19,986 research outputs found
Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revision and Update
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In
recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief
update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern,
1997), we introduce a new framework to model belief change. This framework
combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a notion of plausibility,
allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper, we show
how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This
allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better
understand the principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno
and Mendelzon's notion of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on
several strong assumptions that may limit its applicability in artificial
intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to identify a notion of minimal
change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations including
revision and update.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for other files accompanying this articl
Belief Revision in Science: Informational Economy and Paraconsistency
In the present paper, our objective is to examine the application of belief revision models to scientific rationality. We begin by considering the standard model AGM, and along the way a number of problems surface that make it seem inadequate for this specific application. After considering three different heuristics of informational economy that seem fit for science, we consider some possible adaptations for it and argue informally that, overall, some paraconsistent models seem to better satisfy these principles, following Testa (2015). These models have been worked out in formal detail by Testa, Cogniglio, & Ribeiro (2015, 2017)
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