April 2019, held as part of the European Joint Conference on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2019. The 10 papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 27 submissions. They deal with theoretical and foundational aspects of security and trust, including on new theoretical results, practical applications of existing foundational ideas, and innovative approaches stimulated by pressing practical problems
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