Towards a richer model of deliberation dialogue : closure problem and change of circumstances

This research was partially supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant 435-2012-0104. This research was also partially supported by the award made by the RCUK Digital Economy program to the dot.rural Digital Economy Hub at the University of Aberdeen; award ref. : EP/G066051/1. Further refinements of this work were supported by the SICSA PECE scheme.Models of deliberative dialogue are fundamental for developing autonomous systems that support human practical reasoning. The question discussed in this paper is whether existing models are able to capture the complexity and richness of natural deliberation. In real-world contexts, circumstances relevant to the decision can change rapidly. We reflect on today's leading model of deliberation dialogue and we propose an extension to capture how newly exchanged information about changing circumstances may shape the dialogue.Moreover, in natural deliberation, a dialogue may be successful even if a decision on what to do has not been made. A set of criteria is proposed to address the problem of when to close off the practical reasoning phase of dialogue. We discuss some measures for evaluating the success of a dialogue after closure and we present some initial efforts to introduce the new deliberation features within an existing model of agent dialogue. We believe that our extended model of dialogue may contribute to representing that richness of natural deliberative dialogue that is yet to be addressed in existing models of agent deliberation.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Simulating Realistic Social and Individual Behavior in Agent Societies

While the value of simulations as a tool in the natural sciences has been realized for quite some time, its potential in the social sciences is only beginning to be explored. A class of simulations used to study social behavior and phenomena is known as social simulations. One particular type of social simulation is known as agent based social simulation. Here agents are used to model social entities such as people, groups and towns. A purpose of these models is to reproduce realistic behavior in the simulation which is then used to draw conclusions about the corresponding real world entities. However reproducing realistic behavior is a difficult task. This is in part due to the fact that human actions and interactions do not adhere to well defined rules. A successful solution to this problem must reproduce realistic individual decision making as well as realistic social interactions. We propose two models. First, a model for producing realistic decision making is based off human intuition and deliberation. This model is tested in the Iterative Ultimatum Game and Bargaining Game. It is shown that when agents use both intuitive and deliberative decision making they make decisions similar to those of human subjects. Next we propose a realistic model for social interactions. Our agents remain selfish and are able to break relationships in order to maximize their utility. It is shown that when agents are able to break unrewarding relationships that a Pareto‐optimum strategy arises as the social convention. In addition we conclude the rate and amount of Pareto‐optimum strategy that arises is dependent on the network structure when the networks are dynamic and the rate is independent of the network structure when the networks are static

Carnap, Explication, and Social History

A. W. Carus champions Rudolf Carnap’s ideal of explication as a model for liberal political deliberation. Constructing a linguistic framework for discussing social problems, he argues, promotes the resolution of our disputes. To flesh out and assess this proposal, I examine debate about the social institutions of marriage and adoption. Against Carus, I argue that not all citizens would accept the pragmatic principles underlying Carnap’s ideal. Nevertheless, explication may facilitate inquiry in the social sciences and be used to create models that help us to understand past disputes. This latter application reveals explication’s potential for refining the social histories that inform contemporary political discourse

The Social Epistemology of Consensus and Dissent

This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations ‎between ‎knowledge ‎and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their ‎own, but ‎also have ‎practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ‎role in ‎informing public ‎decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. ‎When is a ‎consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may ‎we ‎legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise ‎epistemically ‎justified? Should consensus be the aim of scientific inquiry, and if so, what ‎kind of ‎consensus? How should dissent be handled? It is argued that a legitimate inference ‎that a ‎theory is correct from the fact that there is a scientific consensus on it requires taking ‎into ‎consideration both cognitive properties of the theory as well as social properties of ‎the ‎consensus. The last section of the paper reviews computational models of ‎consensus ‎formation.

Supporting public decision making in policy deliberations: An ontological approach

This is the post-print version of the Paper. The official published version can be accessed from the link below - Copyright @ 2011 SpringerSupporting public decision making in policy deliberations has been a key objective of eParticipation which is an emerging area of eGovernment. EParticipation aims to enhance citizen involvement in public governance activities through the use of information and communication technologies. An innovative approach towards this objective is exploiting the potentials of semantic web technologies centred on conceptual knowledge models in the form of ontologies. Ontologies are generally defined as explicit human and computer shared views on the world of particular domains. In this paper, the potentials and benefits of using ontologies for policy deliberation processes are discussed. Previous work is then extended and synthesised to develop a deliberation ontology. The ontology aims to define the necessary semantics in order to structure and interrelate the stages and various activities of deliberation processes with legal information, participant stakeholders and their associated arguments. The practical implications of the proposed framework are illustrated.This work is funded by the European Commission under the 2006/1 eParticipation call

THE IMAGINATIVE REHEARSAL MODEL – DEWEY, EMBODIED SIMULATION, AND THE NARRATIVE HYPOTHESIS

In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct Dewey's notion of imaginative rehearsal in light of contemporary, competing models of intersubjectivity such as embodied simulation theory and the narrative practice hypothesis, and argue that the Deweyan model offers us a more encompassing framework which can be useful for reconciling these approaches. In this text I am mainly concerned with sketching a broad picture of the lines along which such a project could be developed. For this reason not all questions are given equal attention, and I shall concentrate mainly on the basic ideas, without going directly into the details of many of them

The evolution of morality and the end of economic man

1871 saw the publication of two major treatises in economics, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and contained a powerful argument that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. Essentially this stance is supported by modern research. This paper considers the nature of morality and how it has evolved. It reconciles Darwin's notion that a developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other view that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically-inherited basis. The social role of morality and its difference with altruism is illustrated by an agent-based simulation. The fact that humans combine both moral and selfish dispositions has major implications for the social sciences and obliges us to abandon the pre-eminent notion of selfish economic man. Economic policy must take account of our moral nature.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Cognitive coherence in the evluation of a novel single item

Article published in Judgement and Decision-Makin

Embodied cognition and temporally extended agency

According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents have denied this. I will argue that there is another important representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked in this debate: temporally extended planning agency. In particular, I will argue that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be explained without the ascription of mental representations, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the absent and abstract can. We will see that this is a serious challenge for the radical as well as the more modest anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see that modest anti-representationalism is an unstable position