Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game

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Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking

Borda a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des m candidats. Condorcet a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des différents m! classements des candidats. La première est plus appropriée pour élire. La seconde est plus appropriée pour classer. Chacune satisfait une certaine monotonie. Leurs monotonies sont incompatiblesChoix social, Borda, Condorcet, monotonie, incompatibilité, élire, classer.

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota

Jury Theorems

We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’ competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (nonasymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’

Judge:Don't Vote!

This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method.Arrow's paradox ; Condorcet's paradox ; Majority judgment ; Skating ; Social choice ; Strategic manipulation ; Voting

Is Specialization Desirable in Committee Decision Making?

Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers.framing, project selection, public policy, collective decision making, committee, uncertain dichotomous choice, specialization, simple majority rule

Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records

The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.

Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century

Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as wide as possible and weight citizens’ votes in accordance with their competence. As it turns out, the optimal system is closely related to J. S. Mill's plural voting proposal. I also explain how voters’ competences can be precisely determined, without reference to an objective standard of correctness and without generating invidious comparisons between voters

On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to voting. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with two alternatives (e.g., Myerson (1998)). We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium under the simple plurality rule when there are three alternatives as well. We characterize the set of inefficient equilibria with two alterna- tives and the condition under which they exist. There is only one type of inefficient equilibrium with two alternatives. In this equilibrium, voters vote unresponsively because they all vote for the same alternative. Under the same condition, the same type of equilibrium exists with three alternatives. However, we show that the number and types of coordination failures increase with three alternatives, and that this leads to the existence of other types of inefficient equilibria as well, including those in which voters vote informatively.efficient information aggregation, simple plurality rule, Poisson games, Condorcet Jury Theorem