Searching for harm or harming search? A look at the European Commission\u2019s antitrust investigation against Google

As the European Commission\u2019s antitrust investigation against Google approaches its final stages, its contours and likely outcome remain obscure and blurred by a plethora of non antitrust-related arguments. At the same time, the initial focus on search neutrality as an antitrust principle seems to have been abandoned by the European Commission, in favour of a more standard allegation of \u2018exclusionary abuse\u2019, likely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure of Google\u2019s rivals. This paper discusses search neutrality as an antitrust principle, and then comments on the current investigation based on publicly available information. The paper provides a critical assessment of the likely tests that will be used for the definition of the relevant product market, the criteria for the finding of dominance, the anticompetitive foreclosure test and the possible remedies that the European Commission might choose. Overall, and regardless of the outcome of the Google case, the paper argues that the current treatment of exclusionary abuses in Internet markets is in urgent need of a number of important clarifications, and has been in this condition for more than a decade. The hope is that the European Commission will resist the temptation to imbue the antitrust case with an emphasis and meaning that have nothing to do with antitrust (from industrial policy motives to privacy, copyright or media law arguments) and that, on the contrary, the Commission will devote its efforts to sharpening its understanding of dynamic competition in cyberspace, and the tools that should be applied in the analysis of these peculiar, fast-changing and often elusive settings

Searching for harm or harming search? A look at the European Commission’s antitrust investigation against Google. CEPS Special Report No. 118/September 2015

As the European Commission’s antitrust investigation against Google approaches its final stages, its contours and likely outcome remain obscure and blurred by a plethora of nonantitrust-related arguments. At the same time, the initial focus on search neutrality as an antitrust principle seems to have been abandoned by the European Commission, in favour of a more standard allegation of ‘exclusionary abuse’, likely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure of Google’s rivals. This paper discusses search neutrality as an antitrust principle, and then comments on the current investigation based on publicly available information. The paper provides a critical assessment of the likely tests that will be used for the definition of the relevant product market, the criteria for the finding of dominance, the anticompetitive foreclosure test and the possible remedies that the European Commission might choose. Overall, and regardless of the outcome of the Google case, the paper argues that the current treatment of exclusionary abuses in Internet markets is in urgent need of a number of important clarifications, and has been in this condition for more than a decade. The hope is that the European Commission will resist the temptation to imbue the antitrust case with an emphasis and meaning that have nothing to do with antitrust (from industrial policy motives to privacy, copyright or media law arguments) and that, on the contrary, the Commission will devote its efforts to sharpening its understanding of dynamic competition in cyberspace, and the tools that should be applied in the analysis of these peculiar, fast-changing and often elusive settings

Google’s Antitrust Cases Competition Analysis in New Economy Markets

Today, global economic performance largely depends on digital ecosystems. E-commerce, cloud, social media, sharing economy are the main products of the modern innovative economic systems which are constantly raising new regulatory questions. Meanwhile the United States has an unimpeachable dominance in innovation and new technologies, as well as a large and open domestic market, the EU is only recently discovering the importance of empowering the European digital economy and aims to break down its highly fragmented cross-border online economic environment. As global economy is rapidly becoming digital, Europe’s effort to create and invest in common digital market is understandable. The comprehensive investigations launched by the European Commission into the role of social network, search engine, or sharing economy internet platforms, which are new generation technologies dominated by American firms; or the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union declaring that the Commission’s US Safe Harbor Decision is invalid1 might be considered as part of an anti-American protectionist policy. However, these measures could rather be seen as part of a broader trend to foster European enterprises in technology developments

Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal

Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Dea

Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal

Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Dea