Do Individuals Recognize Cascade Behavior of Others? - An Experimental Study -

In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al., 1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants' probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the more coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these predictions. Individual price patterns of more than two thirds of the participants indicate that cascade behavior of predecessors is not recognized.Information Cascades, Bayes' Rule, Decision Under Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics.

Computational and Mathematical Modelling of the EGF Receptor System

This chapter gives an overview of computational and mathematical modelling of the EGF receptor system. It begins with a survey of motivations for producing such models, then describes the main approaches that are taken to carrying out such modelling, viz. differential equations and individual-based modelling. Finally, a number of projects that applying modelling and simulation techniques to various aspects of the EGF receptor system are described

Error Cascades in Observational Learning: An Experiment on the Chinos Game

The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence, each of whom wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody’s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we rationalize by way of a simple model of “noisy equilibrium”.positional learning, error cascades

Characterizing Attention Cascades in WhatsApp Groups

An important political and social phenomena discussed in several countries, like India and Brazil, is the use of WhatsApp to spread false or misleading content. However, little is known about the information dissemination process in WhatsApp groups. Attention affects the dissemination of information in WhatsApp groups, determining what topics or subjects are more attractive to participants of a group. In this paper, we characterize and analyze how attention propagates among the participants of a WhatsApp group. An attention cascade begins when a user asserts a topic in a message to the group, which could include written text, photos, or links to articles online. Others then propagate the information by responding to it. We analyzed attention cascades in more than 1.7 million messages posted in 120 groups over one year. Our analysis focused on the structural and temporal evolution of attention cascades as well as on the behavior of users that participate in them. We found specific characteristics in cascades associated with groups that discuss political subjects and false information. For instance, we observe that cascades with false information tend to be deeper, reach more users, and last longer in political groups than in non-political groups.Comment: Accepted as a full paper at the 11th International ACM Web Science Conference (WebSci 2019). Please cite the WebSci versio

A structured approach for the engineering of biochemical network models, illustrated for signalling pathways

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bib/bbn026Quantitative models of biochemical networks (signal transduction cascades, metabolic pathways, gene regulatory circuits) are a central component of modern systems biology. Building and managing these complex models is a major challenge that can benefit from the application of formal methods adopted from theoretical computing science. Here we provide a general introduction to the field of formal modelling, which emphasizes the intuitive biochemical basis of the modelling process, but is also accessible for an audience with a background in computing science and/or model engineering. We show how signal transduction cascades can be modelled in a modular fashion, using both a qualitative approach { Qualitative Petri nets, and quantitative approaches { Continuous Petri Nets and Ordinary Differential Equations. We review the major elementary building blocks of a cellular signalling model, discuss which critical design decisions have to be made during model building, and present ..

On SARS type economic effects during infectious disease outbreaks

Infectious disease outbreaks can exact a high human and economic cost through illness and death. But, as with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in East Asia in 2003, or the plague outbreak in Surat, India, in 1994, they can also create severe economic disruptions even when there is, ultimately, relatively little illness or death. Such disruptions are commonly the result of uncoordinated and panicky efforts by individuals to avoid becoming infected, of preventive activity. This paper places these"SARS type"effects in the context of research on economic epidemiology, in which behavioral responses to disease risk have both economic and epidemiological consequences. The paper looks in particular at how people form subjective probability judgments about disease risk. Public opinion surveys during the SARS outbreak provide suggestive evidence that people did indeed at times hold excessively high perceptions of the risk of becoming infected, or, if infected, of dying from the disease. The paper discusses research in behavioral economics and the theory of information cascades that may shed light on the origin of such biases. The authors consider whether public information strategies can help reduce unwarranted panic. A preliminary question is why governments often seem to have strong incentives to conceal information about infectious disease outbreaks. The paper reviews recent game-theoretic analysis that clarifies government incentives. An important finding is that government incentives to conceal decline the more numerous are non-official sources of information about a possible disease outbreak. The findings suggest that honesty may indeed be the best public policy under modern conditions of easy mass global communications.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Disease Control&Prevention,Population Policies,Hazard Risk Management,Gender and Health