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Tracking brain dynamics across transitions of consciousness
How do we lose and regain consciousness? The space between healthy wakefulness and
unconsciousness encompasses a series of gradual and rapid changes in brain activity. In this
thesis, I investigate computational measures applicable to the electroencephalogram to
quantify the loss and recovery of consciousness from the perspective of modern theoretical
frameworks. I examine three different transitions of consciousness caused by natural,
pharmacological and pathological factors: sleep, sedation and coma.
First, I investigate the neural dynamics of falling asleep. By combining the established
methods of phase-lag brain connectivity and EEG microstates in a group of healthy subjects,
a unique microstate is identified, whose increased duration predicts behavioural
unresponsiveness to auditory stimuli during drowsiness. This microstate also uniquely
captures an increase in frontoparietal theta connectivity, a putative marker of the loss of
consciousness prior to sleep onset.
I next examine the loss of behavioural responsiveness in healthy subjects undergoing mild
and moderate sedation. The Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm is employed to compute
signal complexity and symbolic mutual information to assess information integration. An
intriguing dissociation between responsiveness and drug level in blood during sedation is
revealed: responsiveness is best predicted by the temporal complexity of the signal at single-
channel and low-frequency integration, whereas drug level is best predicted by the
complexity of spatial patterns and high-frequency integration.
Finally, I investigate brain connectivity in the overnight EEG recordings of a group of
patients in acute coma. Graph theory is applied on alpha, theta and delta networks to find
that increased variability in delta network integration early after injury predicts the eventual
coma recovery score. A case study is also described where the re-emergence of frontoparietal
connectivity predicted a full recovery long before behavioural improvement.
The findings of this thesis inform prospective clinical applications for tracking states of
consciousness and advance our understanding of the slow and fast brain dynamics
underlying its transitions. Collating these findings under a common theoretical framework, I
argue that the diversity of dynamical states, in particular in temporal domain, and
information integration across brain networks are fundamental in sustaining consciousness.My PhD was funded by the Cambridge Trust and a MariaMarina award from Lucy Cavendish College
Ongoing Spontaneous Activity Controls Access to Consciousness: A Neuronal Model for Inattentional Blindness
Even in the absence of sensory inputs, cortical and thalamic neurons can show structured patterns of ongoing spontaneous activity, whose origins and functional significance are not well understood. We use computer simulations to explore the conditions under which spontaneous activity emerges from a simplified model of multiple interconnected thalamocortical columns linked by long-range, top-down excitatory axons, and to examine its interactions with stimulus-induced activation. Simulations help characterize two main states of activity. First, spontaneous gamma-band oscillations emerge at a precise threshold controlled by ascending neuromodulator systems. Second, within a spontaneously active network, we observe the sudden “ignition” of one out of many possible coherent states of high-level activity amidst cortical neurons with long-distance projections. During such an ignited state, spontaneous activity can block external sensory processing. We relate those properties to experimental observations on the neural bases of endogenous states of consciousness, and particularly the blocking of access to consciousness that occurs in the psychophysical phenomenon of “inattentional blindness,” in which normal subjects intensely engaged in mental activity fail to notice salient but irrelevant sensory stimuli. Although highly simplified, the generic properties of a minimal network may help clarify some of the basic cerebral phenomena underlying the autonomy of consciousness