A Counterexample to Modus Ponenses

McGee argued that modus ponens was invalid for the natural language conditional ‘If…then…’. Many subsequent responses have argued that, while McGee’s examples show that modus ponens fails to preserve truth, they do not show that modus ponens fails to preserve rational full acceptance, and thus modus ponens may still be valid in the latter informational sense. I show that when we turn our attention from indicative conditionals to subjunctive conditionals, we find that modus ponens does not preserve either truth or rational full acceptance, and thus is not valid in either sense. In concluding I briefly consider how we can account for these facts

Double-Negation Elimination in Some Propositional Logics

This article answers two questions (posed in the literature), each concerning the guaranteed existence of proofs free of double negation. A proof is free of double negation if none of its deduced steps contains a term of the form n(n(t)) for some term t, where n denotes negation. The first question asks for conditions on the hypotheses that, if satisfied, guarantee the existence of a double-negation-free proof when the conclusion is free of double negation. The second question asks about the existence of an axiom system for classical propositional calculus whose use, for theorems with a conclusion free of double negation, guarantees the existence of a double-negation-free proof. After giving conditions that answer the first question, we answer the second question by focusing on the Lukasiewicz three-axiom system. We then extend our studies to infinite-valued sentential calculus and to intuitionistic logic and generalize the notion of being double-negation free. The double-negation proofs of interest rely exclusively on the inference rule condensed detachment, a rule that combines modus ponens with an appropriately general rule of substitution. The automated reasoning program OTTER played an indispensable role in this study.Comment: 32 pages, no figure

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information

The deduction theorem for strong propositional proof systems

This paper focuses on the deduction theorem for propositional logic. We define and investigate different deduction properties and show that the presence of these deduction properties for strong proof systems is powerful enough to characterize the existence of optimal and even polynomially bounded proof systems. We also exhibit a similar, but apparently weaker condition that implies the existence of complete disjoint NP-pairs. In particular, this yields a sufficient condition for the completeness of the canonical pair of Frege systems and provides a general framework for the search for complete NP-pairs

Directional Bias

There is almost a consensus among conditional experts that indicative conditionals are not material. Their thought hinges on the idea that if indicative conditionals were material, A → B could be vacuously true when A is false, even if B would be false in a context where A is true. But since this consequence is implausible, the material account is usually regarded as false. It is argued that this point of view is motivated by the grammatical form of conditional sentences and the symbols used to represent their logical form, which misleadingly suggest a one-way inferential direction from A to B. That conditional sentences mislead us into a directionality bias is a phenomenon that is well-documented in the literature about conditional reasoning. It is argued that this directional appearance is deceptive and does not reflect the underlying truth conditions of conditional sentences. This directional bias is responsible for both the unpopularity of the material account of conditionals and some of the main alternative principles and themes in conditional theory, including the Ramsey’s test, the Equation, Adams’ thesis, conditional-assertion and possible world theories. The directional mindset forgets a hard- earned lesson that made classical logic possible in the first place, namely, that grammatical form of sentences can mislead us about its truth conditions. There is a case to be made for a material account of indicative conditionals when we break the domination of words over the human mind

Intuitionistic computability logic

Computability logic (CL) is a systematic formal theory of computational tasks and resources, which, in a sense, can be seen as a semantics-based alternative to (the syntactically introduced) linear logic. With its expressive and flexible language, where formulas represent computational problems and "truth" is understood as algorithmic solvability, CL potentially offers a comprehensive logical basis for constructive applied theories and computing systems inherently requiring constructive and computationally meaningful underlying logics. Among the best known constructivistic logics is Heyting's intuitionistic calculus INT, whose language can be seen as a special fragment of that of CL. The constructivistic philosophy of INT, however, has never really found an intuitively convincing and mathematically strict semantical justification. CL has good claims to provide such a justification and hence a materialization of Kolmogorov's known thesis "INT = logic of problems". The present paper contains a soundness proof for INT with respect to the CL semantics. A comprehensive online source on CL is available at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.htm