Halo-Independent Direct Detection Analyses Without Mass Assumptions

Results from direct detection experiments are typically interpreted by employing an assumption about the dark matter velocity distribution, with results presented in the $m_\chi-\sigma_n$ plane. Recently methods which are independent of the DM halo velocity distribution have been developed which present results in the $v_{min}-\tilde{g}$ plane, but these in turn require an assumption on the dark matter mass. Here we present an extension of these halo-independent methods for dark matter direct detection which does not require a fiducial choice of the dark matter mass. With a change of variables from $v_{min}$ to nuclear recoil momentum ($p_R$), the full halo-independent content of an experimental result for any dark matter mass can be condensed into a single plot as a function of a new halo integral variable, which we call $\tilde{h}(p_R)$. The entire family of conventional halo-independent $\tilde{g}(v_{min})$ plots for all DM masses are directly found from the single $\tilde{h}(p_R)$ plot through a simple rescaling of axes. By considering results in $\tilde{h}(p_R)$ space, one can determine if two experiments are inconsistent for all masses and all physically possible halos, or for what range of dark matter masses the results are inconsistent for all halos, without the necessity of multiple $\tilde{g}(v_{min})$ plots for different DM masses. We conduct a sample analysis comparing the CDMS II Si events to the null results from LUX, XENON10, and SuperCDMS using our method and discuss how the mass-independent limits can be strengthened by imposing the physically reasonable requirement of a finite halo escape velocity.Comment: 23 pages, 8 figures. v2: footnote and references adde

MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AS A DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING CORRELATED DISTRIBUTIONS

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium